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Shevardnadze Gives Speech on 'Sensitive' Problems

LD1804132890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1155 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 April (TASS)—At the 21st party conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of his standing as candidate delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs devoted his speech to "sensitive" problems of Soviet foreign and internal policy.

A summary of his speech is published today by 'LITERATURNAYA GAZETA'.

Noting that "the main basic aim" of Soviet foreign policy in the years of perestroyka has been "the creation of the maximum favorable conditions for the internal transformations in the country," Eduard Shevardnadze said that today "external circumstances are nowhere an obstacle to our perestroyka." "On the contrary," he declared, "we have essentially steady, stable relations with all states of the world without exception."

Speaking of the events in East Europe, the minister pointed out that since the shocks which had occurred there, the Soviet Union "maintains fairly good business relations with the allied countries." From these shocks, he added, "we have emerged with dignity, maintaining good prospects for the development of political and commercial-economic relations and for the appearance of new equitable relations of mutual respect."

Noting Soviet people's concern in connection with German affairs, the minister said that "Soviet diplomacy has ensured itself the rights and opportunities to influence the solution of the German question." "We are well aware," he pointed out, "that we must find a solution which will give it (the Soviet people) the confidence that a fresh military threat will not come to us from German soil."

As the most important and crucial job for Soviet foreign policy at the current stage Eduard Shevardnadze defined "the creation, together with other states, of a new system of security in Europe." "We are sure," he stressed, "that this will prove possible on the basis of the all-European process, the Helsinki Final Act."

Stressing that at the present moment it really has proved possible to put back the threat of war, the "cold war" is becoming a thing of the past, military arsenals and military spending are being reduced, levels of nations' militarization are falling, and military confrontation is receding, Eduard Shevardnadze indicated at the same time that this is only the start of the road. "We have no right to slacken our efforts to stop the arms race, to give up our plans to build new international relations," he declared. "The new political thinking is operating. Continuing to perfect its instruments, we are obliged to develop an effective concept of new economic thinking and nature conservation thinking. Links with science and the adoption of the intellectual potential of the country and the world into our everyday life are as vital as ever for us. 'Third World' problems require more serious attention."

German Unification Options Examined

PM1804155090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15, 15 Apr 90 p 12

[Article by Dmitriy Danilov, senior research associate of the Institute of Europe of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The Search for the Ideal Compromise. Non-Standard Scenario for German Unification"]

[Text] The solution of many problems in the rebuilding of Europe now depends on the form and speed of German unification. Of special importance are military-political and purely military aspects of unification. Mounting East-West understanding and the ability to reach a compromise have unfortunately not yet extended to solution of the German problem.

It is still being discussed, I believe, by the method of "tug-of-war"—that of bringing the opponent closer to one's own viewpoint. The issue is very serious, the stakes are high; each strives to keep his position, nobody wants to take a risk. Perhaps, there is some logic in this. Indeed, by the logic of military competition the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO] must try to achieve a balance, of forces favourable to them. But there are two objections to such an approach.

Firstly, this is the balance of forces. Whatever form it takes after the unification of Germany, it cannot ensure stability and safety within the European security system owing to the inherent principle of military competition. Any compromise attained between East and West will be without a firm basis. It will resemble an adjourned chess game to be continued at a later date.

Secondly, owing to the special historical importance of the changes taking place today in the heart of Europe, there is the need to envisage the broad prospects for European development and what role Germany will play in this. In determining the future military political character of Germany, the "tug-of-war" policy is, on the contrary, short-sighted, proceeding as it does from established East-West confrontation and not from the need to overcome such confrontation. This poses a serious contradiction, since the Warsaw Treaty as well as NATO countries declare the policy of amending the unnatural split of Europe—this is the main content of the idea of the European home.

This contradiction will disappear if the unification of Germany is regarded not as a challenge to the European security system but as a unique, historic possibility for the break-up of its former obsolete and confrontational structures and the transition to new ones.

In discussion of the European security problem with regard to German unification the possibility of German revanchism is much debated. Some maintain that this may become a reality since the unification and strengthening of an independent Germany creates a favourable breed ground for ideas of pan-Germanism. Others object, saying that a "satiated" country which has attained a high level of democracy is no longer capable of giving birth to the monster of militarism. But it seems to me that such dispute is pointless. The establishment of European security cannot be based on assumptions, even though they may be realistic and well-founded. Such assumptions are insufficient for serious politicians and, moreover, for people who suffered fascism under Hitler. Guarantees are needed.

The withdrawal of Germany from NATO and Warsaw Treaty military structures would obviously correspond to this aim to cease confrontation between these two blocs. The participation of Germany in the political process of shaping the new European security system may be achieved in different ways. But the special place assigned to Germany in this process makes its membership in the political organizations of both blocs fairly attractive and quite logical. Thereby, being militarily neutral, Germany would be granted political guarantees of security from the two blocs and the possibility to play an active part in European policies. At the same time, such double membership would be a permanent and durable bridge making it possible to bring together the military-political interests of both East and West and, above all, with regard to the unifying Germany.

Such a scenario makes it possible in principle to go further and establish joint political institutions between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, naturally with the participation of Germany. They would probably best correspond to the attainment of a collective and reliable security balance on the continent. They could greatly contribute to its contractual-legal guarantees, especially the international aspect, as well as control over the inviolability of European frontiers.

But will political and juridical guarantees be sufficient? In the world today even the most radical pacifist wouldn't like to give a positive answer. For the time being (unfortunately!) military guarantees are also necessary. But they mustn't be associated with the confrontation of the two blocs. If NATO-WTO relations in the military-political sphere are described by the formula "cooperation for security", then why, by spreading it to the purely military sphere, should we not look for non-standard ways of creating joint military guarantees?

For example, the following version is possible. The NATO and WTO countries are forming a joint military contingent stationed on the territory of Germany. The UN peace-keeping force has already served to uphold international military guarantees.

The joint contingent should no longer be under the command of individual countries and blocs. Military command of such an independent formation would report to a competent joint organization of the two blocs. But the best guarantees of German security lie not in the strength of the international contingent of troops (obviously it should not be great), but in its existence.

In assessing how realistic the proposed military-political and military transformations in Europe really are, one should not keep silent about the vague nature of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in future. However, no matter what changes may occur, the essence of the problem remains the same, i.e. to ensure reliable guarantees of European security, taking into consideration the modern military confrontation of NATO either with the WTO in one form or another, or with the USSR. Besides, common interest of the WTO countries in the solution of this problem will possibly give this organization a new lease of life.

A new security system is only the aim to which the settlement of the German issue must correspond. The aim but not the preliminary condition. Movement to it may be slower compared with other trends of German-German development and may include intermediate stages. Let's assume that if an agreement is reached on the deployment in Germany of the joint military contingent of NATO and the WTO, the temporary presence of the troops of NATO countries and the USSR on German territory may be an intermediate measure. But now that their presence is regarded as an independent and not intermediary solution of the issue on military guarantees of security, its efficiency is doubtful.

Maybe the proposed version has its shortcomings, like other proposals. Often the interests of future neighbours regarding the European home differ. But all their problems will be successfully solved by the transition to a new reliable system of European security.

United States & Canada

'Turn for Worse' Possible in U.S.-USSR Ties

PM1804163090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Shalnev report: "The Situation Over Lithuania: Threat or Bluff?"]

[Text] New York—I do not want to appear pessimistic, but the events of recent days suggest that a turn for the worse could be on the way in Soviet-American relations.

I am talking about the events concerning Lithuania. At one time the Washington administration preferred not to talk about them aloud, or if it did talk, only behind the scenes. The most typical public comment was: "No comment."

The situation is changing. This became clear in Bermuda, where at the end of last week President Bush and British Prime Minister Thatcher, holding a press conference on the results of their bilateral talks, expressed profound concern over how the Kremlin is reacting to what is happening in Lithuania.

On Tuesday there was another comment, very brief in form, but still saying a great deal about the mood which, to all appearances, prevails in the White House. The President stated that the administration is studying options for an "appropriate response" to be given to Moscow in the event that the Soviet Government carries out its promise and stops deliveries to Lithuania of goods and raw materials that are sold on foreign markets for freely convertible currency.

It would be naive to assume that the administration has only just started looking for possible responses. The search has been on for a long time. Outward silence does not by any means indicate inner calm. Possible actions began to be stockpiled, according to informed sources, even before the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet proclaimed Lithuania's independence.

The question now is, will the Bush administration resort to measures which in principle can be considered ready and which probably only remain to be sorted and numbered in order of preference?

Before trying to answer this question, let me say that the range of "retributive" measures is fairly wide, from slowing down the pace of talks on trade questions to canceling the Soviet-American summit meeting scheduled for the end of May and beginning of June in Washington. This whole range was mentioned—hypothetically—by George Mitchell, leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, who had just returned from Moscow where a delegation of senators headed by him had met with M.S. Gorbachev.

But it seems to me that the most aggressive measure, so to speak—that is, the cancelation of the summit meeting—is hardly likely to be brought out of the stores. By doing this Bush would be contradicting himself as a politician and statesman. When he finally agreed on the timing of the summit meeting, Bush—like President Gorbachev, to all appearances—could not have failed to see that results comparable, say, to the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles can hardly be counted on.

In particular, contrary to earlier public predictions, made last fall in Wyoming at the talks between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and later repeated in Malta. [sentence as published] Recently there has no longer been any question of signing a strategic arms treaty in Washington. At best it is only a question of initialing it, with certain key elements of the treaty being left "for later," for further coordination: There are too many difficulties and complexities, the differences between the sides' positions on certain cardinal parameters of the strategic arms reduction process are still too significant, and too little time remains for smoothing out difficulties and eliminating differences.

When he agreed on the timing of the meeting, which was "brought forward," in relation to earlier indications, by two weeks, Bush, quite understandably, was acting not so much on the basis of the desire to mark the meeting with some kind of agreement without fail, as on the basis of the desire simply to sit at the same table with the Soviet leader and there, face to face, discuss the large number of problems that remain or have accumulated since Malta. To discuss them, and to outline ways of resolving them or ways of making them less acute.

Bush's presidential style is to work face to face with other world leaders, to work in—preferably—an informal atmosphere, without a rigid agenda and without the absolute necessity to sign some kind of accord come what may. Probably no other president in U.S. history has held so many meetings with foreign premiers and presidents in such a short time in the White House. Only very rarely have these talks ended in agreements. But few people would think of describing them as fruitless.

In preparing to meet with Gorbachev, Bush is counting first and foremost, it seems to me, on hearing "from the horse's mouth" about what is happening in the Soviet Union and reaching an understanding of what the Soviet leadership wants—whether it is a question of Lithuania or of economic reforms—and how it would like to realize these aspirations. At the same time the forthcoming summit meeting is an opportunity for Bush to explain in detail to the Soviet leader what the administration thinks and how it perceives Moscow's actions and words, and to explain things that at the moment the White House and State Department do not want to talk about too much or too loudly.

In other words, talks with Gorbachev are too valuable for the American President as a source of information and a source of explanations, valuable as a means of reaching greater mutual understanding with the Soviet leader, too valuable for Bush to renounce them and burn his bridges—that is not his style. And if the summit meeting were to be broken off, the bridges would indeed be burned, and at the same time the way back to the "cold war" would be opened up.

It must be observed that demands for a hard line have begun to be heard in America's business circles, too. Only the other day Lewis Du Pont Smith, one of the heirs to the Du Pont family, announced that at the annual meeting of the concern's shareholders, to be held around 20 April, he will seek a decision on the "suspension of all economic and financial operations" with the Soviet Union—until, the statement says, the USSR recognizes the republic's sovereign rights. Let me remind you that last year "Du Pont's" trade turnover with the USSR amounted to several hundred million dollars.

Indisputably, there is no unanimity on this score in business circles. There are plenty of influential figures who speak rather critically about what the Lithuanian Government has done, and who will not entertain the very idea of any economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. But you can hardly fail to notice that, as THE WASHINGTON POST reported on Tuesday, a whole series of Soviet-American talks on trade and economic questions could be jeopardized. The newspaper's source for this information was high-ranking and, of course, anonymous officials of the administration. The same information was reported—once again, by reputable officials—to NBC television.

What is this—a warning, a threat, a bluff? I suspect it is both a warning and a threat. In all probability we will find out whether or not I am right in the next few days.

Pessimism Over U.S.-USSR Ties 'Groundless'

PM1804133590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Manki Ponomarev "Observer's Notes": "Was There Any Need To Sow Panic"]

[Text] A week has passed since the end of the Soviet foreign minister's visit to Washington, but the vigorous discussion of its results and the state of Soviet-U.S. relations in general is still going on. The words "unwarranted hopes" are the main theme of individual comments on this score. Even some U.S. officials are venturing to comment in this vein. Here is what White House Press Secretary Fitzwater said: "There is no doubt that we are disappointed at the results of the ministers' meeting."

But some U.S. press organs have plainly panicked. They write that the talks produced little, that there is almost a crisis emerging in USSR-U.S. relations, and that these relations have lost their predictability and stability.

Such moods sometimes infiltrate the mass media in other countries, too. Even one respected Soviet newspaper ventured to headline a report on the results of the meetings between E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker in these terms: "It is good that it was not worse."

Are there grounds for such pessimism? Clearly not. During the Washington talks a most important accord was reached on the date of USSR President Gorbachev's visit to the United States. It should be a major milestone in Soviet-U.S. dialogue and an important element in world politics and make it possible to reach new accords, primarily on questions of arms reduction and disarmament. That is the Soviet side's opinion. President Bush supports it. The forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit, he said, will be a "catalyst" for the process of settling the differences still remaining in the approach to the solution of arms control problems.

The agreement of the date of the forthcoming summit alone would have been enough to justify a positive assessment of the results of the talks between the heads of the two countries' foreign policy departments last week. But it wasn't just the date of the meeting that was agreed. Much work was done in preparation for it and in elaborating the draft agreements which may be adopted and signed. All this shows once more that Soviet-U.S. dialogue helps to strengthen stability. Incidentally, the talk on bilateral relations was particularly productive. An unprecedented number of Soviet-U.S. agreements—around 10—are being elaborated for the upcoming summit and the majority, furthermore, are ready to a high degree. There has also been progress on certain significant aspects of the disarmament process.

Were there difficulties in the talks? Yes, there were. They are inevitable in such a great and complex matter. They were most apparent during the discussion of questions connected with the radical reduction of strategic offensive armaments. That is understandable. The attainment of strategic offensive arms accords touches on the most sensitive problems of the sides' security.

It should be noted here that a new factor has come into play, which hardly affected the course of Soviet-U.S. talks before. I have in mind the need not only for the United States but also the Soviet Union to ensure that the future treaty is ratified. Previously this process was essentially formal in character in our country. The Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was probably the only one subjected to any detailed scrutiny in the USSR Supreme Soviet, but there was no real critical examination of it. Now, however, the USSR Supreme Soviet and its committees are sure to consider all aspects of the future agreement and determine how far it meets the country's interests and whether it undermines its security.

Hence certain complexities which occurred regarding the preparation of the strategic offensive arms treaty at the talks in Washington. The participants in these talks did not consider it necessary to detail them, even though it became known that the main problems arose during the discussion of the question of air- and sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. It is envisaged that there will be a new meeting between E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker in mid-May, at which they hope to resolve a large proportion of the difficulties and find mutually acceptable solutions to the unresolved problems.

There are other factors confirming that the pessimistic assessments of the results of the talks in Washington are groundless. Here I should like to cite the recent speech by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney in Colorado Springs—a speech whose tone and content were untypical of him. He spoke openly about "the Soviet Union's clear desire to end the decades of hostility" and the "tremendous benefit for the future of peace and international security which the USSR's actions bring."

The Pentagon's planned "substantial reduction" in military spending should be considered the "American response," the defense secretary stated. The U.S. President has instructed him to prepare a reduction of the military budget by $231 billion in the next five years so as to be no more than four percent of the country's GNP by 1995, whereas during the years of Reagan's presidency it reached six percent.

Here, surely, is where we should seek a cause of the artificially created panic wave spreading through the pages of the U.S. press. As THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "the Pentagon's budget reductions represent the gravest threat ever to the military subcontractors, who are responding to that threat by aggressive lobbying campaigns in defense of military programs worth hundreds of billions of dollars." Yes, some people would very much like to show that Soviet-U.S. relations have completely ground to a halt and that the USSR's actions are still unpredictable and cannot be trusted.

Of course these relations may be subject to some serious fluctuations and deviations. The process underway is complex, difficult, and contradictory. The forces brought into play are too different—and powerful. Too much is at stake. But that is no reason to panic. All the things which have been done to improve our relations, including our efforts with the U.S. side, should be valued. Because very much depends on Soviet-U.S. mutual understanding and cooperation both for the USSR, the United States, and the whole world.

Secretary Cheney Cited on Reduced War Threat

PM1804174990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Pentagon Chief's Conclusions"]

[Text] Washington, 18 Apr—"The threat of an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union is now the most insignificant it has been since before the start of World War II," U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney has stated. "The current situation in the international arena," he continued, "gives us an opportunity to reduce the armed forces buildup while maintaining U.S. commitments in the military sphere on a world scale."

The Pentagon chief was speaking at a conference of a number of military departments connected with communications and the electronics industry. He reaffirmed the administration's intention to cut U.S. Armed Forces "taking account of the new realities in the world." "It is quite obvious," Cheney stressed, "that we are talking about a significant reduction in the U.S. Army. It will be cut to its lowest level since 1980."

In the U.S. defense secretary's opinion, "the maintenance of the positive trends we have observed in recent months in the Soviet Union and East Europe" will promote the conclusion of agreements on a significant reduction in conventional armed forces, armaments, and strategic arms.

At the same time, Cheney noted the threat of the spread of modern military technology, the appearance in various countries' arsenals of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the development of the potential to produce nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Pentagon chief noted, "there is still a considerable threat to U.S. security, and our task is to provide a strong defense in the nineties."

Baker Cited on U.S. Support for Perestroyka

LD1904085490 Moscow TASS in English 0819 GMT 19 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Alexey Berezhkov]

[Text] Washington April 19 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker confirmed the U.S. desire to help perestroyka in the USSR in his speech at the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee on Wednesday. The speech was devoted to the state of and prospects for trade and economic relations with East European countries and the USSR.

Noting the great difficulties facing those states on the road towards a market economy, he said that the United States should assist them.

Speaking about relations with the Soviet Union, Baker said that the Bush Administration wishes success to perestroyka.

He noted that the United States acclaims the USSR's progress towards principles of democracy, human rights and freedoms, economic freedom, a market economy and a peaceful settlement of conflicts.

However, Americans should be realistic about the influence that the United States can have on perestroyka, the secretary stressed. The U.S. should avoid smooth-tongued calls for direct aid to Moscow.

According to Baker, the best way to help perestroyka and American interests and values is a creative search for mutual benefits in areas that are open for cooperation.

This concerns, above all, the establishment of a united and free Europe, a settlement of regional conflicts, talks on security issues, more efficient agreements on arms control and joint actions in technical and economic cooperation, the secretary noted.

The United States began to realise a program of broad technical cooperation with the Soviets to facilitate the restructuring of their economy, Baker said.

President Bush conveyed a list of possible projects to President Gorbachev at the Malta summit last December. In addition, the U.S. is now studying many other moves to share American experience in several areas, Baker stressed.

Bush Opens Environment Conference 17 Apr

LD1704211190 Moscow TASS in English 2034 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 17 TASS—U.S. President George Bush opened a two-day conference on scientific and economic investigations into global changes in the environment in Washington today.

Not a single country can preserve the earth on its own, the President said, stressing that success in this field can be ensured by global cooperation, as well as by understanding that all peoples live on the same planet.

Representatives from 17 countries, as well as specialists from the United Nations and other international organisations came to Washington to participate in this forum sponsored by the White House.

The Soviet delegation is led by Deputy Prime Minister N. Laverov.

Conference participants are focusing on the influence of human activities on the earth's climate.

Many scientists at the Washington forum believe that, if urgent measures are not taken, the process of changes in the human habitat may become irreversible in several decades.

Receives Conference Participants

LD1804224390 Moscow TASS in English 2230 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 19 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Matyash:

U.S. President George Bush received representatives of 19 countries which participated in a two-day conference on scientific and economic research connected with global environmental changes, in the White House on Wednesday.

The Soviet delegation leader, N. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, expressed the Soviet Government's gratitude to the President for the invitation to take part in this major international forum.

It is noteworthy that the idea of such a conference was expressed by U.S. President during his shipboard meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev off Malta, Laverov said.

The conference regarded with great interest a document submitted by the Soviet delegation. The problem which was discussed these days is of extreme importance not only to the governments and population of many countries but also to the international public at large, the document points out.

The problem of possible negative consequences of environmental changes now calls for a search for mutually acceptable solutions. This is why the recent discussion is of particular importance because it is now difficult for any one country to find a solution to the problem, says the document.

Joint, coordinated and balanced efforts of the international community are necessary including work to overcome economic and technological barriers, since global changes do not recognise political borders, the document points out.

The Soviet delegation had a warm meeting with Frank Press, president of the U.N. National Academy of Sciences. The two sides were gratified to point to a growing Soviet-American dialogue on transnational issues, emphasising the importance of a United Nations conference on the environment and development, which is to be held in 1992.

New approaches to stimulating and broadening bilateral cooperation in scientific, technical and ecological fields, including high-level expert consultations, were discussed.

Frank Press told TASS that he regarded optimistically prospects for expansion of U.S. Soviet cooperation which has a long record.

He said bilateral cooperation covered such important areas as scientific elaborations in the field of transport and energy, the exploration of the world ocean, space research, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Arctic exploration, and the development of an artificial heart. He said he hoped for further development of bilateral cooperation and growing ties between the two countries' academies of sciences.

China

Li Peng's Upcoming Visit to USSR Discussed

OW1804103490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Li Peng, premier of the Chinese State Council, will begin his official visit to the Soviet Union in a few days, on 23 April. Our station commentator Nikolayev writes:

During a recent meeting in Beijing with a delegation of Soviet journalists, the head of the Chinese Government stressed that China wishes to expand its relations of friendship and good-neighborliness with the Soviet Union. Li Peng said: These relations have great significance in maintaining peace and development in the Far East and the world. The peoples of our two countries should get along peacefully and amiably.

It is also the wish of the Soviet people to get along peacefully and amiably with China. I am not mistaken when I say that all the conditions for this are present. The Soviet-Chinese summit in May last year marked an end to the unpleasant past in our relations. Using the words of the Chinese people, it signified an end to the past and the opening of the future.

In a press conference on 16 April, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations is the most important achievement in the restructuring of international relations. Behind these words, I see the nonideological nature of Soviet-Chinese relations. Historic experience and present realities tell people that relations between the Soviet Union and China will be built more solidly and reliably upon the basis of the mutually recognized principle of peaceful coexistence. This is a precondition for avoiding all kinds of misunderstandings and abnormal incidents in the future.

Li Peng, premier of the Chinese State Council, also spoke very clearly about this. He noted: Even if the Soviet people were to no longer consider socialism ideal for the Soviet Union, we would still maintain normal state relations with your country on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

We have not abandoned socialism. Like the People's Republic of China, which will not discard socialism, our two countries are embarking on a similar mission of consolidating and reforming socialism, and improving it in order to meet the demands of our time.

The Soviet Union and China have different timetables, but this should not be an obstacle for expanding the relations of good neighborliness and cooperation. In our bilateral contacts, we are fulfilling the agreement reached during the summit last May.

In his press conference, the Soviet foreign minister said: In general, this will help to expand economic and technological cooperation, overcome military antagonism, and resolve border problems, and will lead to the possibility of discussion on mutual cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Soviet-Chinese meetings are the correct path towards better understanding of each other's experiences and views on international issues of mutual interest.

The visit to Moscow by the head of the Chinese Government will advance the development of Soviet-Chinese relations—about this there is no doubt.

Liaoning Economic Delegation Arrives in Moscow

PM1804140590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Visit by PRC Delegation"]

[Text] A delegation from the Liaoning Province (PRC) Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, headed by Commission Deputy Chairman Wang Benhua, arrived in Moscow 16 April at the invitation of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Foreign Ministry. The delegation will have talks at Russian ministries and departments on specific questions concerning the expansion of economic cooperation between the RSFSR and Liaoning Province.

The delegation had a conversation with RSFSR Foreign Minister V.M. Vinogradov. They discussed the present state and future development prospects of diverse friendly ties between the Russian Federation and Liaoning Province. They noted the substantial expansion of this cooperation in the economic, cultural, and health care spheres in the last few years.

Song Ping Receives CPSU Delegation 16 Apr

OW1704134090 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Song Ping, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, received a delegation from the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, which is headed by Fedorov, first deputy head of the department, at the Great Hall of the People on Monday [16 April].

During the meeting, Song Ping said that since the normalization of relations between the CPSU and the CPC last year, bilateral contacts have developed in a smooth and satisfactory manner.

He said that Premier Li Peng's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union will be conducive to the development of relations between the two parties and two countries.

The delegation from the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee arrived in China on 8 April in accordance with a protocol on exchanges between the CPSU and the CPC.

China Examined on Anniversary of Tiananmen

PM1804112790 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 15, 15 Apr 90 p 13

[Political scientist Viktor Kladov article: "China's Quest for Stability. The Future of Reform After the Tiananmen Square Events"]

[Text] Beijing-Moscow—It will soon be the first anniversary of the tragic night when tanks from the 27th Army burst into Beijing's Tiananmen Square to "impose order." Data about the number of those who died that night are contradictory. Figures of 2,000, 8,000, and even 10,000 were cited. We are hardly likely to ever learn the exact number. It is, however, possible to trace the effect these events have had on the country's subsequent life.

After the Tragedy

A wave of arrests and executions of "active participants in the counterrevolutionary insurgency" rolled over the country immediately after the mass disturbances in Beijing were put down. A line of stifling all dissidence and restoring "lost ideals" and a rigid system of power in the country was adopted. The Chinese press embarked on proving the "antisocialist bourgeois nature" of the policy pursued by people close to former General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. According to the Chinese press, it was these people, "detesting socialism and dreaming of the restoration of capitalism," who were behind the participants in disturbances in Beijing, it was they who "turned the student demonstrations into a counterrevolutionary insurgency."

State Council Premier Li Peng, who claimed just a few days before the June 1989 events that "the actions by patriotic students who advocate democracy and are against corruption will have a positive effect on the government organs' work," outlined the essence of the events which occurred almost a year ago as follows at the recent NPC [National People's Congress] session: "An extremely tiny number of people, advocating bourgeois liberalism, political pluralism, and a multiparty system, actually strove to deny the Communist Party's leading role and to replace the socialist republic by a bourgeois republic...." The objective of "internal and external hostile forces," Li Peng claimed, was to "overthrow the CPC leadership, subvert the socialist system, and turn China into a capitalist country, a protectorate of developed capitalist countries."

Consequences

The dismissal of Zhao Ziyang from the post of general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and the election of Jiang Zemin to that post were a direct consequence of the Tiananmen Square events. A large group of Zhao Ziyang's supporters were forced to exit the political arena with him. The reshuffle of personnel in the country's top leadership, however, was not the completion but only the precursor of a profound turnabout in the economy, politics, ideology, and all spheres of Chinese society's life.

The Economy

There was a partial return to administrative edict methods of management. Whereas the development of market relations and citizens' initiative were hitherto being encouraged by all possible means in the country, the accent now shifted in favor of centralized planning and state regulation of the economy. The policy of "economic recovery and order," having to a certain extent solved the problems of inflation and rising prices, had simultaneously engendered difficulties like declining output, excessive stockpiling of goods, underemployment of production capacities, and even closure of enterprises and rising unemployment. The economy was in real danger of stagnation.

The Tiananmen Square events and the subsequent switch of political course scared Western businessmen away from China. The inflow of Western credits ebbed, and there was a sharp drop in the number of Western entrepreneurs wanting to operate in China. The sanctions imposed by a number of leading capitalist countries had a painful effect on the country's economy. China lost a sizeable degree of its attraction for Western tourists who were an important source of foreign currency for the exchequer.

Many Chinese hastened to close down their private enterprises. The number of such enterprises in the country dropped, for the first time in 10 years, by 15 percent. In its turn, this exacerbated the problems of unemployment and the market.

Politics

Emphasis in domestic policy shifted toward maintenance of stability in society at all costs. "No matter what changes occur in society," Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, recently declared, "the maintenance of stability will remain one of China's most important tasks. If our country remains politically stable, our experience in the building of socialism will be the best possible contribution to the progress of all mankind and the development of the international communist movement."

The struggle against corruption and the decay of the party and government apparatus—both of which were among the most important causes of last year's disturbances—was stepped up. A large number of corrupt functionaries suffered harsh punishment under criminal law, right up to execution by firing squad. A countrywide struggle was launched against the "six evils": prostitution, pornography, the trade in women and children, drug addiction, gambling, and feudal religious and mystical prejudices.

The future development of political reform in China is now discussed in extremely restrained terms. According to NPC spokesman Yao Guang, the pursuit of reform should not hinder political stability in society. True enough, the question of political reform was raised again in Li Peng's report at the recent NPC session. In my view, however, the measures proposed in the report are aimed not so much at reform as at further consolidation of the CPC's positions in society and the machinery of power. According to the State Council premier's claims, the main content of the reform of the political system ought to be "the further improvement of the system of councils of people's representatives, the system of multiparty cooperation under the Communist Party's leadership, and the system of democratic control." Pluralism in politics and a multiparty system are rejected as unacceptable for China.

Ideology

The Chinese leadership's new political course demanded a perestroyka of the CPC's ideological work. As the journal LIAOWANG noted, "ideology is now the key to reform, confidence in socialism has been noticeably shaken, and it is therefore necessary to improve the 'ideological environment.'" As a matter of fact, so far it has been hard to notice any substantial renewal in the forms and methods of ideological work. All phenomena of social life are perceived in China from positions of "class struggle" to this day. Contrasts are drawn between enterprise and initiative on the one hand and obedience and compliance on the other, between individualism and collectivism, between the pursuit of gain and selfless service to society, self-sacrifice in the name of bright ideals. There has been a revived and unprecedentedly large-scale campaign to learn from Lei Feng, a Chinese national hero from the time of the "Cultural Revolution," who acquired fame by selflessly helping people in railroad stations and streets and learning Mao Zedong's works by heart in the evenings, dreaming of becoming one of "Chairman Mao's iron cogs."

The Army

The tragic events in Tiananmen Square ended up as a heavy moral burden on the Chinese military, whose ranks were being split between supporters and opponents of the use of military force against their own people. The prestige of military service, which was steadily declining during the years of reform, dropped.

Worried by these processes and by the development of events in Romania, where the military backed the people in their struggle against Ceausescu's dictatorship, the Chinese leadership embarked on a series of energetic measures to restore the "absolute leadership of the Army by the CPC."

Moods

Having learned from the experience of numerous political cataclysms in the country over the last 25 years, the mass of Chinese people are quickly finding their way in the new political situation. The millions-strong army of cadre workers switched from the propaganda of market relations to the more familiar struggle against "bourgeois liberalization" and the pursuit of a "correct class line." The workers' reaction to changes in the political climate is restrained. As a matter of fact, people try and avoid conversations on political subjects, and it is not easy to figure out their real attitude toward the changes.

The peasants react to the new political course by cutting back the investment of funds in leased land plots (people assume that the land could be once more taken away from them) and striving to invest their accumulated savings in the building of a house or the acquisition of expensive domestic appliances. A certain curtailment of private business in the cities was already mentioned.

The intelligentsia was the one to react most painfully to last year's events. Many members of the intelligentsia and students with whom I spoke admitted that the Tiananmen Square tragedy drove them into a state of apathy, generating alarm and a sense of uncertainty in the future. A latent tension, which seems to permeate the air, can be felt in Chinese society.

Scientific Cooperation Agreement Signed

OW1004100590 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 20 Mar 90

[From the "Taking the Road of Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Text] The Finance and Economy Research Institute of Leningrad and the branch of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Sichuan Province have signed an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation in Leningrad. According to the agreement, representatives of the industrial sectors of the two countries will hold meetings. Sessions also will be organized between industrialists of the two countries to study the current situation taking into consideration the new market conditions in the two countries and the future of establishing cooperative enterprises.

Northeast Asia

Soviet Official Views Relations With Mongolia

OW1804120290 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 0810 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The Soviet Union positively estimates Mongolia's striving to develop normal relations with all interested states, particularly with East Asian nations, despite ideological differences. This was said by head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Board Vadim Perfilyev at a briefing in Moscow.

Mongolia's foreign policy is determined by the priority of national interests; insurance of national security through political, diplomatic means; openess to international community; and active participation in nonaligned movement as well as in international and regional division of labor, noted the Soviet diplomat.

Correction of Mongolian diplomacy toward raising the orientation of its national interests and real needs of the country will more strengthen the foreign political interactions between the USSR and Mongolia, he noted.

Completion of Mongolian Party Congress Reported

PM1804103990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Second Edition p5

[Report by TASS correspondents K. Boldokhonov, D. Sanzhiyev for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "Following a Path of Renewal; Extraordinary MPRP Congress Comes to a Close"]

[Excerpts] Ulaanbaatar, 14 Apr—The extraordinary MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] congress was a major event in the life of the people's Mongolia. It was the first such forum in its history. [passage omitted]

The congress elected the leading party bodies—a 91-member Central Committee and 31-member Central Control and Auditing Commission—and took a decision on transforming the MPRP Central Committee Politburo into a Presidium and instituting the post of MPRP Central Committee chairman instead of general secretary. The head of state and chairman of the Council of Ministers will not be members of the Presidium. [passage omitted]

At the first plenum of the party Central Committee Gombojavyn Ochirbat was elected chairman of the MPRP Central Committee. The MPRP Central Committee Presidium includes G. Ochirbat; MPRP Central Committee secretaries N. Mishigdorj, Ts. Oold, and B. Sumyaa [name as transliterated]; chief editor of the newspaper UNEN L. Tudev [name as transliterated]; and Mongolian Foreign Minister Ts. Gombosuren.

Today the party leader and other members of the MPRP Central Committee Presidium met local and foreign journalists who have been covering the work of the forum, which ended yesterday. Addressing them, G. Ochirbat said: The documents of the extraordinary MPRP congress have armed the country's communists and all its working people with new thinking in the struggle to create humane, democratic socialism.

Answering a question by TASS correspondents on the main aspects of the party's renewal, he replied: First, the essence of this renewal is that the individual and his rights and needs are the constant focus of the MPRP's attention—not just in words, but in reality. Second, the methods of party work, which is to be based on political means, are being fundamentally changed. Special attention will be devoted to the theoretical elaboration of society's development. Third, the whole of party activity is to be democratized by accumulating and working on the basis of broad public opinion. And, fourth, the rights and independence of primary organizations, the party's foundation, are to be considerably broadened.

An important factor in this process, G. Ochirbat stressed, is that the Central Committee has been renewed 80 percent. It now has more representatives of the intelligentsia, the peasantry, and the working class than before.

Describing MPRP activity in the new conditions, the party leader said that it will build its relations with other political and social organizations on the basis of equality, noninterference in their internal affairs, and mutual respect.

Discussing the party's international policy, G. Ochirbat noted its invariable policy of deepening Mongolian-Soviet relations and cooperation between the MPRP and the CPSU. These questions will be discussed during the talks in Moscow planned for the middle of May. Our party attaches great significance to this meeting.

Decree Abolishes Mongolian Security Ministry

LD1904023390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0201 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 19 Apr (TASS)—By decree of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] People's Great Hural Presidium today, the Ministry of Public Security has been disbanded in the MPR.

Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the People's Great Hural Presidium, has also signed a decree on the release of Lt. Gen. Agbaanjantsangiyn Jamsranjab from the post of MPR minister of public security in connection with the absolution of the department.

Both decrees are published today in the UNEN newspaper.

MPRP Commission Begins Tsedenbal Investigation

LD1804155190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0800 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 18 April—TASS correspondent Dugar Sanzhiyev reports: The commission formed at the extraordinary Congress of the MPRP [Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party] to investigate abuses of his official position by Ju. Tsedenbal, the country's former leader, and his entourage has begun work. UNEN reports today that the commission, fulfilling the instruction of the party forum delegates, is striving to achieve complete glasnost in its activity.

A political assessment will be made first and foremost of the activities of people who were members of the upper echelons of the state and party leadership, and who promoted the establishment in the country of Ju. Tsedenbal's personality cult and of the bureaucratic and command style, said B Sumyaa, presidium secretary and MPRP Central Committee member at a meeting with Mongolian journalists. The commission which he heads has taken control of secret archives and closed resources of the MPRP Central Committee and is appealing to everyone who possesses documents and other evidence about infringements of social justice during the period from the 1950s to the mid 1980s to cooperate.

'Unity' Replaces Centralism in Mongolia

PM1804135590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Report by PRAVDA special correspondents V. Sapov and V. Sharov: "Guarantee of Rebirth"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar—On the third day of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Extraordinary Congress the delegates had to adopt some fundamentally important documents which will determine the life of the party and country in years to come. They were the MPRP Platform and Statutes and a resolution on the Main Directions of Party Policy in the Immediate Future and the Tasks Involved in Overhauling the MPRP.

It was a fierce debate. It could not have been anything but fierce. The country is in turmoil. The atmosphere of political clashes has spread to the forum's hall of sessions. Opposition parties and alliances have increased their activities dramatically. This is apparent in the press center set up by the Foreign Ministry for the duration of the congress. There has been a series of press conferences there and meetings not only with forum delegates, but also with representatives of informal organizations. The latter provide correspondents from a variety of countries with an abundance of material. Leaflets propagandizing the ideas of various movements and criticizing the MPRP, sometimes unjustly and stridently, have been pinned up in the city center. The fierceness of the congress debate can be judged by the following instances. On the last day of the proceedings the standing orders were contravened. The delegates worked all night and the nomination of candidates for the new Central Committee was finally completed by 0800 hours on 13 April. The draft commission received around 6,000 amendments and proposals on the platform and statutes alone.

The communists and public of Mongolia will find much that is new and original in the adopted documents. They contain a detailed assessment of the ground covered by the country and party and a description of the prevailing situation and the measures to get Mongolia out of the crisis and overhaul the MPRP. The communists' goals and tasks are clearly defined.

"Mongolian society has embarked on an historic and crucial path of eliminating serious deformation and switching to humane and democratic socialism." These words, contained in the party platform preamble, are the key to an appreciation of the novelty of the adopted decisions, the distinctive nature of the period the country is going through at the moment, and the communists' involvement in the country's destiny.

The MPRP is aware that the switch to humane, democratic socialism is a difficult task which can only be implemented through the concerted efforts and creative activity of the entire people. The congress adopted new MPRP Statutes. During the discussion of the draft there was emphasis on the fundamental contrast with the party's previous "basic law." The MPRP's supreme goal, the Statutes say, is to struggle for the people's well-being. In its activity it will creatively apply Marxism-Leninism.

In accordance with a forum decision, the principle of democratic unity instead of democratic centralism becomes the basic principle of party work. Democracy and glasnost will be combined in the party's work with discipline and collective leadership, and a creative, comradely atmosphere with unity and cohesion. The Statutes contain guarantees against the revival of leaderism and the authoritarian style of leadership and against the power monopoly that brought such trouble and disappointment.

The Statutes provide extensive opportunities for every party member to participate in the formation of elective organs and to publicly express criticism and make proposals, address the congress and top party authorities on any matter, and demand compensation for any political, moral, and material damage that has been unfairly caused.

Many of the things enshrined in the Statutes are already being put into practice. The special commission to rehabilitate people unlawfully convicted during the H. Choybalsan and Yu. Tsedenbal period of government is already operating. Many earlier Central Committee resolutions curbing the development of party organizations' and communists' initiative, severely restricting the creative intelligentsia, and inhibiting society's spiritual development are being abolished.

In accordance with the Statutes, the MPRP will switch to self-financing. It will have party property and its own funds. The source of these funds is membership dues, income from party enterprises, and donations from party members and citizens with party sympathies.

The congress decided to turn the Politburo into the MPRP Central Committee Presidium. Henceforth the leader of the state and head of government will not be members.

There was much argument at the congress about the party's name. In particular, it was proposed that it should be called henceforth the Mongolian People's Party—the party's original name. However, the proposal was rejected. The party of Mongolian communists keeps its name. The congress adopted the documents by a majority of votes.

The afternoon of 13 April saw the election of a new MPRP Central Committee. G. Ochirbat was elected chairman of the MPRP Central Committee and member of the MPRP Central Committee Presidium. Ts. Gombosuren, N. Mishigdorzh [name as transliterated], L. Tudev [name as transliterated], B. Sumyaa [name as transliterated], and Ts. Uold [name as transliterated] were also elected Presidium members.

USSR-DPRK Cooperation Noted on Anniversary

SK1904064590 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Dear listeners, today 17 March marks the (?41st) anniversary of the signing of the Agreement on Economic and (?Trade) Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DPRK. In this connection, the station commentator writes as follows.

This agreement is [words indistinct]. This agreement was the first of its kind signed between our two countries. The preamble of this agreement stresses that the two sides decided to sign this agreement with a conviction that the agreement will best serve the development of the economy and (?trade) of the two countries in conformity with the vital interests of the Soviet Union and the DPRK. [Words indistinct] scientific and technological relations have scored successful development in (?basic direction).

We will now quote the following figures. Over the last period, the DPRK, with Soviet technological cooperation, expanded and built 70 large-scale plants of its people's economy that compose the essential part of the national economy of the DPRK. The Soviet Union dispatched over 6,000 competent technicians to the DPRK to assist it in the construction, assembly, control, and turning to operation of these plants of the people's economy. The Soviet Union also provided the DPRK with continuous assistance (?as required by the national economy) of the DPRK. Some (?2,000) Korean technicians and workers came to our country for technological training, and [number indistinct] technicians and workers received direct job training in the DPRK with the cooperation of the Soviet engineers and companies to become skilled workers.

As the economy and economic capability of the DPRK developed and were strengthened, the mutually advantageous exchange of goods was (?strengthened) in the economic relations of our two countries. [Words indistinct] are the major items the Soviet Union (?exports) to the DPRK, and [words indistinct] the traditional exports of the DPRK and [words indistinct] the goods produced by the enterprises constructed with the Soviet (?technological assistance) [words indistinct], and the Soviet Union supplies the DPRK with [word indistinct]. The DPRK ships such goods as [words indistinct] to the Soviet Union. The volume of the (?light industrial) goods that the DPRK supplies for the Soviet Union has increased in recent years.

The Korean enterprises produce [words indistinct] with the Soviet [words indistinct] and export them to the Soviet Union. The fact that the two countries have attained new [word indistinct] in the economic, scientific, and technological cooperation [words indistinct] are the establishment of joint venture enterprises and (?international combined enterprises), [words indistinct], the establishment of direct relations, the people's consumer goods, machines, the (?increase in the capacity of processing) in production.

This cooperation significantly expanded the capacity of the [word indistinct] through mutual [word indistinct] and contributed to the effectiveness of the bilateral cooperation.

Also, the agreement within the periphery of the [words indistinct] for the economic cooperation in [words indistinct]. Hundreds of the Korean people are producing beans and vegetables in Amur, Chita, and Primorskiy Kray under a contract system. Meanwhile, in the [word indistinct] (?county) of the DPRK, a discussion is under way, with the participation of the relevant organizations of the Primorskiy Kray, for the establishment of a fruit processing plant. At the same time, cooperation continues in the work of building and expanding some plants in the agricultural (?field), and these are the moderate-sized (?modern) production enterprise, wood processing plant, [words indistinct] farms, and poultry farm. The work of establishing the housing and other [words indistinct] plants is under way in (Hasan), a border town of the Primorskiy Kray.

The above are the positive aspects of the cooperation between the two countries, and we [word indistinct] today. At the same time, in the aspects of trade and economic relations between the two countries, some problems occurred because the Korean side (?chronically) broke the agreement in supplying goods to the Soviet Union. This is increasing [word indistinct] in the bilateral (?payment) relations, and this becoming a negative factor in [words indistinct] for the Soviet enterprises, which use such goods as raw materials.

Under the objective [word indistinct] conditions in the people's economies of the two countries, it is not only important for both sides to explore the most effective ways to solve mutual understanding and [word indistinct], but it is necessary for both sides to make specific and (?harmonious) efforts.

On this anniversary, which is significant for the peoples of our two countries, the Soviet people wish the Korean friends great success in their work to realize socialist reform in their country and to reunify the country independently and peacefully and in further strengthening and developing the traditional Soviet-Korean friendship.

Kurile Islands Issue Unclear to Populace

90UF0058A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 8 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by I. Titov: "Whose Kurile Islands?"]

[Text] Not so long ago, the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI published the following cartoon: the Soviet Union torn by interethnic conflicts and next to it the figure of Japanese Prime Minister T. Kaifu with a bag over his shoulder. There are stacks of money in the bag which he is courteously offering in exchange for a number of the islands of the South Kurile chain belonging to the USSR.

We must say that not only a few Japanese reason that way. It is no secret—and letters to our newspaper also suggest this—that similar attitudes prevail among a segment of the Soviet people. Supposedly, we need to give these faraway islands to Japan and receive in return a great deal of Japanese cars, video equipment, and other consumer goods.

However, there is also another point of view. Many people in Japan also take a different view of this issue, to say nothing of our country. In particular K. Kokizawa, deputy of the Japanese Parliament and chairman of the Foreign Policy Section of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, wrote in none other than the influential Soviet journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN: "The idea of a possible resolution of the territorial issue on the basis of one-time financial compensation is wretched all by itself; besides, it will most likely fail to gain the understanding and support of the people of the two countries." Further on: "...no important decision can be made without the approval of the people."

Therefore, two conclusions are in order. The first one is: The Japanese—but definitely not all of them—believe that territorial claims against the USSR are a transaction of sorts. The second conclusion: The Japanese understand that issues of this scale cannot be resolved harmoniously without taking public opinion into account.

What can we say in this reference? First of all, the Soviet people naturally categorically reject any deals associated with squandering their land, all the more so if this deal amounts to giving in to cruel and obstinate pressure (if there are exceptions, they are extremely minor). Besides, as I see it, in our country there still is no clear understanding of the fact that all international issues of this order, and territorial disputes in particular, should be resolved primarily on the basis of a direct expression of the will of the entire people.

Recently, calls for changing the status of the South Kurile Islands in some manner began to be aired in our press. Concepts of their joint development, a UN protectorate, creation of a free economic zone over there and so on are being proposed. This position was voiced by, among others, V. Guliya, USSR People's Deputy from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, in the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA. His colleagues Yu. Afanasyev and G. Popov, having visited the Land of the Risisng Sun, came out in favor of satisfying Japan's territorial claims. B. Yeltsin, who offered five stages for the gradual resolution of this issue right there in Japan, acted less straightforwardly proposing to stretch out the change in the status of the islands over 15 to 20 years and to consider at the last stage whether to give them back or not. Supposedly, the people will not understand it otherwise.

This point of view is seconded by many Japanese politicians. Due to the era of glasnost, they have been given an opportunity to set forth their ideas on the pages of our press without hindrance. Two main arguments are put forward in the matter. Firstly, "the northern territories" never belonged legally to either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union prior to 1945. Secondly, following their transfer to Japan the latter will, supposedly, provide sizable economic aid for perestroyka, and an appreciable change for the better will occur in relations between the two states.

To be sure, the deputies are not official representatives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They may and should express their personal opinions. However, even if a most radical idea is proclaimed, one needs to prove its soundness to the voters and convince them. In general, any serious person who comes up with initiatives of this nature should proceed from this, whether transferring the islands or changing their status is at issue. Meanwhile, the readers who are sure that where there is smoke there is fire begin to doubt both positions because the adherents of a Japanese-style decision do not provide an explanation of their proposals in principle.

It is beyond any doubt that the issue of the South Kurile Islands should be submitted to the public for judgment. However, in doing so complete information on the historical and legal underpinnings of the issue should be offered, rather than prepared conclusions. Only then will the people be able to reject and refute, assess and argue. For example the journals MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN or VESTNIK MID SSSR could pay closer attention to this issue and publish "a package" of treaties, compare various points of view, and indicate their vulnerable points.

After all, an entire propaganda apparatus in Japan serves the movement "for the return of the northern territories." Various information booklets are published; societies, circles, and seminars are actively held. Every party has its own scenario for solving this problem. In a word, an extensive discussion is under way, and various approaches, at times diametrically opposed ones, are compared.

Why should we not discuss this problem with equal vigor? After all, can we go on forever pretending that it does not exist? If a country such as Japan makes its demands quite persistently and relentlessly we, all the citizens of the USSR, should know precisely what they are based on and justified by, and how weighty the claim is. It is also important to attempt to take the position of your opponent and understand the degree to which his demands affect his vital interests.

Some people might object that it is difficult for nonspecialists to sort out complicated historical and legal nuances. I don't think so. Even N. Machiavelli, one of the pioneers of humanism and the idea of people's power, who has been unjustly counted among the ideologists of palace revolutions, wrote that "the people are steadier and much more reasonable" than any state apparatus; "due to some hidden ability, they clearly foresee what will turn out to be good or evil for them." Only in the rarest of cases do the people fail to make the best judgment when they are forced to choose between two equally convincing but opposed points of view.

Therefore, clear and objective information is the most important point. Our access to it is not blocked. However, frankly speaking, one is sometimes surprised by how uninformed our people are. Thus, a combat veteran who took part in the landing of the Soviet troops on the South Kurile Islands in the summer of 1945 and who I happened to talk to still does not know that Japan did not at all seize the Kurile Islands in the war of 1904 and

1905 but received these territories pursuant to treaties. It is another matter that Japan violated them continously, occupied our Far East, and subsequently wanted to subjugate one-half of Asia...

This is why I consider very fruitful the idea of one of the Liberal Democratic Party leaders, S. Abe, who proposed at a meeting with M.S. Gorbachev that issues in dispute in the mutual relations of the two countries be resolved on the basis of wisdom.

The issue of the South Kurile Islands is ceasing to be a territorial problem in the customary meaning of this word, now that extensive models of development have been relegated to the past and the overpopulation of the largest Japanese cities is accompanied by the desolation of once populous islands. Unlike, for example, the center of Europe where such territorial claims may be bolstered by material ambitions, Japan's aspiration to get the islands is purely political in nature. This is why the issue needs to be resolved on the basis of political wisdom exactly. This is the ideal way. However, it looks as if the Japanese side does not agree with the thesis that preservation of the status quo is the main factor in universal security. It is vigorously trying to convince us of the veracity of the Japanese proverb that a defeat "may also be a victory."

It is hard to predict how events will develop. However, our call to put an end to the dispute should not amount to a refusal to dot the i's so that all of us, both voters and deputies, know why they subscribe to and defend a particular position.

For me, this position is associated with the following approach: Put an end to it and do not look for guilty parties—history indicates that a prolonged conflict may only be resolved in this manner.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

SRV Communist Party's Nguyen Van Linh Queried

PM1904094190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview in Hanoi with Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee, by own correspondent B. Vinogradov: "Course of Renewal and Social Stability. Nguyen Van Linh, General Secretary of CPV Central Committee, Answers IZVESTIYA's Questions"—date not given]

[Text] [Vinogradov] This year the Vietnamese people celebrate the 45th anniversary of their republic's formation. How do you assess the path that has been traveled and what tasks face Vietnam in the future?

[Nguyen Van Linh] The past years have been years of the struggle for freedom, independence, and the unification of the country. The party and our people have successfully completed that stage. Now, on the approach to the year 2000, we intend to continue the course of renewing society and ensuring further socioeconomic stabilization. We want to use these years to accumulate material wealth—as the prerequisite for our development in the future. Those are our plans in general terms. They will be fleshed out in the new Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] program, which we are currently drawing up. It will be submitted for ratification by the seventh congress, scheduled for the second quarter of next year.

[Vinogradov] Talking about the party's role at the present stage, how do you view the development of the democratization process? What is the idea of renewing the party itself?

[Nguyen Van Linh] Following the sixth congress the CPV undertook leadership of all the processes of renewing and democratizing social life. But we cannot count on the success of renewal if we divide the development of democracy into two independent spheres: within the party and within society as a whole. I think that democratization should be conducted in all spheres simultaneously and with equal vigor in order to ensure the conditions for political and social stability, as well as for the implementation of economic reform. Important positive results have been achieved in this area in the three years since the sixth congress. I'm talking about intraparty democracy and the activity of state and social organizations. We believe that democracy is the aim and motive force of socialism and an effective means of renewing the party itself. It is designed to ensure that the rights of citizens to participate in running the country are observed. But democracy should be controllable, and it should be developed in the interests of socialism without permitting anarchy or social chaos. We openly state that democracy should serve the majority of working people. At the same time, the dictatorship policy with regard to the reactionary minority which has still not given up its attempts to destroy the socialist system should be continued.

The Vietnamese people, on the basis of their historical experience—for which we paid a high price—recognize only the CPV as their sole leading force and reject political pluralism along with the multiparty system, just as they reject the possibility of opposition trends and parties existing in our society. At the same time, our people demand that the CPV review its obsolete views and come more into line with the modern demands of revolution. The party honestly admits its guilt for the mistakes that have been made and is actively working to correct them. It supports in every possible way criticism from below and freedom of expression, which are the guarantee that the tasks facing it will be successfully fulfilled.

The party takes account of and respects the various opinions that have emerged in the course of debates and discussions in the search for truth. But after a choice has been made, the principle of democratic centralism—whereby the minority gives way to the majority—comes into force. Provision is made for minority opinion and it is submitted for discussion in cases when this is necessary.

[Vinogradov] What is your opinion of the processes currently taking place in the East European countries? Will they affect Vietnam's relations with those countries?

[Nguyen Van Linh] The CPV and the Vietnamese people are following events in East Europe with great attention. We regret to note that in certain countries communist parties are losing power while opposition forces are gradually moving toward the restoration of capitalism, only concealing this behind other slogans.

We are all well aware that the socialist ideal allowed those countries' peoples to achieve definite successes in their development and to come through major trials in the past. It has to be admitted that East Europe is now experiencing hard times. There is no doubt, however, that socialism will continue to inspire peoples and genuine Communists to struggle against the factors which have distorted its essence. One way or another, capitalism is not the final stage in human civilization's development. The events in East Europe have raised many theoretical and practical questions which require careful study. Our party and people must draw the relevant conclusions from this.

[Vinogradov] At the recent CEMA session in Sofia Vietnam supported the idea of switching to hard currency in reciprocal settlements. What are the prospects for CEMA's activity in that respect, and what place, in your opinion, will Vietnam occupy in the future system of economic integration?

[Nguyen Van Linh] While remaining a CEMA member, Vietnam is making its contribution to that organization's activity, and is developing cooperation on the basis of the principles of mutual advantage. The SRV supports the idea of changing CEMA's structure with a view to enhancing its effectiveness. We are prepared to actively participate in the process of setting up a new CEMA mechanism, to stimulate direct ties between individual sectors, and to expand modern forms of cooperation. We advocate a gradual transition to world prices and the use of hard currency in mutual settlements and commodity exchange.

[Vinogradov] We have all witnessed the stabilization of the Vietnamese economy and the successful implementation of economic reform. What is the "secret" of your success?

[Nguyen Van Linh] Over the past three years Vietnam has been implementing economic reform. We have focused our efforts on three priority areas—food production, consumer goods production, and exports. The foundations are being laid for a power industry and an infrastructure. As for economic structures, it is planned to further strengthen the state and cooperative sectors while simultaneously developing other types of ownership, including private ownership. The policy of attracting the financial resources of individual citizens and cooperatives into industry, agriculture, and trade is having a tangible effect. The capital thereby brought into play has made it possible to markedly increase output of various products for both the domestic market and export, and hundreds of thousands of extra jobs have been created. Virtually all national economic structures have been placed on a footing of economic accountability, self-financing, and single prices.

We have introduced realistic exchange rates for foreign currency, legalized and expanded foreign exchange and gold trading, and set up a network of commercial banks where the level of interest paid compensates investors for any loss due to inflation. In the past year alone a huge sum of money—1.3 trillion "surplus" dongs—has been removed from circulation and "tied into" the banking system and savings banks. The first steps have been taken in renewing foreign policy activity. We are providing incentives for foreign capital, not least from the Soviet Union, to invest in the country. State planning and management of the economy is now conducted at the macro level—that is, without interference in enterprises' trading and production activities. A large number of intermediate components which acted as middlemen have been cut. All this, I repeat, represents just the first few steps. But these steps are very important and are of decisive significance for our economy.

[Vinogradov] How does the law on foreign investment function in Vietnam and how do you assess Vietnam's level of cooperation with capitalist countries?

[Nguyen Van Linh] Back in December 1987 the SRV National Assembly adopted a law on foreign investment. Since then 105 agreements have been signed at state level with various foreign countries. These represent a total sum of $850 million. Vietnam is consistently following a policy of expanding cooperation with the Soviet Union. At the same time, we are organizing links with other states on the basis of the principles of mutual advantage.

[Vinogradov] There is a great deal of argument and discussion in the Soviet Union at present about private ownership—private ownership of land and means of production. Vietnam's experience in this respect is interesting for us. Could you please tell us what your attitude is to the existence of private ownership in a socialist state? How is this matter being resolved in Vietnam? Can a party member own a private enterprise?

[Nguyen Van Linh] The problem of ownership should be viewed within the framework of Vietnam's nationwide economy, which has passed the stage of capitalist development and is at the first stage of the period of transition to socialism. Currently the state sector produces 30 percent of national income, the cooperative sector produces 50 percent, and the private sector is considered an objective reality and functions under state supervision.

Under our conditions it differs substantially from private enterprise in capitalist countries. In the future we will adopt another set of laws guaranteeing the private sector's long-term existence—that is, as long as it proves its viability and is of benefit to society. The socialist state has firm control of the commanding heights and what are called the "nerve centers" of the national economy.

The CPV Statutes state that only people who do not exploit the labor of others can be party members. But a party member may own an enterprise in which only the labor of his family members is employed. In those cases when the hired labor of others is involved, CPV members are forbidden to engage in enterprise.

[Vinogradov] A few words about glasnost in Vietnam. How do you assess the new law on the press which was adopted at the SRV National Assembly session in December, with reference to the abolition of censorship, on the one hand, and the ban on owning private publications, on the other hand. Has the principle of the party nature of the press as the leading principle of the Vietnamese journalists' work been preserved?

[Nguyen Van Linh] We regard the new press law as another step forward in the process to improve the legal basis of the state. The law guarantees SRV citizens freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and also enhances the role of the press in building socialism and defending the motherland in accordance with the course of renewal elaborated by the party.

Under the law the citizens of our country have the right to obtain information about all aspects of life both inside the country and abroad. They can also furnish information to the press without supervision from any side, they can express their opinion on any question, irrespective of whether it concerns the policy of the party or state organs or the activities of individual citizens. The only restriction which applies to the mass media is that they must not publish anything that constitutes a state secret.

In the conditions of our country there is no need at present to have private publications and therefore, in my opinion, this does not constitute a restriction on freedom of expression or freedom of the press. Especially as under the law, all the mass media belong either to party, state, or public organizations and at the same time are a public platform. Anyone may use this platform to freely express his opinion.

[Vinogradov] Let us return once more to international issues. How do you assess the possibility of a settlement of the Cambodian problem?

[Nguyen Van Linh] Vietnam favors a quest for a political solution to the Cambodian problem and the establishment of guarantees to forestall a restoration of the "Khmer Rouge" regime. We respect the Cambodian people's right to self-determination and their desire to hold free general elections under UN supervision and embark on building an independent, democratic, and neutral Cambodia. Vietnam has withdrawn all its volunteer troops from Cambodia and together with the international community is contributing its share to the achievement of a fair and reasonable settlement of the problem on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and independence of this state.

[Vinogradov] One last question. How do you assess the current state of relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union? What should be done to enhance the effectiveness of our cooperation?

[Nguyen Van Linh] Vietnam and the Soviet Union are making great efforts to further develop and renew all-around cooperation. Certain achievements in this respect already exist. At the talks with M.S. Gorbachev in May 1987 and at subsequent meetings we have agreed to work toward the expansion and improvement of mutually advantageous ties between our countries and to facilitate the establishment of direct contacts between sectors and organizations.

Our governments are currently elaborating the main spheres of these activities. Measures are being taken to eliminate existing difficulties. I am convinced that all-around collaboration between our parties, governments, and peoples will continue to strengthen for our common good. The Vietnamese people and the CPV highly appreciate the enormous and effective assistance of the Soviet Union to the building and the defense of our fatherland, and they express their gratitude.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to send fraternal greetings and best wishes to the CPSU, the government, and the entire Soviet people via IZVESTIYA. I hope that the Soviet people may swiftly resolve the problems which have arisen and firmly steer the course of building a great socialist power, the bulwark of world revolution.

Cambodian Official on USSR's 'Positive' Stance

BK1804144590 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Unidentified station correspondent's "interview with Im Chhunlim, alternate member of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, during his short visit to the USSR": date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Station correspondent] What is your assessment of the Soviet Union's stance on a solution to the Cambodian problem?

[Im Chhunlim] The Soviet Union's stance on a solution to the Cambodian problem is positive. The Soviet Union has always respected the Cambodian people's interests; it knows the situation in Cambodia well. For this reason, the Soviet Union has provided assistance and actively contributed to finding an appropriate and just political solution to the Cambodian problem.

TASS Commentator on Mediating Cambodia Issue

OW1504233390 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 31 Mar 90

[TASS commentator's article on mediating Cambodia issue]

[Text] There is another new idea about mediating the Cambodia issue. Representatives of Vietnam and China may meet in Bangkok with Thailand participating in the meeting. Bangkok has dispatched General (Lutaiyi) to Hanoi and Foreign Minister Sitthi to Beijing to hold talks on the Cambodia issue. Although wide differences exist between the two sides, the news people hear now is heartening. Hanoi announces that it is willing to attend this meeting. It believes this meeting will be useful. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach said: According to a Vietnamese ambassador stationed in China, China is not opposed to continuing talks. Although the Cambodia issue is quite complicated, it can be solved step by step. Of course, it depends first of all on the Cambodian Government and the opposition party composed of Sihanouk, Son Sann, and the Khmer Rouge. Phnom Penh's national reconciliatory policy, which affects some members of the opposition party, is supported by the people victimized by the war. Currently, Cambodia is speeding up its preparations for a nationwide general election with UN participation. The international meeting on the Cambodia issue has reached an agreement on this election, but there are still obstacles. A very obvious issue is that Hanoi and Phnom Penh have already announced that Vietnam has completely withdrawn its army. However, Beijing and Cambodia's opposition party think otherwise. It seems this dispute can be solved by observers of the United Nations.

The Khmer Rouge is the main political issue. It receives foreign aid. The opposition party calls for disbanding the Phnom Penh government or obtaining at least three-fourths of the seats in the political power organizations. The Cambodian Government resolutely rejects the idea of Pol Pot elements joining political power organizations. A ceasefire in Cambodia has been included on the agenda. This depends largely on Thailand, on whose soil Cambodian refugee camps are located. What is praiseworthy is that foreign countries are preparing to help the 10 refugee camps in the border area by repatriating 300,000 of the refugees home or to the neutral refugee camps under the charge of the UN. Cambodia says it is willing to cooperate with foreign countries on this issue.

The TASS commentator believes that if representatives of Vietnam, China and Thailand can meet in Bangkok, this may be a major milestone on the road to solving the Cambodian conflict.

U.S. Tour Aims To Put 'Pressure' on Philippines

PM1704114090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent D. Kosyrev dispatch: "'We'll Get By Even Without You'"]

[Text] Manila, 11 Apr— Seven American congressmen headed by Patricia Schroeder are traveling on an itinerary that takes in Hawaii, Guam, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia.

In Schroeder's words, it is fully possible that "the decreasing tension between East and West and the United States' increased debt" will mean that the two large American military bases in the Philippines will have to be evacuated. Let us add: There is a chance that Manila itself will request this. However, Washington would not want to withdraw the military aircraft and ships based in the Philippines from the western part of the Pacific Ocean entirely; therefore, the alternative of "scattering" them over several bases is now being looked at—either on the existing bases, or on bases which up to now figure only in draft form. The congressmen's itinerary exactly denotes these proposed sites on the map of the Pacific Ocean.

True, while Hawaii and Guam are American territories and it is not necessary to ask permission there, the prospects of opening even small bases in Indonesia are, I think, next to nil. In Thailand, the Americans even now make use quite often of some of the Thai Armed Forces' sea and air ports. As for Singapore, an agreement was discussed there last year that was roughly analogous to the accords with Thailand on the putting in and refitting of ships and aircraft. According to the latest press reports, premises are now being prepared there for roughly 170 U.S. Navy specialists, who will monitor the refitting of warships in Singapore dockyards. Plans to deploy one squadron of American F-16 fighters in that country on a rotation basis are being discussed.

And finally: The exodus from the Philippines is a far from settled question. Schroeder herself notes that it is a question of the price that the Philippine authorities will ask for extending the agreement on bases, which expires next year. Talks on this subject begin in May. It is of course impossible to rule out the possibility that Manila will raise the question of a total and immediate withdrawal of bases, although Washington is obviously not counting on this scenario. Thus it is quite possible to view the congressmen's trip also as pressure on the Philippine authorities, as a means of saying to them yet again: "We'll get by even without you."

Armitage's Appointment as Panel Chief Viewed

HK1204042790 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Richard Armitage, former United States defense secretary, will head the American delegation at talks to be held in Manila on the future of the military bases in the Philippines. The talks were postponed because of the coup attempt last December and have been rescheduled for mid-May.

Meanwhile, the White House has confirmed that Washington intends to keep its bases in the Philippines. Analysts say the appointment of Armitage, an expert on Asian affairs, is a signal against the growing movements which oppose the bases' retention. Meanwhile, Manila has continued to insist that Washington fulfill its financial obligations in connection with the use of the bases, as spelled out in the 1988 Memorandum of Agreement.

Near East & South Asia

Primakov Receives Egyptian Solidarity Delegation

PM1804140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A delegation of the Egyptian Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Peoples, headed by its chairman A. Hamrush, visited Moscow from 8 to 15 April.

The delegation was received by Ye.M. Primakov, member of the Presidential Council, and A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, and had talks at the USSR Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries.

Need for Broad Coalition in Israel Seen

TA1604200390 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1600 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Commentary by Dmitriy Mikhaylov]

[Text] The Israeli prime minister is prepared to engage in negotiations with the alignment to set up another national unity government. Interviewed in MA'ARIV, he even noted that it may very well be a government with a rotation agreement, just as in 1981. [Words indistinct] our commentary Dmitriy Mikhaylov:

The possibility that a broad coalition will be established in Israel is growing. On the one hand, Shim'on Peres' chances of setting up a narrow-based coalition are waning. If Peres sets one up in the remaining 10 days he has, this will be a miracle. This was stated by the No. 2 man in the Labor Party, Yitzhaq Rabin. At the same time, Shamir's chances of heading a narrow-based government are likewise not very promising. In the first place, because the two parties on which the matter depend—SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] and the NRP [National Religious Party]—announced that they would only join a unity government. Second, Shamir, after all, is a seasoned politician and he (?knows) beyond a shadow of a doubt that as a premier heading a very narrow coalition in the Knesset he will be the target of attacks from every direction: the United States, Egypt, West Europe, the Alignment, and the radicals in his own party.

I believe that the establishment of a broad coalition will also correspond with Israel's national interests, provided, of course, that [words indistinct] the go-ahead is given to the main demand raised by the Alignment, namely that Secretary Baker's proposals are accepted and negotiations with the Palestinian delegation in Cairo are launched. If not, Shamir will face the same crisis as the one that cost him the no-confidence vote in the Knesset a month ago. This is unacceptable to the Labor Party and the Likud.

In fact, it is very probable that even if the Alignment manages to set up a narrow coalition, it will immediately encounter difficulties that will be hard to overcome. Let us suppose that Agudat Yisra'el's Council of Torah Sages imposes its authority on the two renegade Knesset members [MK's], Rabbis Verdiger and Mizrahi; supposing Peres presents some government in a week, one should still bear in mind that according to the coalition agreement with Agudat Yisra'el, it will enjoy freedom of vote on political issues. The two renegade MK's, Verdiger and Mizrahi, will then bring the government down at the very first opportunity when the Likud raises a motion of no confidence over negotiations with the Palestinians.

And now, from the particular to the more general: In order for peace in the Middle East to prevail, the two sides will have to give up something. In order for Israel to be able to cede something, its government must be strong. [Words indistinct] every political move in the world. The party that feels weak embraces extremely radical positions. It is noteworthy to mention the PLO's experience in this context: When the PLO's positions were weak, that organization adopted all the clauses in the Khartoum Declaration, and in fact there was no chance of negotiating with it. Yet as 'Arafat grew stronger in the international and Arab arenas, when the majority in the world understood that the PLO is the Palestinians' main option, then he immediately espoused far more moderate positions compared to his previous views.

The same holds true for Israel: Only a strong government enjoying firm and broad parliamentary coalition support will be able to show flexibility. And that, too, only on one condition: That the Likud leader who, as the popular saying in the USSR goes, gave up on principles regarding the rotation issue, is also able to give up on dated principles in the political sphere.

Syria's Talas on Mideast Issues, Arms Trade

PM1804102090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Corps General Mustafa Talas, Syrian deputy prime minister and defense minister, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent S. Medvedko in Damascus: "Mustafa Talas: Talking About Working

Days on Holidays"—date of interview not stated; first paragraph is Medvedko introduction]

[Text] Damascus—Spring is the season of the main national holidays for the Syrian Arab Republic: In March the Syrian people marked Revolution Day, and in April—the day of the evacuation of foreign troops. My interviewee is Corps General Mustafa Talas, deputy prime minister and defense minister of the republic.

[Medvedko] Mr. Minister, let me congratulate you at once on the two Syrian holidays and our approaching common holiday—the 45th anniversary of the victory over fascism. Furthermore I would like to congratulate you on a personal victory—comparatively recently, I hear, you successfully defended a doctoral dissertation at the USSR Defense Ministry Institute of Military History on a theme that is topical for this date, "The Military Thinking of Marshal G.K. Zhukov."

[Talas] Thank you for the congratulations. As for my personal victory, as you call it, I would like to say that the defense of this dissertation is a recognition of the Soviet Union's outstanding role in the defeat of fascist forces in World War II and, I hope, my own modest contribution to the cause of cooperation between our two armies.

[Medvedko] Well, allow me to move on from the festive part of our talk to the subject of everyday life. Our country's everyday life today consists not of ordinary working days, but of revolutionary days. Therefore my first question is: What is your attitude toward what is happening in the USSR?

[Talas] We are on Gorbachev's side. We welcome the changes in Eastern Europe, as well as the USSR's course of deconfrontation with the United States. Syrians regard perestroyka as a natural phenomenon. After all, President Hafiz al-Asad began a similar process, which we call "corrective movement," 20 years ago! Since then Syria has been following a path of political and economic pluralism. Various political parties are active in the country, united in the Progressive National Front, while in the economy state, private, and mixed sectors coexist. I would like to note that during that time the president has not yielded a single step to the United States or Israel. Over these years we also have not deviated by a single step from the path of friendship with the Soviet Union. But there are phenomena that cannot but concern us. Today Israel is accepting tens of thousands of emigrants from the USSR, seeking to settle them in the occupied territories. This is dangerous not only from the viewpoint of the disruption to the demographic balance. As a professional soldier I would like to point out another danger too—the substantial boost to the Israeli Army, which confronts us; and that army is receiving people who have undergone excellent Soviet military training. This fact cannot but concern me as a military leader. I think it would be more logical first to seek the convocation of an international conference on the Near East and a solution to the conflict, and only then to tackle questions of emigration. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan, the Syrian Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon continues. Israel is refusing to meet the Palestinians' just demands—in these conditions the satisfaction of Tel Aviv's requests for an increase in the influx of immigrants is perceived in the Arab world as help for Zionism and support for its aggression. This situation, in my view, is fraught with the risk of a deterioration in the Arab countries' fraternal relations with their great friend the Soviet Union.

[Medvedko] A war has been in progress for some 15 years now in neighboring Lebanon. The Western mass media, and indeed the media in some Arab countries too, sees the cause of this protracted conflict in the presence of Syrian troops there. What is your answer to that?

[Talas] The recent events in Lebanon—hostilities between Christians: formations of the "Lebanese Forces" of S. Ja'Ja' and the forces of General M. 'Awn—refute such assertions. There is not a single Syrian soldier in East Beirut. Why does the war not die down there? The Lebanese themselves will tell you that it is 'Awn who is to blame for the continuing tragedy; he unlawfully seized power in East Beirut. But he cannot be the leader of the whole of Beirut, still less of Lebanon, not because he is a Maronite Christian, but because he is a fanatic. Even those of his own faith flee him. There are now 75,000 Lebanese Christian refugees in Syria. Incidentally, they are not all living in hotels, but with their relatives. Is not this further evidence of the unity of the two peoples? Syria's position on Lebanon remains unchanged: We are with the Lebanese—Muslims and Christians—and with all who are on the side of the legitimate authorities. After all, the ideology of the Ba'th Party is not addressed to people of some specific faith. The party proceeds on the basis that all Arab states are part of a single nation. Arabs should not be divided by "Berlin Walls" erected artificially between them.

[Medvedko] What is your opinion on the reduction in the numerical strength of the Soviet Army and cuts in military production in the USSR?

[Talas] The troop cuts do not cause concern—if necessary the Soviet Union will always be able to increase its strength to the necessary level. But I do not share the view that it is necessary to curtail military production, and I have said so to my Soviet colleagues. I think, on the contrary, that it should be developed, types of armaments should be improved and sold to all who need them, which is what the United States does. Especially since many types of your military hardware are better than Western models. Parity with America should be retained in this sphere.

[Medvedko] But would it not be better if both the United States and the USSR gave up the weapons trade together?

[Talas] Of course that would be the best thing. The process of reducing the weapons trade should be synchronized. Furthermore both the USSR and the United States should put pressure on other states to make them too renounce this trade. That would be a great thing. But while the West is selling weapons to Israel we are forced to strive to amintain the strategic balance. Naturally, disarmament would be in the interests of the peoples of the Near East, as would a peace based on the principles of justice.

[Medvedko] A last question for you as a military leader who has played a direct part in wars in the Near East. As a professional soldier and politician, do you think that in the conditions of the delays in resolving the Near East conflict and the continuing occupation of the Arab lands, a new Arab-Israeli war is inevitable?

[Talas] I do not think that. It can be avoided, but only by pooling efforts, primarily those of the United States and the USSR. They should put pressure on Israel to make it meet the just demands of the Palestinians and other Arab peoples, who, believe me—speaking as an ordinary man this time—want to live in peace as much as the Israelis do.

Future of Economic Cooperation With Syria Viewed

PM1804151590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent V. Shchennikov dispatch: "A Tried and Tested Partner. On Syria's National Day"]

[Text] The bronze figure of a Syrian torchbearer pointing the way forward is to be found in a Damascus square, symbolizing the freedom and independence of the country which is now celebrating Evacuation Day, a major event in its people's life. It was at dawn on 17 April 1946 that the last company of French colonizers left Syria's territory, and the flag of truly free Syria was raised above the parliament building which had been under fire by the occupiers only a short while earlier, the TASS correspondent in Damascus reports for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

Much attention is being given here at present to questions concerning the future of Soviet-Syrian relations. Worried by forthcoming changes in questions concerning the provision of aid in the economic development of "Third World" countries, as announced in the USSR, Syrians often address this topic.

"Indeed," I was told by A.S. Skripkin, counselor-envoy for economic affairs at the USSR Embassy in Syria, "the introduction of changes in the country's present foreign policy course and the current economic difficulties in our country will, to a certain extent, result in a review of the level and forms of economic ties with foreign countries, including Syria. The Soviet Union plans to participate in the development of industrial projects whose construction quality is up to world standards (power stations, railroads, oil and gas extraction, and so on), and will give up the provision of aid in the construction of technically complex production units involving the provision of equipment where we ourselves lag behind the developed countries.

"Furthermore," the counselor-envoy went on, "the question of ways to settle the issue of Syrian indebtedness to the Soviet Union is becoming especially acute for us in the present circumstances. First, it ought to be noted that, contrary to widely held beliefs, our cooperation with Syria is now sufficiently profitable, the Syrians are prompt in repaying loans and have not approached us with any request to postpone payments. At present, Syrian exports cover the costs of economic assistance to the country by our organizations. Specifically, the Syrian side delivered to the Soviet Union in 1989 consumer goods (textiles, sewn goods, fancy goods, perfumery products, medicines, domestic detergents, and foodstuffs) worth a total of 605 million pounds sterling on account of debt repayments, while exports from the USSR amounted to 90 million pounds sterling. How do we plan to speed up the debt repayment?

"Mainly by making broader use of services provided by Syrian organizations: building hotels and sports facilities in our country's southern regions, increasing the number of tourists to Syria, provisioning and servicing Soviet ships and aircraft, acquiring vegetables, fruit, and other produce for Soviet ships of the Mediterranean Squadron, and production sharing between the two countries' industrial enterprises in the manufacture of goods which are in short supply in the Soviet market, like furniture and bathroom fittings. At the same time, it is planned to expand cooperation on barter basis in the opening up and exploitation of phosphate, oil, and gas deposits and the production of soda, bitumen, and citrus and other agricultural crops."

Andreyev Comments on Oil Market 'Crisis'

NC1804111390 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from "The World Today"]

[Text] The average price of oil sold by OPEC members has dropped to its lowest—$14.50 per barrel. An extremely dangerous situation has emerged for all the oil exporting countries in the world oil market. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes:

The sharp fall in the price of oil during the past three months was completely unexpected. In January this year the price of each barrel of oil was about $22. Today its average price has dropped to $14.50 per barrel, and the drop is continuing.

During the January meeting of the OPEC committee on controlling the oil market, it was pointed out that the increased demand for oil creates favorable conditions for maintaining and increasing the price of black gold in the future. But as we can see now, this forecast was extremely optimistic.

It seems that the reason for the extraordinary drop in oil prices is surplus production in the world market. Many OPEC members are constantly violating the production ceiling and are offering more and more of this raw material to the world market.

Now the increase in the daily production of oil has reached 2 million barrels and has become a ruling factor in the world market. Naturally this situation greatly harmed [word indistinct] and prices started to drop, beginning a vicious circle. On the one hand a large number of OPEC members are trying to maintain their former income level and are thus constantly adding to their oil production to offset the drop in the prices. On the other hand, oil surplus is leading to a drop in the price of this raw material. Meanwhile, the main danger is that this process can turn into an uncontrollable flood. It is not accidental that one week ago, Sadek Boussena, Algerian mines minister and current OPEC president, started extensive negotiations with oil partners in a bid to compile the most effective methods to stabilize the oil market. An extraordinary conference within the frameworks of OPEC will probably be held soon.

It seems that the oil-producing countries were not ready for the current crisis. Early this year oil prices increased considerably because of increased demands in North America and Europe due to the cold season. Under such conditions, the participants in the last—86th—OPEC conference concluded that the total volume of oil extraction and the export of this raw material would increase from 20.5 million barrels every 24 hours to 22 million barrels and that the minimum price of each barrel would continue to be $18. But it is now clear that this was a hasty decision.

With the blatant violation of quotas—especially by the UAE and Kuwait—supply exceeded demand. This situation threatens the economic stability of all OPEC members. Iran too is facing an extremely difficult situation. The current year's budget and the five-year plan have been based largely on oil incomes. If the current trend in the reduction of oil prices continues, all of Iran's economic programs will crumble like a paper house. It is not accidental that these days the employees of Iran's Petroleum Ministry remember more and more the adage that a stitch in time saves nine.

CPSU Delegation Returns From Bangladesh

PM1904100190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Delegation Returns"]

[Text] The CPSU delegation comprising A.S. Kamay, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, and F.N. Yurlov, group leader at the CPSU Central Committee International Department, returned to Moscow from Dhaka 17 April. The CPSU delegation had been in Bangladesh at the invitation of that country's Communist Party Central Committee.

Talks Held With India on Asia-Pacific Problems

LD1604205390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1522 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 16 Apr (TASS)—A report that regular Soviet-Indian consultations on problems of the Asia-Pacific region have taken place in Delhi was circulated here today. The consultations were conducted by Igor Rogachev, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs; S.K. Singh, first deputy minister of external affairs of India; and C. Das Gupta, deputy minister.

I. Rogachev was received by I.K. Gujral, Indian external affairs minister. During a conversation, which passed in a friendly atmosphere, it was noted from both sides that in conditions of stormy changes in the world, Soviet-Indian cooperation was and remains a permanent high spot.

I.K. Gujral expressed support for the changes taking place in the USSR and the Soviet leadership's efforts to overcome the difficulties which arise along their path. The minister stated that India favors maintaining the unity and territorial integrity of the USSR.

The identity or proximity of views of the USSR and India on key questions of the global situation was expressed. A committed discussion on the process of a Cambodian settlement and the situation around Afghanistan took place. Both sides reaffirmed their desire to contribute toward solving these problems. The readiness of the USSR and India to develop good-neighborly relations with the PRC was expressed. The mutual understanding that the question of Kashmir should be settled between India and Pakistan by peaceful political means on the basis of the Simla Agreement was reaffirmed.

Sub-Saharan Africa

New Ambassador to Nigeria Appointed

PM1804130190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Unattributed "Chronicle" report]

[Text] The USSR president has appointed Comrade Oleg Ivanovich Bocharov USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The USSR president has relieved Comrade Yuriy Viktorovich Kuplyakov of his duties as USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Federal Republic of Nigeria in connection with his transfer to other work.

ANC's Mandela Discusses International Situation

LD0604085290 Moscow TASS in English 0734 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—Nelson Mandela, vice-president of the African National Council of South Africa, gave an interview to TASS correspondents Yuriy Pichugin and Vitaliy Chukseev in Johannesburg. The interview was published in the ECHO OF THE PLANET magazine, issued here today.

Answering the question about the international situation Mandela said: "From the point of view of international situation the striking feature is the attempts which are being made by the superpowers to reduce international tensions. A threat of a nuclear war is one which had disturbed all people throughout the world and I think that the steps which are being taken by world leaders, the two superpowers, are in the interests of humanity as a whole. In this regard we must pay special tribute to President Gorbachev who actually started the process of improving international relations.

"President Gorbachev has to be complimented for the initiative which he took. He has brought up this by taking specific steps such as a reduction of the Army, pulling out missiles and other measures all of which were calculated to create a mutual confidence between the socialist and capitalist countries. We must also compliment President Reagan because he responded very well to the initiatives by President Gorbachev and they established a relationship which made it possible for this process to be continued between President George Bush and President Gorbachev."

Speaking about the situation in South Africa Nelson Mandela said in part: "As far as the local situation is concerned the striking feature is the central role which is occupied by the ANC. Our president, comrade Oliver Tambo, was able to hold the organization together. And that is one of the reasons that so wide an organisation has been able to grow despite the very serious conditions under which it operates.

"We are addressing the question of the unity of all the anti-aparatheid forces in the country and I think that the atmosphere for that move is ideal.

"But apart from that there are also very interesting development on the government side. We have a president today who is highly different from other leaders of the national party. The impression I have got from Mr. de Klerk is that he is a man who wants to lead white in this country on a new path whereby they can reach some fundamental and irreversible agreement with their black brothers.

"ANC policy is based on harsh reality. When I went to jail I could not vote. I have come out of jail after 27 years, I still cannot vote. That is the most striking feature about a situation in that country and as long as this is a situation South Africa will continue to be a land of turmoil, of crisis, of bitterness. And the people will continue to fight the government and to call up on the international community to tighten sanctions."

As far as the negotiating process is concerned Nelson Mandela said that all people who sit at the negotiating table must be democratically elected in non-racial elections. On that there can be no compromise.

Considering the unity of ANC, Mandela said:

"There is no other organisation in this country inside and outside parliament which is so popular with the people. The ANC has got a mass following of the blacks in this country and the substantial number of whites and that is what important. But we do not want to regard ourselves as the only actor in the scene. We are prepared to consider other actors as well, but we insist that we should present a united front, a mass democratic movement."

Asked about the processes of glasnost and perestroyka in the Soviet Union Nelson Mandela pointed out that the process was started by Mikhail Gorbachev. "He is one leader who had the courage and the honesty to stand up and tell the world that a social system to which he had committed his life, his political life has serious deficiencies. I haven't seen a leader of a comparative status in the West who can have the courage and the honesty to stand up and to tell the world that capitalism made a serious mistake by subjecting the people of the world to the evils of imperialism and colonialism.

"President Gorbachev introduced the new measures and the new approaches. He must have know what is likely to happen. He must have assessed the situation beforehand, he and the party. And therefore we must not be in a hurry in our judgement because it appears to me that as far as the masses of the people are concerned there is no question to them of turning to capitalism as against socialism. I can see them condemning the fact that there are no free political elections. I can see them criticising the monopoly of political power in the party and the lack of human rights. But I can't see the masses of the people saying that they are renouncing socialism in favour of capitalism," Nelson Mandela pointed out.

East Europe

Trade Turnover Protocol Signed With Hungary

LD1804152590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1130 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 April (TASS)—The USSR will remain Hungary's leading trade partner. This is determined by the protocol on trade turnover and payments between the two countries for 1990, signed here today.

In accordance with this document the lion's share of Soviet exports will comprise traditional deliveries of goods which are most important for Hungary: energy carriers, raw materials, minerals, agricultural and road-building machinery, cars, and trucks. In turn, Hungary will continue to export to the USSR Ikarus buses, communications means and systems, computer equipment, equipment for the light, food, and medical industries, consumer goods and food.

Konstantin Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations, said in his speech at the signing ceremony that the document is the result of much work carried out by experts from the two countries. It will serve as basis for the implementation of bilateral deliveries of goods on the basis of direct contractual links between Soviet and Hungarian organizations and the development of progressive forms of cooperation. The deepening of exchange of opinions seen during the drafting of the protocol will, in the minister's view, promote the successful implementation of the tasks of transition as from 1 January 1991 to the new forms of settlement between the USSR and Hungary and freely convertible currency.

"We base ourselves on the premise," stressed Konstantin Katushev, "that the many years of practice of our commercial-economic relations have produced volumes and broad ranges of bilateral deliveries of goods and performance of service corresponding to the interests of the national economies of the two countries. And in the future, too, we must be sure to keep to the level which has been achieved."

Hungarian Minister Comments on Trade With USSR

LD1804211490 Moscow TASS in English 1902 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The total commodity turnover between the Soviet Union and Hungary will amount to more than seven billion roubles in 1990, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Trade Tamas Bek told a news conference here today.

Comparing the commodity turnover with that of last year, the minister noted that its level fell by approximately 0.9 billion roubles. In accordance with a recently-signed protocol, Hungarian imports from the Soviet Union will decrease by 8.5 per cent, including the import of machinery and equipment by 13.9 per cent.

This reduction is the consequence of smaller centralised investments. Balanced accounts of payments are envisaged for the current year and this is why Hungarian imports from the Soviet Union will exceed exports by 100 million roubles, taking into account the balance of non-trade payments.

The total volume of exports from Hungary to the Soviet Union will decrease by 12 per cent, Bek said, including the decrease in the exports of machine-building products by 26 per cent.

At the same time deliveries to the Soviet Union of medicines and processed foodstuffs will increase by 26 and 16 per cent respectively.

The minister stressed that the two sides agreed to a compromise solution because the Soviet side was seeking to radically change the correlation between machine-building products and the commodities of the non-machine-building group. As a result the share of machinery in the total volume of Hungarian exports, envisaged by the protocol, will amount to 48 per cent as against fifty-five per cent envisaged by the long-term agreement.

The minister said that preparations for the signing of the protocol lasted for nearly six months. The Soviet partners wanted to balance payments by the end of 1990 exclusively at the expense of cutting purchases of machinery and equipment from Hungary.

This would mean that this year's exports of Hungarian machine-building products would amount to no more than 500 million roubles, or four times less than in the previous year.

Another problem, the minister said, was the Soviet side's insistence on a radical change in the structure of its purchases from Hungary, envisaged by the long-term agreement. They wanted to have more light industrial goods and foodstuffs supplied by Hungary. This was presented as a condition for continuing the supplies of raw materials and fuel at existing levels.

In order to make up for the reduction in the commodity turnover, Bek said, the sides agreed to create favourable conditions for barter trade. The point of this agreement is that the Soviet and Hungarian Governments will facilitate the activity of enterprises and organisations under barter deals. The volume of this trade in 1990 may amount to nearly 600 million roubles and involve 60 regions of the Soviet Union.

The Hungarian minister expressed confidence that the last year of Soviet-Hungarian trade for transferrable roubles would create favourable conditions for the transition in 1991 to the use of freely convertible currency for settling accounts.

Hungarian Democratic Forum Deliberations Noted

PM1804163190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov report under the rubric "Panorama of International Events": "Democratic Forum Meets"]

[Text] Budapest—The Hungarian Democratic Forum arrived at its third congress, which opened on Thursday, as the leading political force in Hungary.

It is already possible now to declare boldly that Hungarian Democratic Forum representatives will preside over the State Assembly and form the government. At the congress of this party, which took place this time behind doors closed to journalists, it was determined that Hungarian Democratic Forum member General

Keri Kalman will preside, at least over the first session of parliament. Talks about a future government coalition were entrusted by the congress to party president Jozsef Antall, who in Hungary today is being viewed as synonymous with the prime minister.

The Hungarian Democratic Forum congress also discussed the question of government coalition allies. Here, it must be noted, a new element of no little significance has arisen. Unlike earlier statements in which the possibility of coalition with the second-most powerful party, the Alliance of Free Democrats, was admitted, such a possibility is now ruled out by the majority of congress participants. At the same time, however, this dogmatism was not displayed with regard to the Alliance of Free Democrats' ally, the Alliance of Young Democrats. On the contrary, Hungarian Democratic Forum President J. Antall openly stated that he views the Alliance of Young Democrats, which holds 21 seats, as a potential partner in a government coalition. If the Hungarian Democratic Forum manages to win over the Alliance of Free Democrats' former ally to its side, then a government drawing on an absolute majority in parliament can be formed.

The Hungarian Democratic Forum congress stated that the party was intending to nominate its own candidates to the majority of the most important government posts. True, the names of these candidates were not yet specifically put forward; however, we did hear quite a few proposals. Many people, for instance, are worried by the question of whether a shakeup on party lines will be started in ministries and state enterprises, as can be observed in some neighboring countries. A notable development in this connection is Thursday's television statement by Hungarian Democratic Forum press secretary Cs. Kiss that there will be no "witch-hunt" and that specialists can work in peace.

Speaking about manifestations of anti-Sovietism in Hungary, another Hungarian Democratic Forum representative, I. Bethlen, an economic questions expert who is destined for the post of finance minister, stated in an interview with a Japanese newspaper that such manifestations were nothing but irresponsible chatter. It should never be forgotten, I. Bethlen remarked, that Soviet oil costs Hungary less than Arab oil, and that the majority of Hungarian industrial goods sell only on the Soviet market... The Hungarian Democratic Forum president himself said when the congress opened that a future Hungarian government was interested in friendly relations with the USSR.

"The interest of the Hungarian state lies in having the Soviet Union as its strong and reliable partner," J. Antall emphasized.

Funding Needed for Troops Returning From CSFR

PM1804082590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 First Edition p3

[Interview with Colonel General E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces, by correspondent Colonel P. Chernenko, under the heading "Troop Withdrawal: Lessons of the First Stage"—date and place not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] It is six weeks since the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia began. Progress in implementing the accords reached between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and the problems connected with redeploying formations and units were the subject of a conversation between our correspondent and Colonel General E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces.

[Chernenko] Eduard Arkadyevich, what can you say about the initial results of the withdrawal?

[Vorobyev] As is well known, our troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia is being conducted in three stages: the first by 31 May 1990; the second by the end of 1990; and the third by 30 June 1991. It is a difficult task. This is shown to some extent by the following figures. A total of 64 military garrisons are being eliminated. More than 73,000 personnel, 1,220 tanks, 2,505 combat vehicles, 1,218 artillery systems, 77 frontline air force planes, and 146 helicopters are to be withdrawn. As you yourself appreciate, even the purely technical implementation is extremely complex. Nevertheless the first stage of the troop withdrawal, which began on 26 February, is, I stress, going strictly according to plan.

So far, the tank division under the command of Colonel V. Tikhomirov has been completely redeployed to the USSR. The initial results of the Soviet troop withdrawal have been reviewed at a session of representatives of the two countries' governments. I must point out that neither the Group command nor the relevant Czechoslovak organizations have any previous experience of redeploying formations and units on this kind of scale. Because of this, there have been some delays with loading material supplies and equipment onto trains, and unforeseen difficulties have arisen with their reloading at Chop Station. And, at first, miscalculations were made as regards marshaling trains and traffic and compiling appropriate documents.

The center set up under the auspices of the Central Group of Forces headquarters to take charge of the troop withdrawal constantly coordinates its actions with the control service of the Czechoslovak Army General Staff, which makes it possible to promptly take the measures necessary to eliminate bottlenecks. I have some more figures for you, because, as you appreciate, our conversation is pointless without them. A total of 62 units of railroad rolling stock, 19 motor vehicle convoys, 6,371 personnel, and 280 tanks had been withdrawn from Czechoslovak territory by 31 March....

[Chernenko] What is the moral and political atmosphere surrounding the withdrawal? As we know, a few months ago Czechoslovakia was swept by a wave of rallies and demonstrations; demands in the form of ultimatums were made at some of them. And, unfortunately, there have been cases of tactless behavior toward our military servicemen. So what is the situation like now?

[Vorobyev] The press has carried reports on rallies staged in areas where Soviet troops are deployed. The wave of rallies has died down now but not disappeared altogether, unfortunately. To be perfectly frank, the mass media are contributing to this to a considerable extent. In addition to its objective, even critical reports, Civic Forum also often publishes far from objective material on Central Group of Forces personnel, both at the center and at local level. And sometimes it gives out information that is simply unconfirmed. An example of this is the report about Soviet military servicemen selling weapons to Czechoslovak citizens.

But what is particularly regrettable is that even the military press has become involved in this unseemly campaign. The other day, the newspaper OBRANA LIDU informed its readers that Soviet families vacating their apartments are leaving them in a disgraceful state. They claim that these families are taking everything with them that has any value at all: toilet bowls, baths, washstands, and in some cases even facing tiles. These are the kind of "sensationalist" facts we come across.... But I can say with all responsibility that they are far removed from the truth.

However, bitter corn does germinate, no matter where it is cast. There has recently been an increase in the number of acts of hooliganism by Czechoslovak citizens, mainly young people, against military servicemen and their families. Two smoke bombs were thrown at the premises of a guarded installation, for example. And rocks have been thrown at passing Soviet vehicles in the population centers of Milovice, Bruntal, and Libava.

We regularly inform the local national committees, the Civic Forum Coordination Center Council, and even the president of Czechoslovakia of such instances.

[Chernenko] We are leaving behind barracks, service and warehouse premises, and residential buildings in the garrisons.... What is going to happen to them?

[Vorobyev] Good service and living conditions for personnel have been created over a period of more than 20 years in the garrisons of the Central Group of Forces. The value of the military installations built by the Soviet side since 1968 to the present day is estimated at 237.9 million rubles [R]. Of the 17,700 apartments occupied by us, 7,700 have been built with Soviet funds. So how are we going to dispose of all this?

All military camps, residential buildings, and other buildings and installations are being handed over to the Czechoslovak side as the troops withdraw and the garrisons are vacated. Joint Czechoslovak-Soviet commissions determine their book value and suitability for future use and draw up the terms under which they are to be transferred. To date, of the 1,220 buildings and premises of various purpose already surveyed (653 of them are Soviet property), the Czechoslovak side is buying 281, including 11 residential buildings comprising 666 apartments worth R4.5 million. It is proposed to hand over 40 installations with a total value of R4 million to the Czechoslovak National Defense Ministry for subsequent sale to civilian organizations. A total of 332 installations, mainly warehouses for fuels and lubricants, various storehouses, and prefabricated panelboard buildings, will be destroyed, since they do not meet modern requirements. Some of the collapsible prefabricated storehouses, fuel reservoirs, and Soviet-made equipment will be dismantled and taken back to the Soviet Union.

[Chernenko] And a last question, Eduard Arkadyevich. The units and subunits entrusted to you are being redeployed to new places, where—there is no point in hiding it—far from everything is ready to receive them. The difficulties are particularly great with regard to providing servicemen's families with housing. Have there been any changes in this respect, and what are the plans for the immediate future?

[Vorobyev] There are no straight answers to these questions. Wherever our units are redeployed, the USSR Defense Ministry and the military districts' command units and military councils are doing everything possible to house the troops and provide them with all they need. But the difficulties with providing housing for officers and warrant officers are certainly great. The overwhelming majority of them have no apartment at all. For example, of the 1,207 families of the division redeployed to the Moscow Military District, only 334 have housing in their previous place of service. And of the 71 families who have arrived in their new place of service, only 23 have obtained apartments: The rest are living in hostel accomodation. The local authorities have pledged to provide another 200 families with apartments within the next year. Prefabricated panelboard barracks are being made into family hostels.

That is the picture. I know that the situation is no better in other regions of the country to which our formations and units are being sent. There are barracks for soldiers and NCO's in the Kiev, North Caucasus, and Belorussian Military Districts. But where are we to get apartments, schools, kindergartens, and municipal and communal service establishments? The Defense Ministry cannot solve this problem on its own. I believe that there is only one solution: The government must allocate extra funds for strictly targeted use.

Bulgaria Government Condemns Anti-Soviet Rally

LD1904103390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] The Bulgarian Government resolutely condemns the unprecedented and undignified demonstration on 17 April outside the Soviet Embassy in Sofia. The point at issue is the rally by the opposition federation of independent student associations. According to the newspaper (DUM), it is the first anti-Soviet rally in Bulgaria. The purpose of the rally is to express support for Lithuania's decision on independence. The rally, however, abounded in scathing attacks on the Soviet Union and its national policy. It is difficult to evaluate it as anything but flagrant interference in the internal affairs of our state.

Bulgarian Party Council Changes Name, Policy

90UF0071A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 8 Apr 90 p 3

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent Yu. Savin report: "With a New Name"]

[Text] Sofia—The first issue of the daily DUMA ("The Word" in Russian) has appeared. This is now the name of the Bulgarian Communist Party organ RABOTNICHESKO DELO, which had appeared for 63 years.

As Stefan Prodev, chief editor of the publication, emphasized, given the new social and political conditions and given the party's social universalization, the former name does not correspond to the demands of the times. "Duma" is a simple and clear word which is dear to every Bulgarian (S. Prodev recalled the newspaper with a related name published by Christo Botev, the well-known Bulgarian revolutionary, poet, and writer) and affords greater professional freedom. The newspaper's editorial board intends to affirm in the daily new ideas and a democratic spirit.

The proposals of the editorial board were accepted by the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Party Council. We recall that the Bulgarian Communist Party now has a new name—the Bulgarian Socialist Party. This decision was made by an all-party referendum, the results of which were approved and made public by the Supreme Party Council. Some 726,000 communists participated—almost three-fourths of party members. Approximately 87 percent of those who voted supported the new name, 13 percent were against.

The report of Aleksandr Lilov, chairman of the Supreme Party Council, called the change of party name a historic event. The Bulgarian Socialist Party is beginning a reinterpretation of its theoretical and practical goals and of its experience in light of the new realities and new problems. Its goal is a democratic and socially law-based society with people's equal rights and opportunities, a society in which each and everyone has an opportunity—a society of democratic socialism. The change of name also means a new party policy, the report also said. It is a policy of profound radical change and reforms in the economy, social sphere, spiritual life and legal system.

Our party has no intention of being a "party without a past," the chairman of the Supreme Party Council observed. It has enough bright pages which are of permanent significance. It also has that which needs to be abandoned. The importance of freeing the party of corrupt people who have violated party morals and those common to all mankind and who have committed crimes was emphasized.

We are for a transition to democracy, for a peaceful and civilized transition, A. Lilov stressed. We are for a transition to a market economy, but with the payment of the lowest possible social price, given the best guarantees of the preservation of security and rights for all. It is important to discover and nominate on behalf of the party strong, competent, honest, and unsullied candidates who are most authoritative among the people for the impending elections.

In connection with the election of Petr Mladenov as president of the country and in accordance with constitutional requirements, the Supreme Party Council relieved him of executive office in the party. At the same time Stanko Todorov and Lyuben Gotsev were elected members of the Supreme Party Council Presidium.

A thousands-strong meeting was held in the capital's "9 September" Central Square whose participants warmly approved the results of the meeting of the Supreme Party Council. "The future awaits us, we are heading toward it—with a new name and new ideas. We will win!" The final speaker at the meeting concluded his speech with these words.

Bulgarian Party Aiming for 'Civilized Dialogue'

PM1804144390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent L. Zhmyrev dispatch: "'Down With' and 'Together'"]

[Text] Sofia, 12 Apr—The Bulgarian version of transition to democratic socialism is, in its own way, a unique experiment in preserving and modifying former social structures while collaborating with new political forces.

The official registration of the Bulgarian Communist Party's [BCP's] new name—the Bulgarian Socialist Party—took place in Sofia City Court. After the legal act was completed, Rumen Serbezov, secretary of the Supreme Party Council Presidium, stated that the judicial registration of the party's change of name truly reflects the new aims and tasks which it has set itself—the building of a democratic, just, and humane society.

The first press conference of the BCP's ongoing election campaign took place at party headquarters. Speaking there Aleksandur Lilov, leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, stated that for the first time in many years the list of BCP candidates for the Bulgarian parliament will be compiled according to proposals from below, from grassroots party organizations, and not at the Party House (the former BCP Central Committee). One of the conditions for an election victory is the participation of every party member in the election campaign.

Describing a feature of the BCP's present election platform, A. Lilov noted that the party does not adopt "Down With" slogans. Its rallying call is "Together."

This very aim—achieving a political consensus and transforming the raging passions which have exacerbated confrontation between various political forces into a course of civilized dialogue—was the object of the consultations between the country's president, Petur Mladenov, and representatives of various social and political forces: the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, the Union of Democratic Forces, and others. The president saw it as a sign of hope that reason is prevailing in the new and unusual situation of pluralism and the conflict of ideas and interests. Dialogue and striving for civilized competition define the overall political climate of present-day Bulgaria.

Participants in the presidential consultations were united on the point that there is no political force in Bulgaria today which alone is in a position to extricate the country from its crisis. National accord in the name of a bold and at the same time realistic policy of reform is needed.

Foreign observers, whose opinion is widely represented in the the Bulgarian press, note that Bulgaria is now "the only island in East Europe" which has not been engulfed by a tidal wave of mind-boggling reincarnations and antisocialist transformations. The country's prospects are that cooperation among all the political forces now confronting one another is entirely possible.

West Europe

Lithuania's Prunskiene Meets Norway's Leadership

LD1904102890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Kazimiera Prunskine, prime minister of the Lithunanian government, and Algirdas Saudargas, the republic's foreign minister, are in Oslo. We have been informed that they are meeting with the Norwegian prime minister and foreign minister. Problems of economic cooperation and, of course, the supply of oil, are being discussed at the meeting.

Ambassador to Finland Criticizes Lithuanian Leaders

LD1804172590 Helsinki International Service in Finnish 1500 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The Soviet ambassador to Finland, Boris Aristov, regards as senseless the attempts of the Lithuanian leaders to turn the Lithuanian question into an international issue. Aristov, who gave an address on perestroyka in Oulu, stressed the right of the Soviet republics to secede from the Soviet Union. According to Aristov, the Lithuanian leaders' attempts to turn an internal question into an international one disrupts the constitutional process.

Ambassador Aristov also proposed a meeting of the highest leaders of the European countries, the United States, and Canada in Helsinski next year or the following year to discuss a new all-European security structure.

Finnish Coalition Party's Kivela Visits Moscow

PM1904141990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS "Official Report"]

[Text] On 13 April there was a meeting at the CPSU Central Committee International Department with Finnish National Coalition Party General Secretary P. Kivela. There was a discussion of questions of the development of interparty cooperation and topical issues of the situation in Europe.

Switzerland Expels Soviet UN Mission Member

AU1904090690 Paris AFP in English 0834 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Bern, April 19 (AFP)—Switzerland has expelled a member of the Soviet U.N. mission for spying and barred two others from returning here, the government announced Thursday.

The move came after a police investigation revealed that members of the mission in Geneva were involved in military and economic espionage, a statement said. They had illegally tried to obtain scientific and technical information and material, it added.

The expelled official has left the country, while the other two diplomats who had already quit the mission, were barred from returning to Switzerland.

Switzerland expelled a member of the Soviet trade mission in Bern in February of last year for economic and military espionage.

Further on Shevardnadze-De Michelis Talks

PM1804150090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Soviet-Italian Talks"]

[Text] Talks were held on 17 April between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and Italian Foreign Minister G. De Michelis, who was in the Soviet Union on a working visit.

The central topic of the talks was the state of affairs in Europe. The sides agreed that the processes taking place on the continent favor rapprochement between its Eastern and Western parts. It is important that these processes should fit in with the CSCE process and lead to the building of a Europe of peace and stability.

A thorough exchange of opinions took place on the problem of German unity. E.A. Shevardnadze stressed that the process of building German unity is possible given that three main conditions are observed: It should take place by stages, by peaceful, democratic means, taking into account the interests of all parties and with strict preservation of the balance of forces and the immutability of existing borders, and it should take place in harmony with the Helsinki process. The Soviet side believes that the most correct form of peaceful German settlement is a peace treaty. This should define the military-political status of Germany and close the book on the last war. Germany's membership of NATO does not suit the Soviet Union, the country's public opinion, or the Soviet people.

The ministers agreed that as a result of the process of perestroyka in the USSR, the profound political transformations in the East European countries, and the formation of the foundations of a united German state, the situation in Europe has changed so radically that a new European approach to security and cooperation is becoming an imperative of the day. An important prerequisite for this approach, in the sides' opinion, is the combination of the process of unification of the two German states with the deepening of the all-European process and the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. The conviction was expressed that the meeting of the leaders of the 35 CSCE states in 1990 should be an important stage along this path.

The growing significance of the Helsinki process for the development of all-European cooperation and the strengthening of stability on the continent was noted. The two sides expressed the conviction that the conference of CSCE countries at the highest level should be a major step toward strengthening European security and should culminate in results reflecting the realities of the present-day development of Europe. The sides came out in favor of thorough and all-around preparations for the conference.

The ministers agreed that the summit conference should reaffirm the immutability of the Helsinki principles and note the growing cooperation between East and West; sign an agreement on conventional arms and, if possible, an agreement on confidence-building measures, and also define the avenues of further cooperation in these spheres; and study potential means and mechanisms capable of ensuring the holding of more intensive political consultations at various levels.

In the course of this conference it is also expedient to discuss specific paths of all-European economic integration. Certain groundwork has already been done in this sphere: Relations have been established between CEMA and the EEC and agreements have been signed between individual East European countries and the European Communities.

E.A. Shevardnadze and G. De Michelis agreed that each of the participants in the all-European process can and should make a constructive contribution to the design and creation of the architecture of tomorrow's Europe. The Italian minister, for his part, gave an assurance that Italy intends to make the maximum use of its period of chairmanship of the EC leading organs in the next half-year to this end.

The ministers' dialogue devoted great attention to the state of and prospects for Soviet-Italian cooperation, especially in the light of the implementation of the accords reached in November-December 1989 during M.S. Gorbachev's state visit to Italy. The ministers expressed satisfaction at the general level and volume of Soviet-Italian collaboration. At the same time the urgent need was stressed for greater dynamism in the development of bilateral ties and the speediest possible attainment of concrete results in a number of areas of our partnership which are of important national economic significance for the Soviet Union.

The ministers heard and approved reports from the leaders of working parties set up on the eve of the visit to discuss concrete questions of international life (the situation in Europe, disarmament, and regional problems, including the Mediterranean) and bilateral relations.

The talks took place in a businesslike, constructive atmosphere.

On the completion of their talks E.A. Shevardnadze and G. De Michelis signed the protocol of the 15th session of the mixed commission on implementing the cultural agreement between the USSR and Italy, which will govern Soviet-Italian ties and contacts in this sphere for the next three years. The sides, in particular, agreed to study the question of possible participation by Italian experts in the restoration of buildings of historic and artistic value that were built in Russian cities according to the designs of prominent Italian architects.

On the same day a luncheon was given on behalf of E.A. Shevardnadze in honor of G. De Michelis.

In the evening G. De Michelis left the Soviet Union.

He was seen off at the airport by E.A. Shevardnadze and other officials.

F. Salleo, Italian ambassador to the USSR, was among the sendoff party.

Italian Foreign Minister Views Moscow Agenda

PM1804143190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Italian Foreign Minister G. De Michelis by own correspondent M. Kozhukhov: "Gianni De Michelis: 'We Count on the Soviet Union'"—date and place of interview not given, first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The Italian foreign minister, who is visiting our country, replies to questions put by IZVESTIYA's correspondent.

[Kozhukhov] Mr. Minister, what will be the main topic of your visit to the Soviet Union, the key question at the Moscow talks?

[De Michelis] It is envisaged that global problems of concern to the entire international community will be discussed in Moscow. This means primarily the problems of the new European political architecture. The whole range of questions connected with the new system of European security, which in its broader interpretation takes account not just of the interests of the countries of the Old World but also of those of the United States and Canada. It proceeds from the fact that rivalry and confrontation are an attribute of the past. The process of European integration has also placed on the agenda discussion of the future political and economic relations between West and East Europe, as well as preparations for the summit conference on security and cooperation which is to be held again in Helsinki.

We will also examine the situation in our bilateral relations, and in particular questions connected with the numerous agreements signed during President Gorbachev's visit to Italy.

Naturally, the "Lithuanian question" will also be discussed. In Italy serious concern is being expressed in connection with the situation in the Baltic republics, and especially in Lithuania, and I will convey this to Minister Shevardnadze. The Italian view is that strong-arm arguments must not crush the logic of the quest for political solutions. This concern is dictated by the sympathies for President Gorbachev's policy and the sincere interest in the success of perestroyka which exist in our country.

[Kozhukhov] How do you see the USSR's role in the process of continental integration, in the new structures of a changing Europe?

[De Michelis] The unification will take place gradually, in stages. This process will revolve around the new European community which will construct mutual relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the USSR, on the basis of bilateral agreements. A European confederation as proposed by President Mitterrand may be established as a result. Or the process could end with all the countries of the continent joining the Council of Europe—which would also facilitate the creation of a common area, so to speak, a common vision of the world in political and legal terms. Whatever happens, the final forms of integration remain a subject for discussion today.

[Kozhukhov] The upcoming unification of the two German states is attracting universal interest in Europe. Where does Italy see the solution of this problem?

[De Michelis] We in Rome proceed from the premise that the unification of the two Germanys should strengthen rather than weaken European security. We regard it as logical that the new, united Germany should remain a member of NATO, while bearing in mind the security interests of its neighbors and strictly abiding by the principle of the inviolability of postwar borders. In short, bearing in mind the exceptionally serious political, economic, and social consequences of this step for the whole continent, we favor a unification formula which would guarantee the interests of all European countries, including Italy itself, of course.

[Kozhukhov] The bilateral relations between our countries are developing favorably. The successes of Italian entrepreneurs in the USSR are there for everyone to see. What is contributing to this?

[De Michelis] First and foremost, it is the high level of constructive political cooperation which facilitates businessmen's work. Apart from this it is the objective competitiveness of Italian business, which is based on both initiative and readiness to take risks. Both indicate that Italy counts on the USSR. Despite all the difficulties which you are currently experiencing and may experience in the future, the Soviet Union is destined to play a significant role in 21st century Europe not just in political but also in economic terms. And for the sake of that it is worth taking risks right now.

[Kozhukhov] This is a time of complex questions in our country, and to many of them there are no ready-made answers. Is there any question which you ask yourself when discussing the USSR, to which you do not know the answer?

[De Michelis] I wonder about the economic reform. It will not be easy, of course, to find solutions to your political problems, or the currently very acute ethnic problems, but nonetheless, in my view the transition to a market economy represents the greatest difficulty in your vast country. It was not the perestroyka which destroyed the previous system that merely conveyed a semblance of well-being and security. The system was destroyed by reality itself. It proved unable to meet the challenge of the times. There is no other option for the USSR today but change. Naturally, only you yourself can make it work, but international cooperation is needed to help your country to overcome the difficult transitional period. Many people in Europe realize right now that, if perestroyka failed, this would have extremely serious negative consequences for all of us. We are all in the same boat, only some of us have more comfortable seats than others.

French Chief of Staff Meets Moiseyev, Yazov

PM1804123390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p1

[Unattributed report: "Official Visit"]

[Text] Army General M. Schmitt, chief of staff of the French Armed Forces, arrived in the Soviet Union on an official visit on 16 April at the invitation of Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister.

The guest and his entourage were met at the airport by Army Gen. M.A. Moiseyev and other generals and officers from the Soviet Armed Forces.

Those present included Brigadier General P. Vigla [name as transliterated], defense attache at the French Embassy in the Soviet Union.

A conversation took place the same day between Army Gen. M.A. Moiseyev and Army Gen. M. Schmitt. Questions of mutual interest were discussed.

Army Gen. M. Schmitt was received by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister. In the course of the conversation the sides expressed confidence in the usefulness of contacts in the military sphere for broadening trust and mutual understanding between states involved in the all-European process. Army Gen. M.A. Moiseyev took part in the conversation.

The guest from France laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall.

Army Gen. M.A. Moiseyev gave a dinner in honor of Army Gen. M. Schmitt.

Further on Yazov, Moiseyev Meetings

LD1804170890 Moscow TASS in English 1531 GMT 18 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces General Maurice Schmitt, who is currently in the Soviet Union on an official visit, today met Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov. Bilateral relations and prospects for their development and strengthening were discussed.

Schmitt also met Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces General Mikhail Moiseyev.

"We are deeply convinced that perestroika, which was launched in the Soviet Union on the initiative of President Mikhail Gorbachev, has given an impetus to those positive processes that are now taking place in Eastern Europe," Schmitt told TASS.

His opinion is that the current processes in East European countries are of exceptional importance for advance along the road of democratisation and progress.

Speaking of their likely impact on Franco-Soviet relations in the military field, Schmitt emphasised that all European leaders, both civilian and military, should find solutions so that stability and security on the continent would not be upset.

"Relations between the Soviet Union and France should continue to be built on mutual respect and trust," Schmitt said.

Schmitt Speaks on European Problems

LD1804183890 Moscow TASS in English 1620 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The unification of the two German states should not violate stability in Europe, General Maurice Schmitt, chief of staff of the French Armed Forces, told TASS. Schmitt, on an official visit to the Soviet Union, today visited the military High Airborne Command School in the Russian city of Ryazan.

Speaking about the evolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the general said this issue "should be considered both at Vienna and at the forthcoming Helsinki-2 summit meeting."

He said relations between the two blocs should advance "towards mutual respect, and then—towards cooperation."

Speaking about the objectives of the formation of a French-West German brigade in 1988 and about its operation, Schmitt said the brigade could be employed only in case of aggression against either country.

He said the joint brigade "should teach the two nations, which were engaged in three major wars between themselves between 1870 and 1945, to live in peace."

Commenting on the Soviet proposal to cut the strength of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops down to 750,000 on each side, Schmitt noted that this proposal had first to be studied.

He said one of the problems was posed by the different principles of military development in various countries. For instance, countries with universal military service have an advantage over countries having a professional army, with regard to reserves.

"More important now is an agreement on the levels of various kinds of armaments on the territory from the Atlantic to the Urals and in separate zones, which I hope will be achieved at Vienna," Schmitt said.

The general pointed to the frankness of the Soviet military, which he said promoted sincere and friendly relations.

"It was a pleasure to deal with people who love their homeland so much, which we Frenchmen greatly appreciate," he said.

Austrian Market Economy Experience Viewed

PM1104142590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[S. Chebanov report: "Experience in Mastering the Market"]

[Text] "Austria's Experience in Transferring From Administrative Regulation of the Economy to a Market Economy" was the first international seminar for members of the USSR Supreme Soviet economic commissions and committees, held 4-5 April 1990. The aim of its organizers—the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute and the Austrian National Bank (the country's central state bank)—was to familiarize Soviet legislators with positive elements in foreign practice which could be used in the process of forming a new economic mechanism in our country.

Austria's postwar development provides a concrete example of the creation of an efficient socially oriented market economy. Purposeful measures to stabilize money circulation and regulate prices and wages have been implemented since 1955 in a country where the government has had a traditionally important role in the economy. As a result, optimum proportions were achieved between state and private ownership and between centralized and market structures. All this ensures efficient social reproduction and the population's great prosperity.

Speeches were delivered by Austrian financiers, businessmen, and politicians who participated directly in the implementation of the economic policy for the transitional period.

FRG's Genscher Cites Shevardnadze Interview

LD1204204190 Moscow TASS English 2016 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Bonn April 12 TASS—"The interview of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze with the magazine 'NATO'S 16 NATIONS' confirms my conviction that the Soviet Union strives for constructive participation in the establishment of lasting and just peaceful order for the whole of Europe, with the United States and Canada being fuly involved in the process," stated West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

In a statement circulated by the West German Foreign Ministry here today, Genscher pointed out that the Soviet leadership is also interested in comprehensive stability on the continent in all its dimensions, including security issues, political and economic aspects.

Like the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union attaches much importance to the invigoration of the Helsinki process which, in Genscher's opinion, is to play a decisive role in overcoming the split of Europe and Germany.

Noteworthy is also the coincidence of views on such problems as relations between the military and political alliances and the future of Europe, Genscher pointed out.

This manifests itself in a particularly clear way in the desire of the two sides to strengthen and deepen the CSCE process and direct it to the channel of practical deeds. This also applies to the plans to convene CSCE summit conferences, to hold CSCE foreign ministers' meetings, to establish a European centre to prevent and settle conflicts as well as to monitor disarmament, Genscher noted.

Along with disarmament and confidence-building measures, much importance is also being attached to ensuring that NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation move from confrontation and cooperation, assuming political character to a larger extent than military one.

In the positions of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic, there remain differences of opinion over the question of NATO membership for a reunified Germany, Genscher emphasised.

These differences, however, should not eclipse those prospects for a renewed Europe that arise from Shevardnadze's inteview, Genscher stated.

Civilian Goods From Defense Plants on Display

PM1204103790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[PRAVDA-TASS report under general heading "News Roundup: 10 April"]

[Text]

FRG

"The World's First"—these words rang out repeatedly at a press conference at the Bonn Press Club which was devoted to the "Konversiya-90" Soviet exhibition which opened in Munich 20 April. At the first, and so far the only, exhibition of this kind more than 1,200 examples of exclusively civilian goods produced at 300 defense sector enterprises are on display; these have been produced within the framework of the program to switch military industry to civilian production. The exhibits include transport facilities, electronic components, communication systems, medical equipment, and consumer goods. Visitors' attention is bound to be attracted by powerful traction vehicles built on tank underframes, models of future supersonic aircraft, models of Soviet carrier rockets, electronic household goods, and even... a model of a submarine for tourist excursions.

CPSU Congratulates Spain's Communist Party

PM1804154590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee message to Spanish Communists on anniversary]

[Text] To the Spanish Communist Party [PCE] Central Committee

Dear comrades!

The CPSU Central Committee ardently congratulates the PCE on the 70th anniversary of its foundation.

The PCE has had a long and difficult journey. The heroism of Spanish Communists, who were among the first to embark on the struggle against fascism in Europe, earned them the respect of progressive forces the world over.

Your party still plays an important part in the country's political life. Soviet Communists are well aware of the PCE's efforts to defend the Spanish people's democratic gains, deliver mankind from the threat of war, and establish common sense and the norms of humanity in international relations.

We are in favor of strengthening the established relations of comradeship and solidarity between our parties in the struggle for the triumph of the ideals of democracy, peace, and social justice.

[Signed] CPSU Central Committee

Latin America & Caribbean

Abalkin Concludes Visit to Cuba, Departs 18 Apr

Albakin Queried on Trade Relations

LD1804221490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by correspondent Ye. Fateyev from Havana]

[Text] [Presenter] Well, and now for a review of international events. We will begin with a report from Havana where the annual, 20th sitting of the intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technical cooperation finished today:

[Fateyev] Here protocols are being signed on the results of the sitting, and on interaction in the trade turnover and payments of the USSR and Cuba for 1990.

The volume of mutual trade between Cuba and the USSR is currently increasing by 8 percent, and will reach almost 9 billion rubles. It is also intended to increase the volume of technical assistance rendered to Cuba by the Soviet Union, and to bring it up to R600 million this year. This means that many important facilities will come into service. The powerful electrometallurgical complex in Havana should produce its first steel products, for example. A significant increase in the production of petrol and other petroleum products is expected with the startup of oil refining works in the town of Cienfuegos. The creation of the first main friendship pipeline in Cuba is planned. [video shows port scenes, construction work, industrial enterprises, and the planned location for a pipeline construction; then Abalkin being interviewed by Fateyev]

[Begin video interview] [Fateyev] Leonid Ivanovich, it is well known that calls have recently been heard from the rostrum of the Congress of People's Deputies and in the Soviet press for our country's economic relations with Cuba to be reconsidered.

[L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and head of the Soviet delegation—identified by screen caption] Many of those who are speaking about the folding of relations with Cuba or with other countries are not thinking in real terms. It suffices to say that a third of the sugar consumed by the Soviet people is produced here on this island. I have become acquainted with the work of a nickel combine which supplies all of its nickel to the Soviet Union, to the Urals. And the high quality steel which we use, as well as the stainless steel, is produced, is a product of Cuba. We will not even mention the supplies of citrus crops and other things. We have already concluded an agreement for a drastic increase in the purchase of medicines and medical preparations, and are going down the road of renewal—not without consideration and not in such a way as to forget the past—but in a considered fashion, carefully, and opening up new, very promising channels for cooperation. [while Abalkin is speaking, video shows factory production of the various products that were mentioned, as well as citrus fruit being picked] [end video interview]

Castro Comments on Talks

LD1804203690 Moscow TASS in English 2008 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Havana April 18 TASS—Meetings and talks with the visiting Soviet delegation led by Leonid Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, were held in an atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding, Fidel Castro told a news conference on Tuesday.

"We see that the Soviet Union, notwithstanding its own difficulties, is making efforts towards further developing economic relations between our two countries," he emphasised.

In answer to a question about the results of the session of the inter-governmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Castro pointed out the importance of these relations for the two countries and mutual interest in trade and cooperation which had been developing for 30 years.

These contacts made it possible to establish close friendly political and economic relations which stand the test of time and withstand difficulties, he added.

Speaking of talks with Abalkin, the Cuban leader said that not only economic topics but also political, social and historical matters were discussed during the talks.

Abalkin Holds News Conference

LD1904061190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0312 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] [no dateline as received] Soviet-Cuban goods turnover this year will amount to more than 9 billion rubles, including volumes of technical assistance. This is 8 percent more than last year. As far as the volume of aid the Soviet Union is providing to Cuba is concerned, it is not being increased, declared Leonid Abalkin at a press conference.

The linking up of fundamentally new directions of cooperation, including international tourism, joint ventures, common capital investments, and the development of medicine and health care are opening up new horizons in bilateral relations. Now the construction and reconstruction of several major objects, including the nickel industry, where there are very rich prospects, is under way. Provided both sides demonstrate sufficiently serious approaches, a balanced judgement and statesmanlike wisdom coupled with the maintenance of their traditional friendly ties, opportunities will open up substantially, in my view, for extending the volume of our business relations in the next five years, emphasized Leonid Abalkin.

Having signed protocols on the results of the 20th session of the intergovernmental commission, we summarized the result of the five-year cycle which our countries have gone through. Despite all the positive assessments, we were very critical and self-critical in evaluating the results. We noted a whole range of actions which have complicated our relations and have, for instance, prevented us from completely fulfilling our mutual obligations last year. A quite critical assessment of these aspects is reflected in the joint documents.

We have thoroughly evaluated the path traveled and the existing deficiencies. This has allowed us to define future prospects more clearly. We have agreed not to repeat past mistakes. On the whole, a lot of complex work lies ahead in determining the prospects of Soviet-Cuban cooperation for the next five-year plan.

Abalkin Departs Cuba for Moscow

LD1904035190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0048 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Havana, 19 Apr (TASS)—The Soviet delegation led by Leonid Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, having taken part in the 20th session of the intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission on Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation, left for Moscow on Wednesday.

Raul Castro, the Cuban leader, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers, and other officials arrived at the "Jose Marti" International Airport to see the delegation off. Among those saying farewell were Yuriy Petrov, USSR ambassador to Cuba, and Ramon Balaguer, Cuban ambassador to the USSR.

Soviet-Cuban Relations, Cooperation Examined

PY1404122290 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 13 Apr 90

[By Leonid Levchenko]

[Text] The Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Technical, and Scientific Cooperation is meeting in Cuba. Not only the capitals of Cuba and the Soviet Union are interested in the outcome of the meeting; the Western media has been speculating about current and future Cuban-Soviet relations.

Soviet cooperation with Cuba represents a heavy burden for the Soviet economy, which is facing several problems. However, speculation aside, we can say that the predictions filled with bad intentions do not go along with reality. As in the past, the Soviet-Cuban contacts are currently stable and cover all the main aspects of social development. The contacts are based on the principle of equal rights, respect for autonomy, mutual understanding of responsibility, and the need for international assistance.

Last year, speaking before the Cuban Parliament, Mikhail Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union appreciates its friendship with socialist Cuba, and expressed his disposition to continue to develop Soviet-Cuban relations.

There is no doubt that the new conditions in the international field calls for new demands on bilateral relations, especially with trade. The two countries are interested in seeking new economic methods to encourage cooperation. Cuban President Fidel Castro met with Leonid Abalkin, who heads the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Technical, and Scientific Cooperation. Castro and Abalkin studied the agenda of the meeting.

The commission will evaluate last year's cooperation and will address the tasks for this year, scientific and technical cooperation programs, and coordination of the Soviet and Cuban economic plans for 1991-1995. The experts agree that there is no reduction in the cooperation between the two countries.

Regarding bilateral relations in general, the spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry labeled relations as very good. This coincides with the evaluation recently given to Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca. The meeting being held by the commission created great interest due to the U.S. effort to strengthen the economic sanctions against the island.

Yakovlev, Frolov Awarded Latin American Order

LD1204222390 Moscow TASS in English 1613 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—The Freedom and Unity Order of the International Association for the Unity of Latin America has been awarded today to Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo member and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and member of the USSR Presidential Council, Academician Ivan Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and PRAVDA's editor in chief, and academician Yuriy Osipyan, member of the USSR Presidential Council.

They have been awarded the order by a decision of the ninth conference of the Association for the Unity of Latin America. The conference ended here today.

When presenting the awards to Yakovlev, Frolov and Osipyan, Jose Maria Chaves, president of the association, emphasised that the orders have been awarded to them for their outstanding contribution to the strengthening of the world-wide brotherhood of peoples, the strengthening of peace and prosperity of mankind and for the energetic activities to implement perestroyka ideas that have had such a beneficial effect on the international atmosphere.

"The Soviet people have always entertained the sentiments of solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Latin America for unity and feedom," Yakovlev said in a reply speech.

"Democratic changes that have taken place there in recent years are close to Soviet perestroyka."

"As far as reforms in the Soviet Union are concerned, he said, "we now need both greater unity and the development of the great feeling of freedom. Only this gives us hope for the future."

TASS To Open Office in Chile in April or May

PY1404144890 Santiago HOY in Spanish
9-15 Apr 90 p 25

[Text] Two correspondents of the Soviet news agency TASS will arrive in Chile in late April or early May to stay. This was reported by Vladimir Shejovtsov [name as published], who visited the HOY offices. He came to our country to make the initial contacts in order to establish a TASS office in Santiago. TASS is subordinated to the USSR Council of Ministers. Although it is an official agency, TASS does not receive funds from the state. TASS provides services to more than 3,000 media in the USSR alone and it has more than 100 foreign correspondents.

Supreme Soviet Session

Decision on Gdlyan, Ivanov Case Adopted 18 Apr

LD1804154790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1420 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] I am sure that many of our listeners, very many of them, are awaiting reports from the Kremlin and the latest news about how the discussion is going on the work of the commission to check materials connected with the activity of the investigative group of the USSR Procuracy headed by Gdlyan. So, we now have on the line the Mayak correspondents' point at the Kremlin. Marina Novitskaya, good day.

[Novitskaya] Good day.

[Announcer] Well, then, Marina, what's the news?

[Novitskaya] I must tell you that the evening session ended half an hour ago and a decision on this question was finally made.

[Announcer] And what is it?

[Novitskaya] Well, this decision is quite a long one. I will say only that it was not adopted without conflict. There were various proposals and, in particular, a statement from the collegium of the USSR Procuracy was distributed which says in particular that bewilderment has been caused by the attempts by some deputies to transfer responsibility for the violations of legality and the arbitrary actions committed by Gdlyan and Ivanov onto the present leadership of the USSR Procuracy, which revealed flagrant violations of legality.

But here is the decision. I shall tell it to you.

The first point: To take cognizance of the commission's report and to consider the functions of the abovementioned commission fulfilled. The second, which is no less important: To condemn the unproved statements of people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov which discredit the USSR Supreme Soviet and individual people's deputies and officials. To warn them that if they continue such activity which leads to the destabilization of the situation in the country, the USSR Supreme Soviet will come forward with the initiative of depriving them of deputies' immunity.

And, finally, the point which, more than any other, aroused disagreements and which in effect caused the work to grind to a halt. Here it is: To turn down the representation from the USSR Procuracy on agreeing to make USSR people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov criminally accountable. However, in connection with the impossibility of their continuing to work in the procuracy, to agree to their dismissal from the bodies of the procuracy. To demand the dismissal of those leaders of the procuracy who did not ensure the proper checking of the activities of the investigative groups and thus promoted the violation of legality. And to make it incumbent on people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov to fulfill the legitimate demands of the investigators conducting cases of corruption, bribery and violation of legality, to give evidence, and to participate in other investigative actions.

Here I should explain that what is at issue here is that cases are continuing, including those in which Gdlyan and Ivanov were involved as investigators, and they are simply obliged to participate in this. Finally the USSR Supreme Soviet considers it essential to strengthen the leading link of the USSR Procuracy.

There are two points here which are also very important. One of these is to give an instruction to the procuracy, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Security Committee to implement measures aimed at implementing proposals contained in the commission's report and those made by people's deputies during these sessions. They concern bringing to justice persons whose activities led to the violation of human rights and aroused particularly acute public disquiet.

And there is one more point. Two committees of the Supreme Soviet—one of them is the Committee on Questions of Law and Order and the Struggle Against Crime, and the other is the Committee on Legislation—and the Council of Ministers are instructed to draw up measures for the radical restructuring of the whole law enforcement system of the country, to analyze and to report to the Supreme Soviet on the state of the struggle against corruption and bribery, and to make proposals for a decisive stepping up of this struggle.

One more very important proposal: to set up a union investigative committee. This means, in essence, that investigation will be withdrawn, finally, from the competence of the USSR Procuracy and from procuracy bodies altogether. This has long been under discussion; both law specialists and journalists have raised these problems. So, there is the decision.

Uzbek Delegation Statement on Gdlyan, Ivanov

LD1804230990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1946 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Remarks by Deputy Mukharov and text of statement by Uzbek delegation read out by Chairman Lukyanov at the 18 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin in Moscow during the debate on the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair—recorded]

[Text] [Mukhtarov] Anatoliy Ivanovich, esteemed comrade deputies, to adopt this decision as a whole and, in particular, Point 3, there was no need for us at the First Congress of Peoples Deputies to set up a special commission to examine the activity of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Such a decision could have been adopted at any sitting of the session. That means our commission has been working uselessly and fruitlessly for almost a whole year. That is the first thing.

The second thing is that the adoption of this point, Anatoliy Ivanovich, is an encouragement of all the illegal actions committed by the investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov. It is an encouragement of that democracy-by-rally which they have taken to the extreme. At present the country stands on the brink of the abyss. This is an encouragement of all of their illegalities and so on. Therefore, I earnestly ask you, Anatoliy Ivanovich, we greatly respect you and your democratic approach, to put this point to the vote in its first version. If we pass it, then we pass it. If we do not, then Gdlyan and Ivanov are living people; they will come here and we will continue.

One last thing, I would like to state that the question of or a report on the activity of the USSR Procuracy or, in general, questions of the fight against organized crime or the prevention of illegality is not on the agenda of our session. I would like you to take into account and I request that you read out the statement of the delegation of Uzbekistan.

[Lukyanov] Comrades do you insist I read out the statement of Uzbekistan?. [shouting from hall] It is a short one. The deputies insist and a large group has signed it.

Yesterday, in conditions of very great pressure from a rally in defense of Gdlyan and Ivanov held on Manezh Square, many of the members of the Supreme Soviet who spoke, in essence, led the session away from a detailed analysis of the evidence of the very crude violations of socialist legality committed by the investigative group. We, the deputies from the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, see a monstrous political game behind all of this.

We propose the following: If the members of the Supreme Soviet consider the evidence presented by the procuracy insufficient, then, in accordance with the law on the state of peoples deputies, to instruct the USSR Procuracy to present within three days all the materials they have; to put the representation from the procuracy to the vote point by point. We propose the workers directly engaged in the investigation and at least Comrade (Ilyukin), the head of the investigative group, be given a hearing.

Otherwise, the discusion is turning into a squabble. Many people refuse to see what even a blind man could see. This is a superficial approach and we doubt that many people want to objectively go into this question. It might lead to unpredictable consequences. If our request is not satisfied we reserve the right to adopt the appropriate measures. We demand this be read out at the Supreme Soviet session. This is followed by signatures. [commotion in hall] I have read this out at the demand of the deputies.

Moscow TV Carries 18 Apr Supreme Soviet Session

Debate Continues on Gdlyan, Ivanov Case

LD1804172390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 18 April begins broadcasting a recording of a joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow on 18 April. The session is chaired by Lukyanov.

Lukyanov calls on the deputies to register: 423 register, so the session proceeds. Lukyanov makes a number of observations that have been put forward by deputies, certain of whom have said that they will not take any further part in the work of the session. Many telegrams have been received today from organizations, meetings, and individual viewers.

At 1505 GMT Laptev takes the floor. One by one he details individual draft decisions that have been proposed by individual deputies. Then he outlines, point by point, the draft proposal upon which deputies will be invited to vote i.e. the conclusions of the congress commission that examined material connected with the activities of the investigative group of the USSR Procuracy headed by Telman Gdlyan.

At 1520 GMT Laptev answers questions from the floor Deputy Krayko asks a question about the dismissal of the members of the investigating group and the consequences of such a move. Deputy Sychev asks why the question of the dismissal of Gdlyan and Ivanov should again be put to the vote today when it was already voted on yesterday.

At 1523 GMT Lukyanov says it is his duty to inform deputies about what took place during the night and what has been said by citizens in the approaches they have been making to the Supreme Soviet. He proposes that the session should proceed with the examination of the decison that has been proposed.

At 1524 GMT in response to demands from the floor, Lukyanov agrees that deputies should register once again; 428 deputies register.

Lukyanov says that representations have been made that non deputies have been pressing the registration buttons. He calls for a vote on whether or not to proceed with consideration of the proposed resolution: 327 vote in favor, 48 against, and 26 abstain. Lukyanov observes that 27 registered people did not take part in the voting.

At 1528 GMT Lukyanov gives the floor to Deputy Abdullayeva.

Abdullayeva says that she has analyzed carefully the results of yesterday's voting on the question and is convinced that the system that exists within the procuracy requires serious correction. We have not yet realized the depth of the tragedy of our people. Even one life wasted would be enough to merit punishment: But here we are talking not of just one wasted life, but of hundreds. Please support the draft decision, she concludes.

At 1531 GMT Lukyanov invites Tutov to take the floor. Tutov quotes from specific bribery allegations raised during the investigation.

At 1533 GMT Lukyanov says that Tutov should stick to the point. He then invites Akhromeyev to take the floor. Akhromeyev says that it was stated correctly yesterday that there are three points to be made about the work of the law enforcement bodies—the first being that it has not worked. However, we are also considering the behavior of two fellow deputies, he says. I cannot comment on their performance as investigators, but in general I agree with what was said by Medvedev. Their behavior has been impermissible. Ivanov said impermissible things, for example, at a Leningrad meeting; things intended to set the people against the country's elected leadership, Akhromeyev assets.

At 1538 GMT Lukyanov invites Adylov to take the floor. Adylov believes that no one should abstain during the vote.

At 1540 GMT Lukyanov invites Zhuravlev to take the floor. He says that Gdlyan and Ivanov should be invited to return to the Supreme Soviet and invited to continue their work as deputies: They should not be charged. He regrets that the solution proposed by Danisov was not accepted. We must demand that Gdlyan and Ivanov cease activities that are harmful to society. They began by fighting against corruption. We must assess the situation very carefully from all sides and demand that the two cease all activity harmful to society—confine them to parliamentary activity, perhaps. If we try now to respond to evil with evil we will never overcome our problems, he says. Our society is worried not just by the activity of Gdlyan and Ivanov but the basic cause of our problems today—an incorrect cadre policy. A subservient fool is more dangerous than an enemy.

At 1546 GMT Lukyanov invites Deputy Obolenskiy to take the floor. He talks about the order in which he thinks the voting should proceed. Then Deputy Stadnik takes the floor. He asks where in our country is it possible to find an independent prosecutor today?

Point-by-Point Voting Begins

LD1804174390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1551 GMT on 18 April continues its recording of the joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin on 18 April.

Lukyanov reads out a note from an Uzbek deputy asking that the case under discussion should not be discussed as though it were a nationalities issue. An unidentified deputy takes the floor to say that voting by name is the proper way for the Supreme Soviet to proceed. Why, he asks, shouldn't voters know how their deputies voted? He thinks that Sukharev should be dismissed.

At 1556 GMT Lukyanov explains details of the voting procedure in response to a question from an unidentified speaker. He says that the draft decision has been duplicated and will be taken around to deputies.

At 1557 GMT another unidentified deputy takes the rostrum to say that the issue under discussion is not one of interethnic relations but one that relates to the whole state. He gives figures indicating the size of the shadow economy in Uzbekistan, and the size of the shadow economy throughout the whole country—these figures show just how widespead the problem is, he maintains. On voting by name—some deputies are simply afraid that they will subsequently be persecuted, he surmises.

At 1614 GMT Lukyanov gives the floor to Denisov who supports the proposal as it represents truth and justice. The procuracy has proved to be incompetent and in need of reform. Deputies should behave more responsibly.

At 1617 GMT First Deputy Vasilyev requests the right to reply to Deputy Tutov. Tutov has cited one protocol, but ignored many others. Procuracy actions have been justified, he asserts. He makes an official statement on the subject of Gdlyan's and Ivanov's violations of the law. They bear personal responsibility for persecuting totally innocent people.

At 1620 GMT Lukyanov interrupts to say it should not be read out before the voting. He asks for it to be submitted in writing. He asks for deputies' support on this. It is considered to have been given. He asks deputies about voting procedures: to vote on the motion as a whole or by individual articles? 218 are in favor of for voting as a whole, 170 against, 22 abstained. It is to be voted as a whole. The first article has been passed, but a second Article 2 has been received. Lukyanov expresses exasperation at the long delays in voting. If it fails as a whole it will be voted on by article. Lukyanov puts the draft to the vote. 221 for, 157 against, 36 abstained. This is not enough to pass it. It will have to be voted on point by point.

At 1626 GMT Lukyanov asks if he should read out the second point. No. He puts it to the vote as proposed today. Deputies have a copy of it in hand. 315 for, 68 against, 29 abstained. This point is passed.

At 1629 GMT Lukyanov points out that many deputies have not participated in the voting. A female deputy protests against voting by name and calls for secret voting.

At 1631 GMT Lukyanov moves on to the third point despite protests from the floor. It is to be voted as a whole. 204 for, 156 against, 60 abstained. The point is not passed.

At 1633 GMT Lukyanov says that point must be revised while they move on to other points. The fourth point is put to the vote without being read out. 375 for, 22 against, 19 abstained. It is passed.

At 1635 GMT the fifth point is put to the vote: 411 for, one against, four abstained. It is passed. Amendments have been proposed. Kugultinov proposes an addition to the fourth point. He is opposed to deputies' immunity. Ordinary people can be arrested easily, so why not deputies? This will make deputies give more thought to the legal processes.

At 1641 GMT Burlatskiy agreed with Kugultinov. In the past deputies did not protect the innocent. He calls for a radical restructuring of the legal system in the interests of human rights and law and order.

Amendments Proposed; Tax Law Viewed

LD1804191190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1643 GMT on 18 April continues its recording of the joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin on 18 April.

Laptev says that the proposal for a radical restructuring of the legal system is reflected in the final point. This can be strengthened in the way suggested. Lukyanov wonders how to proceed; should there be time for thought on this? Yes.

At 1645 GMT Zhuravlev suggests a slight change to the wording of Point 4. Kisilev says that the point should apply to current officials and not just past ones. Tsyplayev also suggests alternative wordings. Investigators should not be able to be deputies at the same time, he believes.

At 1648 GMT Lukyanov points out that many lawyers are deputies at one level or another.

Kirilov then comments on previous suggestions, supporting Tsyplyayev's ideas.

At 1650 GMT Sorokin disagrees with the inclusion of the word "dismissal" as deputies are released from work already. Levykins says the question of official responsibility should be resolved differently.

At 1654 GMT Boldyrev asks who will bring procuracy officials to account as there is no procedure for this at present. Lukyanov says this has already been decided. Romanenko then proposes some alternative wordings. Gdlyan and Ivanov should be temporarily removed from their posts during investigation, he says. An unidentified deputy wonders about the future actions of the two investigators if they are dismissed; as citizens they should aid the investigation, he suggests.

At 1658 GMT Khadzhiyev comments on the possible dismissal of Gdlyan and Ivanov; all the guilty should be brought to book. Burykh then refers back to yesterday's voting on the first point and questions its validity. Lukyanov responds.

At 1702 GMT During Zhuravlev's comments on Point 3, reception becomes unmonitorable for two minutes.

At 1704 GMT a deputy objects to the wording on the dismissal of the two investigators. Ryzhkov questions why amendments are not allowed on some points.

At 1705 GMT Sobchak says that the wording of Point 1 that was voted yesterday should be restored. This is agreed. The situation over Gdlyan and Ivanov is at an impasse. They are being paid as investigators, but not working in their posts. The situation must be cleared up. The suggestion that they should have immunity removed should be rejected clearly, he states.

At 1709 GMT Lukyanov calls for suggestions to be submitted in writing. Kucherenko has suggested a 30-minute interval to draw up new wording to be discussed later. The session ends and the recorded relay continues.

At 1711 GMT Nishanov, in the chair, introduces a discussion on tax legislation. He calls for registration. There are 387 present, a quorum. The session is declared open.

At 1714 GMT Velikhov says that the law is called on to stimulate entrepreneurial activity. Much in the law has been left unclear and the 55 percent tax rate needs further discussion, he believes. Monopolies must be combatted, too. The law is impracticable for foreign trading. He points out other contradictions in the law. Fundamental science should not have the concept of profit attached to it, he says.

At 1723 GMT Engver says that the alternative versions of this law should be published for discussion. He agrees with Velikhov with regard to fundamental science. Profitable enterprises should not be expected to subsidize less successful ones. Investment funds should not be subjected to taxes. The church should be put in a privileged position, and "afghantsy" should be given privileges also, he maintains.

At 1731 GMT Rogatin supports the ideas of the alternative version of the tax laws. The proposed law will have a bad effect on sport and physical culture, he says. Sarakayev says tax law should raise living standards. He supports the law.

At 1744 GMT Borodin says that more funds should be allocated to public health. Enterprises should introduce health insurance for employees and medical enterprises should be given tax privileges. Pharmaceutical enterprises should be given help, too, he concludes.

Amendments to Tax Law Proposed

LD1804203890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1750 GMT on 18 April continues its recording of the joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin on 18 April.

Kakhn says the draft will have bad effect on enterprises currently working for the good of society. Flexibility is necessary and tax funds should go to local authorities to help solve social problems, he suggests.

At 1755 GMT Postnikov makes a proposal on the wording of tax legislation on food industry enterprises.

At 1800 GMT Deputy Mateushuk says that the social climate of society is the mirror of economy. She says a reform in pricing is necessary. Many enterprises are facing bankruptcy, she says. She refers to the experience of other countries in increasing economic potential. She says we stand to lose more tomorrow than what we have gained today unless these problems are solved. She puts forward a proposal on Article 3 of the draft referring to increments in women's pensions, and on Article 6 referring to improving working conditions. She also touches upon other articles of the draft referring to the conditions of women and children.

At 1809 GMT an unidentified deputy says the law should be closely linked to the antimonopoly law. He points out certain weak points in the law and does not think it will work.

At 1812 GMT Deputy Valentinov takes the rostrum and refers back to a Supreme Soviet decision on ecological matters adopted last year. He wants to know whose responsibility it will be to fulfill this decision. He goes on to talk about various benefits for collective and state farms and complains there is nothing in the draft law covering these matters.

At 1816 GMT Deputy Samarin says that this new draft law is no panacea for the problems of taxation in the country as it falls down on many counts. We must seriously consider an alternative draft to the one proposed by Yaroshenko and it should not be adopted at a first reading, he believes.

At 1820 GMT Deputy Zhigunova believes that the draft law proposed will cause great harm to some enterprises and calls for more subsidies for health, culture and education. She proposes that deputies should not vote for the draft.

At 1823 GMT Deputy Khadzhiyev returns to the rostrum and calls for changes or a review of certain points of the law and says that the problems of the autonomous republics should be taken into account.

At 1831 GMT Lukyanov says that the debate will be continued at a joint session and wishes deputies a good appetite and a good rest.

The relay continues with Laptev now in the chair. He passes the floor to Deputy Akhmetova who believes that the maximum tax rate could be reduced. She calls for a fairer profit distribution system for certain enterprises in certain industries. She also calls for a fairer correlation between the union and republican budgets.

At 1835 GMT Deputy Voblikov says that the question of distrubution of tax and of profits also concerns the distribution of power.

At 1840 GMT Deputy Boykov says that his commission on the socioeconomic development of oblasts, etc, has examined the law and concluded that a maximum taxation rate should be 50 percent and not 55 percent. Work should begin on an alternative draft, he remarks.

At 1844 GMT Deputy Fominykh says that the draft law has has been examined in the industrial commission and says he sees the future of the country in free enterprise. He points out a series of mistakes in the draft law and goes on to explain them at lenth. We must switch over to a market economy as quickly as possible, and the law must be redrafted, he says.

Discussion Returns to Gdlyan, Ivanov

LD1804212790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1850 GMT on 18 April continues its recording of the joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin on 18 April.

Deputy Nyuksha points to a certain discrimination in points of the draft law relating to some enterprises.

At 1855 GMT Deputy Lisitskiy makes various points about the draft law, particularly those relating to Article 7 and Article 8. He believes that discussion on this law should be terminated now.

At 1900 GMT a deputy refers to various aspects of the draft law as they affect the far north, such as reindeer breeders and fishermen. He asks that Yaroshenko's alternative proposal be discussed in commissions and committees.

At 1902 GMT Laptev now appears to take over proceedings although Nishanov is still seated in the chair.

At 1904 GMT Deputy Bobritskiy says the main problem here is to determine what in fact constitutes a union budget, republican budget, and so on. He also raises the questions of ownership and wage fixing.

At 1908 GMT Deputy Amonashvili raises a question on Article 6 of the draft law and proposes that a Soviet anti-AIDS fund be set up.

At 1903 GMT an unidentified deputy says there is no question that a law on taxation is necessary and there is a crying need for an incentive for economic activity. There are many questions still to be answered on export and import trade taxation and regulation. Privileges should be given to more charitable organizations and to the Knowledge Society.

At 1916 GMT Uetilen speaks in favor of transfering gradually to the alternative version of the draft. He expresses the views of people living in the northern regions with their special needs.

At 1922 GMT Abdullayeva complains that the allocation of profit tax to the center will harm local budgets.

At 1927 GMT Zhuravlev says that a tax rate of 45 percent is desirable and should be stated clearly today. The bureaucracy will not go away until its pay is cut off.

At 1931 GMT Laptev says that there are still many peoples waiting to speak. The debate must be continued at some other time. He then reads out a complaint from a group of deputies saying that Enver insulted the People's Congress. He hands over the chair to Lukyanov.

At 1934 GMT Lukyanov says that they will now return to the decision on the Gdlyan and Ivanov case. He invites Laptev to speak. Has everyone got a copy of the decision, he asks? He says that this is the third time the matter has been discussed. He sums up the suggestions and proposals that have been received. Important changes have been made to Points 3, 4 and 5.

At 1943 GMT Lukyanov suggests putting the new versions to the vote immediately. An unidentified deputy points out the side effects of the new version of Point 3: If Gdlyan and Ivanov are not to be tried then others also guilty may also escape responsibility.

At 1946 GMT Lukyanov again suggests voting on the draft. Another deputy, from Uzbekistan, says that if Point 3 is adopted there is no need to appoint a commission—it has wasted its time. Illegality must not be allowed to prosper; it would set a bad example in the present situation. He asks for a statement by the Uzbekistan delegation to be read out.

At 1949 GMT Lukyanov reads out the statement condemning a recent demonstration in support of Gdlyan and Ivanov.

At 1950 GMT Lukyanov tries to put it to the vote again. There is shouting from the hall.

At 1952 GMT a female deputy puts a question to Laptev about Point 3. If the investigators are to continue to participate in the investigation why are they being sacked? Laptev gives an explanation.

3 Points of Gdlyan, Ivanov Draft Approved

LD1804214990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1955 GMT on 18 April continues its recording of the joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin on 18 April.

Lukyanov wants to put the points to the vote. He asks deputies to vote. There are 415 present. He puts Point 3, 4 and 5 to the vote: 248 for, 94 against, 52 abstained. They are not passed.

At 1959 GMT a female deputy asks about the investigator's future fate.

At 1959 GMT Medvedev says the Supreme Soviet cannot make decisions on violations of the law. The procuracy cannot allow people who have broken the law to remain working for the procuracy; that would be illegal. Ten or twelve other investigators are under investigation in this case. Charges against those cannot be dropped by the procuracy as this would also be illegal.

At 2004 GMT Zhuravlev tries to speak but Lukyanov refuses him permission. He then proposes to put the points to the vote one by one. He asks deputies to register. There are 422 present. He puts Point 3 to the vote: 275 for, 84 against, 48 abstained. The point is passed.

At 2009 GMT Point 4 is put to the vote: 368 for, 25 against, 13 abstained. It is passed.

At 2011 GMT Point 5 is put to the vote: 396 for, eight against, seven abstained. It is passed.

At 2012 GMT Dikul asks about the wording of Point 3. Dismissal was voted out twice yesterday but was put back in today. Lukyanov gives an explanation.

At 2015 GMT Khadzhiyev asks about the proposal for law workers not to be allowed to be deputies. Lukyanov explains the procedure for this to be considered. The deputy insists that it be put to the vote; 194 are in favor.

At 2022 GMT Laptev is now in the chair. Petrova raises the question of an article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI about corruption among deputies.

At 2026 GMT Laptev agrees that the mass media has been carrying material discrediting individual deputies and the Supreme Soviet in general.

At 2028 GMT a female deputy makes a procedural point and comments on Point 3 of the Gdlyan and Ivanov decision and their dismissal. She complains about the coverage of yesterday's proceedings. Laptev says that part of yesterday's session will be broadcast after this one.

At 2031 GMT a deputy complains about the arm twisting over the voting on today's decision. The chairman's actions should be subject to investigation over violation of various procedures, he complains. Another deputy complains about violations of procedures, too.

At 2033 GMT Laptev announces the end of the session.

Medvedev Speech on Gdylan, Ivanov Issue

LD1704205990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1505 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Speech by Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, co-chairman of commission investigating USSR Procuracy, at the USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow on 17 April—recorded]

[Text] [Medvedev] Esteemed deputies, esteemed presidium, I will not read out our commission's report. All deputies will have had an opportunity to see the text. It is fairly long. I propose just to clarify the main points in the report; it will take roughly thirty minutes. I can reply immediately to questions concerning the commission's work. We have agreed to reply to questions on the subject matter of the commission's work after the interval, after the three co-chairman and all the commission members have discussed any questions that the deputies may have. Of course, we face an unusual session today, because for the first time the Supreme Soviet is dealing with a matter which concerns the fate of two people's deputies. Previously such matters were dealt with at meetings of the USSR Supreme Soviet presidium. Supreme Soviet session did not formerly go into such matters. The matter is being dealt with at an open parliamentary hearing. I must express my great regret that the chief heroes... or culprits... of our session have not shown up for today's session. [commotion in hall]

[Lukyanov] Roy Aleksandrovich, excuse me. I would like to announce something to the deputies. All the documents were given to Comrades Gdlyan and Ivanov two days in advance, here are the copies of the documents that were handed to them. You will know that under the Law on Status they have the right either to attend or not to attend a session where such a matter if being examined. Please, I apologize for the interruption.

[Medvedev] Why am I expressing my regret? The reason is that over recent months, at numerous rallies both Gdlyan and Ivanov have categorically demanded of us that open parliamentary hearings be held to discuss their case and that they should be given an opportunity to reply. We have fixed such open parliamentary hearings, and yet neither Gdlyan nor Ivanov are present here.

It is an unusual thing when the fate of two investigators, two people, is discussed literally by the whole country, splitting the country into two different groups. I must say this occurs frequently in the history of various states. This happened at one time in France with a question of principle when issues relating to anti-Semitism split France into supporters of Dreyfus and anti-Dreyfusites. This happened here in Russia with the Beylis case. It happened during the time of Rasputin when some people were fervent supporters of Rasputin and others were fervent opponents of Rasputin. Some elements of all these cases, Rasputin and the other cases, can also be traced in these people. Therefore, to some extent, our session here today is not only an important precedent but also a kind of historic session because people will talk for a long time about the decision which we adopt and about our discussion, and I can honestly say the issue will not end with this session. Whatever decision we adopt, the issue of Gdlyan and Ivanov will remain for a long time in of our people's consciousness. Countless groups supporting Gdlyan and Ivanov exist and will continue to exist, and I discern in this movement not just a shortcoming but also a certain virtue of our public opinion because for an enormous majority of the people, even those living far from Moscow and who have never seen or heard of Gdlyan and Ivanov, this is not just a question of the fate of two investigators but also a matter of principle—hate for corruption, hate for injustice. In these people, justly or unjustly—you can judge on this from the accounts you will evaluate—they see two avengers, two protectors of the people, and two bold fighters against corruption. I say I discern in this the positive factor in this movement which has unfolded in our country in defense of Gdlyan. The negative factor is that an enormous degree of legal ill-breeding among our people is also revealed by this. We have received a huge number of letters from the most diverse corners of the country, thousands and tens of thousands of letters, defending Gdlyan, against Gdlyan and Ivanov. We have received very many letters which are simply strange to read. People write directly, sometimes elegantly and sometimes less elegantly, that Gdlyan and Ivanov are, of course, criminals, but they were fighting against even more dreadful and powerful criminals. Some people express themselves in a more refined manner, as it were, saying that in rising to fight the hydra of corruption we cannot avoid staining ourselves with its blood, that we cannot wage a struggle against illegality in our country using legal methods, and even that when people find out about arrests of families, about the arrest of wives and children, mothers—some people write, and I have even received one letter from the chair of a juridical institute—they write that these women, although they are innocent, should go to prison because they also enjoyed the luxurious houses and dachas which were built for them by their husbands and that they received valuables from them, unembarrassed by their violence, and that it would be a good thing for them to go to prison, too. This legal nihilism, this lack of respect for the law, this aspiration to protect the law even using the most illegal methods, is of course a grave consequence, a grave legacy of those eras of illegality which we have lived through at various times and which we shall probably not overcome very soon.

Doubts were expressed as to the competency of our commission. Our commission has eight lawyers and eight nonlawyers, and certain comrades said that only lawyers could deal with such matters, that only lawyers were competent to deal with these things. I am bound to say that trials by jury, something that we also defend and that many forces in our country are calling for, similarly do not involve legal experts. Ordinary people, with their common sense, bring in a verdict of guilty or not guilty; it is the job of the judges, the court and legal experts to determine the degree of guilt, the measure of punishment and what articles of the criminal code were contravened. In that sense, our commission, which included writers, mathematicians and ordinary workers, was also in some small way appointed by the congress as something akin to a jury. All of us deputies here, the majority of whom are not legal experts either, will have to bring in our verdict. We are to some extent a large jury, because we will have to pass a verdict without being legal experts. I do not propose to refer to the first part of the report, which deals with the background of the conflict and the background of the matter. Let me just note that, as always, we are let down by what could be described as the habit of mounting campaigns. Gdlyan and Ivanov were not alone, they had a whole group of investigators numbering 200 people. It was not the only group operating in the Central Asian region or in the Soviet Union. There were eight groups in Uzbekistan alone. They were engaged in the battle against corruption and in the investigation of crimes of different sorts. Approximately three years ago a campaign was mounted to extol the two investigators and to encourage a sort of cult around them. This campaign led to the creation of these idols and it is difficult subsequently to eradicate this image from the public mind. It was the result a campaign organized to a considerable extent by the procuracy itself. Then an attempt was made to use a similar campaign, an even more rapid one: It took a month or two to denounce Gdlyan and Ivanov. From the end of April and throughout May, the whole of the press (?was inundated), and only the reverse effect was achieved. Gdlyan and Ivanov were transformed into something akin to national heroes, and millions of people, as I say, began to stand up for them. We must, of course, get rid of campaigns like this when matters of such importance are being addressed and everyone must calmly and soberly go about his business.

The second part of my report deals with aspects of the work of the USSR Procuracy. Well, everyone who has read the report can see that we have drawn a very unflattering conclusion about the work of the USSR Procuracy as a whole and the USSR Procuracy's supervisory powers in particular. There was a lack of supervision, and where supervision and scrutiny are absent, there lawlessness, violation of legality and license always begin to bear fruit. I am bound to say that now that we are faced with the issue of decisively strengthening the law enforcement bodies we must all concern ourselves with strengthening the procuracy as well. We can all see, for instance, that the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies, headed by Minister Bakatin, have in a short space of time bolstered their prestige both inside the Supreme Soviet and among the country's population. This is despite the fact that the leadship of the Ministry of Internal Affairs found itself with the difficult legacy of Shchelokov and others inside the system who were frequently mere apologies for leaders. Now we often look differently at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The prestige of the KGB bodies has also risen, as has that of the Supreme Court.

As far as the prestige of the procuracy is concerned, over the past two years, and especially during the year which has passed since the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the prestige of the procuracy has unfortunately dropped to a considerable extent both in the eyes of the Supreme Soviet and in the eyes of the broad masses of the population. The report by our commission contains a phrase about the need to decisively strengthen both the cadres and the leadership of the procuracy. I can decipher this phrase. The general report of the commission was not signed by all of the commission's members; the majority signed it. In this case we approved the report with a majority of the members of the commission. We had a minority and this minority wishes and, I hope, will be able to speak immediately after my speech or in the course of the debates and it will express its own viewpoint on the report and on the commission's work. I speak on behalf of all of the commission's work. On one issue all of the commission's members were agreed; I hope I speak on behalf of all of the commission's members: We must elect a new procurator general for our country at the next congress of people's deputies. [applause]

I believe Comrade Sukharev has done a good deal of work, but has coped badly, in my point of view and in that of the commission, with the enormous mission, and enormus responsibility entrusted to him.

Now as concerns the work of the Gdlyan-Ivanov investigation group. I repeat that in the report, and this forms the main part of the report, we examined quite closely the work of the Gdlyan investigation group. Our report points out a multitude of law infringements by the Gdlyan investigation group. The report is supplemented further by the conclusion of the crime commission concerning the actions of Gdlyan and Ivanov over the last year. That conclusion also contains elements of infringement of at least three articles of the criminal code.

In our report we find indications of infringements of at least five or six articles of the criminal code and for that reason our commission considered it necessary to twice recognize as absolutely lawful and correct the fact that the USSR Procuracy has instituted criminal proceedings over the infringements of legality during the investigation into this criminal case by the Gdlyan-Ivanov group.

Some people are saying all investigators are they same: They all break the law and it is, therefore, of course, wrong that these two investigators should be made liable. I have to say that even from my experience of this investigation group of the USSR Procuracy...[changes thought] I have to conclude that this is not true. Most investigators in our country—and they form a large body of people—work honestly and conscientiously perform their duties not for the money. They are paid little, but for their conscience, so to speak, for their own honor, and without the work of that investigation apparatus, the investigation apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Procuracy, and the KGB our lives would become impossible with the orgy of crime we are seeing today. It is far from me to condemn all investigators.

Of course, even now there are investigators in various regions of the country who infringe the law, and I even have with me here articles from NEDELYA and from the journal EKHO showing that even now in 1987, 1988, and 1989 directors of enterprises and collective farms and individual workers in our system are being rehabilitated after being sentenced on the strength of wrong, false testimony. Some are spending time in prison. So the investigation apparatus has not yet completely rid itself, of course, of its past failings, but most investigators work honestly, and although the failings of this group—the group led by Gdlyan and Ivanov—are very serious, even they were not typical of the entire group but only for a part of it. Of approximately 200 investigators, and almost 1,000 passed through the group in the course of six years, only 10 or 15 people, including Gdlyan and Ivanov as well as (Tarakozov), head of the investigation section of the USSR Procuracy, are being brought to trial, as far as I know.

So, I am not going to repeat everything that is stated in our report-back, in the commission's report. I would merely like to respond to the reproaches about us not examining all the cases, about not having looked through all 1,000 volumes and studied all the dozens or hundreds of cases and therefore being incompetent to pass judgment on the work of that group. Well, I too must reject this reproach, because our commission did not set out to, nor could it, repeat the work done over six years by an investigation group of 200 people. To decide whether bread is fresh or not it is by no means necessary to eat the whole loaf; nor to decide whether meat is stale or fresh it is necessary to eat 100 pounds. It is sometimes enough to eat or try a single piece to see that something is wrong.

It is true, for instance, that out of the numerous suicides—there were ten or eleven suicides of witnesses or suspects—we discussed only two cases; of the many cases of arrests of relatives, we also studied only five or six instances, of illegal arrest of relatives; of the hundreds of cases in which bribes of 200-250,000 were given and the bribers, after allegedly confessing voluntarily, were released from imprisonment on instructions from Ivanov or Gdylan, returned to their jobs and even demanded that they be readmitted to the party. Sometimes they were actually readmitted.

These were not voluntary confessions, of course, because some of them were made after 20 or 30 interrogations, after two, three or sometimes seven months in prison. They were recorded as self-incrimination, though in fact there was no self-incrimination at all. Yet the investigation into those cases was subsequently dropped and not referred to court, and put into bags, as it were, which Gdlyan and Ivanov in their own language, in their own peculiar jargon, called nuts. These were prisoners whom the investigators had to crack by any means. Pianists were those prisoners who subsequently wrote out these statements. Into these bags went the testimonies that were not to be passed on to the courts, although it was they that the court should have examined first and foremost, since it was mainly the chief mafiosi who were freed, people who had suborned militia or party workers. If they were able to pay 250,000 one has to assume those were not their last 250,000 and that they were keeping a few more millions for themselves for a rainy day. They were sent into what they called pits—I do not think I have the term wrong—and then the investigators who took up Gdlyan and Ivanov's cases had to spend several months digging their way out of those pits.

All sorts of things have been written, even about me. There was an epigram in KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE that read, "Not Roy the historian, dig a pit for Gdlyan" (pun on word roy meaning dig in Russian] Well, I had no intention of digging a pit for Gdlyan, but on studying the case I saw that this group, and Gdlyan himself, has dug so many pits, tens and hundreds of pits, that it was difficult for them not to fall into one of them. I think this is why they are not here today to answer the questions that the deputies might want to ask.

As far as the work of the commission is concerned.... Oh, I want to tell you about something else that is not in the report. Generally, the court sessions and the work of the investigators were based on verbal confessions from defendants. Evidence played a secondary role and in many cases there were no objective data or any evidence. Therefore, although the document I am going to read needs checking, it is a confession and I want to read it by way of an example of the work of the investigators. It is a senior official of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party. Our commission received the letter before this person was fully exonerated by the Supreme Court. At the time he was still being referred to as the defendant, it was before the trial. This is the document we received.

One day Ivanov came along and said furtively: I understand that you did not take bribes. But you are in the mire. The peasants will zap you. The matter concerns a woman. I can help you, if you trust in me, but this is strictly between us. You have to confess, it is the only way to save yourself. Gdlyan has set a ceiling for you, he continued, it is 225,000. You received R200,000 from 25 people. When I asked where this 200,000 was to come from, he laughed for a long time. You don't need it! You received it, then disposed of it all. Then he suggested that it had not been taken all at once, but in instalments, saying: All you need do is write, you will be told what and how. Ivanov demanded a quick confession in my own hand, and he set me a date, but I did not accept his conditions. Then he said: if you don't obey us, you will be tearing your hair out. We will plant containers of gold on you, we will put all your relatives away, we will put your son away for drugs—we have just heard that a large group of drug addicts has been arrested. He threatened to blacken my reputation through the press, and he gave me an article from MOSCOW NEWS to read, in which it was asserted that I had committed abuses. I had no way out, I was afraid for my children, for my daughter, for whom they promised to arrange a rape, for my son, and for all my kin.

Since that time, Ivanov has looked after things. Ivanov gave me the names of the Central Committee workers, and in essence he forced me to say that I had given them money, although in reality this did not happen. Gdlyan said to me at one of the interrogations that they would imprison all the bribetakers at Old Square. Ivanov said we should complete this pyramid with the ideology people, like Yakovlev and Razumovskiy. I did not support this suggestion, and stated that I had never been in their offices. At this, the interrogator said he would not give any evidence against Ligachev for the time being, that would come later, and let's have Mogilnichenko to finish up. He asked me to give evidence against Afanasyev, chief editor of PRAVDA, and Zakharov, the minister of culture. It came home to me, and I realized that Gdlyan and Ivanov were banking on Lukyanov, Gorbachev, and Ligachev in their work.

Some time later, Ivanov asked if I knew that Yeltsin received an expensive carpet worth over R4,000 as a gift, a bribe. Later, when Yeltsin started to gather points in the election campaign, Gdlyan and Ivanov changed tack, and started gathering evidence against Ligachev.

I shall not read all of this, but we have dozens of such confessions from those still on trial, as well as from those released or cleared, or from witnesses. I repeat, this has to be checked, checked by an investigation. [disturbance in hall; Lukyanov rings bell] Why read it? Like the other confessions were read during trials? I will read selectively, all right? I will also read out another finding, by a specialist, an expert. Here, for example, are the confessions made by completely different defendants at different times. We ordered a graphological expert report. Here is one defendant, I won't give his name: While in places of detention, I have thought deeply about my earlier life. A year or two later a defendant writes: While in the interrogation cell, I have thought deeply about my earlier life. Here one defendant says: Soviet justice is humane towards persons who.... Another defendant writes a year later: Soviet justice has a humane attitude towards persons who.... Here one defendant writes: If I deliberately lie or conceal anything in this document, may Soviet justice punish me with all the strictness of Soviet legislation. Another defendant writes a year later: If I deliberately lie or conceal anything in the document before you, may Soviet justice punish me with all the strictness of Soviet legislation. I am trying to say that these documents were written to dictation. [voices from hall] Give me a chance to speak.

[Lukyanov] Comrades! Just a minute, Roy Aleksandrovich. Please, despite everything that is going on and all the difficulty of this question, I ask you to hear it all out without prejudice, calmly, with restraint. Comrades! Have respect for yourselves, the Supreme Soviet and the task that has been set for us by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Carry on.

[Medvedev] Our report also has a section concerning the overall atmosphere. Although in the cases we examine there are no confessions accusing Romanov, Aliyev, Grishin or Medunov, all this came to light later at meetings, we consider— and again it is the whole commission that agrees about this, not just the part of it that signed our report—we consider that one of the main reasons why Gdlyan and Ivanov have come to the focus of attention of the whole public is the fact that those whom the people justly call the "fathers of stagnation" have not borne any serious responsibility. This was around even under Khrushchev, and, regrettably, this tradition continues today as well. Medunov feels quite relaxed, even though the decision on excluding this person from the party contains phrases calling for investigative checks.

Let us take Aliyev; Aliyev is even demanding that there should be an investigation into the charges made against him. He recently published a long interview in TEATRALNAYA ZHIZN [theater life] in which he says it is all lies, I did not give any ring with a special diamond to Brezhnev, I demand an investigation, a check. No such check is being made, no checks are being made on any members of Brezhnev's family, no checks are being made on many others—and I am guided by press materials, and I trust the authors—whom the people consider to be tainted by corruption and to have created corruption about themselves. I do not want to put all leaders of the party and state, even from the past, in this category, because had healthy forces not been preserved within the body of the party and state apparatus, our perestroyka would not have been possible, but a considerable proportion of the fathers of corruption caused immense damage to our society. There may have been no mass terror, but the moral damage, the economic damage and the political damage were no less than the damage caused to us by Stalinism.

Our commission has worked in an atmosphere of pressure from, basically, the committee for defense of Gdlyan. In general I do not consider this is something illegal; in general, all parliaments in the world, and now our parliament, come under pressure, both from the public and from certain organs of power—take the decisions of the Leningrad Soviet, the Moscow Soviet, and even the decisions of the Leningrad Soviet to give Gdlyan and Ivanov political asylum in Zelenograd, give them apartments in Zelenograd, and to instruct all the district's militiamen to protect Gdlyan and Ivanov from the actions of the procuracy. This pressure on the court, on the procuracy and on the Supreme Soviet is not something that I consider completely out of order. The public has the right to this, and the parliaments of all countries—I was in Italy not so long ago—often experience great pressures during their sessions when discussing very acute problems. And they have to make decisions while under pressure. What is important is only that they should adopt the right decisions. But for these groups—I am coming to the end of my brief report—for these groups, I would like to read out the decisions of the Democratic Reform group, and read out from the RESPUBLIKA newspaper, which I am told is the newspaper of the Social Democratic Party which is re-emerging or just emerging, the opinion of Sakharov about Gdlyan and Ivanov. Of course, it was expressed long ago, just after the First Congress of People's Deputies. What is your attitude to the case of Gdlyan and Ivanov? Sakharov's reply: "On the one hand, there is no doubt about the need for an investigation into all the charges brought up by Gdlyan's group against the highest leaders of the country, Smirnov, Ligachev and many others." That is what our commission has done, or has insisted on, if not done. "All the links which exist must be made clear—that is a very important task, and any attempt to put the brakes on brings quite justified agitation from the people. On the other hand, Gdlyan and Ivanov are part and parcel of our investigative system, they have had very great powers, and this is often tied up with serious infringements of legality. I am convinced that the investigation probably went outside the law. I am not a member of the commission on this issue, and am not acquainted with its findings, but I hear that there were people who died while under invstigation, that there were six or seven cases of suicide of those under investigation. These are very serious facts, so I have a very complex attitude to this problem."

And so, I would like to advise a much more balanced approach, as displayed here by Andrey Demitriyevich Sakharov, to the defenders and to those who so loudly and sometimes without thinking come out with the stupidest and even provocative accusations at meetings.

Well, as far as the attitude of Gdlyan and Ivanov themselves to our commission is concerned, we heard them in the commission, we heard Gdlyan and Ivanov and we also heard the committees for defense of Gdlyan and Ivanov. They did not present any documents to us, and throughout the work of the commission, of course, both Gdlyan and Ivanov produced numerous insults about the commission as a whole and about individual members of the commission, but we did not start turning to the commission on ethics concerning this. We were rewarded with the most varied epithets; the commission had sold itself out to the corrupt Moscow mafia, the failed dissident Medvedev was in it, and Yarin the "special" [spetsrabochiy]; and concerning the member of our commission, Adylov, they said simply "that Uzbek Adylov," as if belonging to a certain nation were something bad in itself. That is the kind of behavior, but if course, it ought not to be considered normal and correct.

That is the end of my report. We did not experience pressure from above, particularly in the last months of our work, and there was no interfernece in the work of our commission, either. We worked completely independently, and drew our conclusions completely independently. I ask your forgiveness if I have got anything wrong. I have finished.

Moscow TV Carries Final Part of 17 Apr Session

LD1804221790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2034 GMT on 18 April, following its recording of the 18 April Supreme Soviet proceedings, begins carrying the final part of the 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin not carried in yesterday's recorded relay.

At 2035 GMT Lukyanov is heard putting an amendment to the vote which shows 51 in favor and 298 against.

At 2037 GMT Laptev reads out the wording of the point on the dismissal of Gdlyan and Ivanov.

At 2039 GMT Sobchak reads out a suggested alternative wording. Lukyanov presents objections to this wording. Lukyanov asks Laptev to present a composite wording. Khadziyev suggests a version and explains the reason for it.

At 2045 GMT Laptev reads out a wording calling to account those who did not ensure sufficient control over investigators. Lukyanov says that he will put Khazhiyev's version to the vote later.

At 2049 GMT Arutyunyan says that no assumption of guilt should be made. Another deputy suggests rejecting the procuracy's proposal.

At 2052 GMT a deputy says that Gdlyan and Ivanov have refused to turn up for work and should be sacked for that reason alone. Lukyanov says that deputies should not be sacked for not turning up for work.

At 2053 GMT Lukyanov puts to the vote ending the discussion 315 for, 44 against, 24 abstained. A deputy comes to the front and insists on speaking. Deputies refuse to listen. Lukyanov calls for calm. He will allow the deputy after the vote. The deputy continues speaking. He says only Point 1 should be voted. Put an end to this matter.

At 2057 GMT Laptev reads out a composite wording of the point on the dismissal of the investigators. Lukyanov puts it to the vote: 206 for, 121 against, 64 abstained. The wording is adopted, says Lukyanov. Shouting is heard in the hall.

At 2100 GMT Sazonov says that the wording was not adopted on the voting figures shown on the screen. Lukyanov disagrees. The shouting continues.

At 2101 GMT Kisin says the investigators should not be dismissed for absence as they are working deputies. Sukharev replies to this point. Gdlyan and Ivanov have been absent for almost a year. They were given leave. They have received their pay regularly.

At 2104 GMT Starovoytova says that the Armenian Supreme Soviet has a say in this matter.

At 2108 GMT Lukyanov tries to move on to the next part. He finally ends the discussion and tries to put to the vote the alternative version. More shouting in the hall questions the previous voting figures. Lukyanov asks if a revote is being requested. He cites the procedural rules on adopting a decision: A simple majority is required.

At 2113 GMT A deputy reads out the rules on voting. Lukyanov consults the rule book and Laptev. He reads out the relevant rule. A majority of the total number of Supreme Soviet deputies is required. He calls for deputies to register: 408 present. The composite version is to be put to the vote once again. Laptev reads out the version again. 216 for, 123 against, 61 abstained. It has not been passed.

At 2121 GMT Lukyanov calls for suggestions to be submitted in writing for further voting tomorrow. He then closes the session.

PRAVDA Reports Discussion of Gdlyan, Ivanov Case

PM1804133690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Report by special correspondents Yu. Ursov, V. Shirokov from the Kremlin: "Closer to the Truth"]

[Text] Yesterday a joint sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities examined the question of "The Findings of the Commission To Investigate Materials Relating to the Activity of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Investigations Group Headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan."

On the eve of the joint sitting of the chambers, USSR people's deputies received two voluminous documents—a submission from the USSR Prosecutor's Office "Requesting Consent To Dismiss from Prosecution Organs and Institute Criminal Proceedings Against USSR People's Deputies T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov," and the report of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies Commission To Investigate Materials Relating to the Activity of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Investigations Group Headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan. The report alone contains 52 pages, which indicates the substantial, painstaking work carried out by the commission's participants in fulfilling the instructions of the congress.

Unfortunately T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov did not attend the USSR Supreme Soviet sitting. According to one story heard in the auditorium, they are sick; according to another version they are in Armenia, where they are running as candidate people's deputies.

But let us anticipate and say that T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov instructed a deputy to read out their statement at the session. It was decided to duplicate the statement and give a copy to every USSR Supreme Soviet member and every people's deputy.

It must be said that not all the commission members signed the report. As R. Medvedev, one of the cochairmen, reported, they have their own, particular opinion on the case, and will present it to the participants in the sitting.

In his speech R. Medvedev dwelt on the fact that this is an unusual case—whereas formerly a deputy's fate used to be decided by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, now for the first time an open parliamentary hearing is taking place. Incidentally, T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov themselves demanded this in their speeches at large rallies. For the people, R. Medvedev said, this is not simply a question of the fate of two investigators, but rather a question of our attitude to injustice and corruption. Many people see them precisely as fighters against these odious phenomena. It is curious that the commission received many letters roughly to this effect: Yes, Gdlyan and Ivanov sometimes used unlawful methods in conducting investigations, but after all, they were fighting against even bigger crimes!

But is it right to defend the law by unlawful means? Can you, in the name of discovering the truth, make family arrests, hold mothers of large families in custody for a long time, and drive people to suicide? In fact, as the speaker noted, the USSR Prosecutor's Office itself is largely to blame for the creation of the Gdlyan cult and the setting up of idols. The absence of strict prosecutor's office supervision of the work of this investigations group led to a lack of control and permissiveness, violations of legality in the conduct of the investigation, and the wrongful release of a large group of bribers.

A. Denisov, chairman of the Commission for Deputies' Ethics, said that the conduct of many deputies does not stand up to criticism, and some of them are motivated by malice. It is from the ethical viewpoint that T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov deserve condemnation, since in their public speeches they have come out with outright insults against their adversaries. This conduct is impermissible for a people's deputy, and they should be given a severe warning.

A. Denisov went on to say that investigators T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov displayed professional and moral incompetence, since in many instances the courts rejected their evidence and demonstrated that it lacked cogency. But this, in turn, demonstrated the incompetence of the prosecution service, which decided to make the investigators "scapegoats" and whitewash itself at their expense. For this reason perhaps both the investigators and the leadership of the prosecutor's office should be dismissed.

The speech by A. Sukharev, USSR general prosecutor, expressed the view that he is by no means defending the honor of the regiment. It is a question of protecting the global values of perestroyka; the point is that the rule of law can only be defended with clean hands, and that investigation has shown that T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov repressed innocent people and covered up for inveterate bribe-takers.

In the subsequent debates the speakers' positions were divided, at times being diametrically opposed. Some thought that the materials presented by the investigating commission are unconvincing, others that T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov deserve the severest punishment.

In the afternoon the debate continued. Discussions lasted until late in the evening.

Supreme Soviet To Discuss Pension Law

LD1904074290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Half an hour ago a routine sitting of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet started. Anatoliy Ivanovich

Lukyanov who is chairing it, in opening the session, reported that until late last night a session of the Presidential Council and the Soviet of the Federation was in progress. Issues were examined of the radicalization of economic reforms and the stabilization of the country's economic situation. It is proposed that the Supreme Soviet should become engaged in this work of exceptional importance, since this program will need to be backed up with laws.

Today the Supreme Soviet will examine the draft law on pension provision for USSR citizens in the second reading. As you know, it was examined in the first reading back in autumn last year. As a result more than 500,000 proposals have been received from citizens. Approximately three-quarters of the country's deputy corps also expressed their ideas on it. As a result of intensive work, part of the proposals and comments has been taken into account.

Nikolay Nikolayevich Gritsenko, chairman of the Commission of the Soviet of the Union for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy [name of commission as heard], is giving a report on the more precisely defined draft law at the session.

Political & Social

1,400 Foreigners Executed in Late 1930's

LD1904122290 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] The State Security Committee in the Soviet Union says preliminary evidence is available on purges of more than 1,400 foreign nationals who were executed in the late 1930's on various charges, including spying, membership of Trotskyist groups and provocations against the Soviet Union. (Huge Ebolein) of Germany, (Edward Prukhniak) of Poland, both of them communists, Bela Kun of Hungary, and (Axel Lowthen) of Denmark were among the victims. Many of them were blacklisted by Nazi Germany and sought refuge in the Soviet Union, which they believed to be the stronghold of socialism.

'Radical' Politician Afanasyev Quits CPSU

AU1904141290 Paris AFP in English 1347 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 19 (AFP)—Radical politician Yuriy Afanasyev has quit the Soviet Communist Party, his secretariat said here Thursday

Mr. Afanasyev, a historian, is a co-chairman of the Inter-Regional Group of deputies, a parliamentary faction formed last summer to press for radical political reform.

His secretariat said he left the party of his own free will Wednesday.

He had recently come in for strong criticism from conservatives who accused him of wanting to split the party.

Earlier this month, the party leadership called for a purge of those who undermine its policy or threaten its unity.

The Central Committee complained that "under the banner of perestroika, certain people are going into battle from a pseudo-radical approach, attacking both ideological and organisational foundations", with some "even attacking Lenin and Leninism".

It specifically referred to supporters of the "so-called democratic platform" within the party, which includes figures such as former Moscow party boss Boris Yeltsin and, until Wednesday, Mr. Afanasyev.

Under the pretense of calling for a radical perestroika, these people were attempting to split the party into political factions, the Central Committee charged.

In an interview with AFP last summer, Mr. Afanasyev suggested that Stalin's dictatorship was a natural outcome of Leninist rule.

He was due to leave Thursday evening for Japan.

Deputy Deems Afanasyev 'Blasphemous'

LD1904125790 Moscow TASS in English 1057 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—The slighting and nihilistic attitude to history can have grave consequences, the Soviet NEDELYA weekly writes in its latest issue in a commentary on the recent interview by Yuriy Afanasyev, rector of the Moscow History and Archives Institute, to the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL.

The magazine quoted Afanasyev as saying that the Soviet Union "has followed a wrong road for more than seven decades."

NEDELYA reprinted the interview and published a commentary by USSR People's Deputy Anna Kanarovskaya. Kanarovskaya traces the evolution of Afanasyev's political views and compares his scientific works of the 1970s, which earned him a doctor's degree, with his current assertions which she describes as "blasphemous".

She says that historian Afanasyev thus "has totally disavowed his scientific works" in which he expressed a "diametrically opposite" point of view on the nature of the 1917 revolution, communism and the role of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU).

Kanarovskaya suggests that Afanasyev should quit the party and at the same time relinquish his doctor's degree.

Gorbachev Chairs Presidential, Federation Councils

LD1804194290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by correspondent D. Kisilev]

[Text] A joint session of the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council of the USSR took place today under the chairmanship of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Here is an on-the-spot report from our correspondent. [Video shows session in progress. In addition to Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Maslyukov, and Yazov, others are also seen]

[Kisilev] Economic crisis, this is what each of us is experiencing himself. Where is the way out? This is the problem that continues to be discussed in the Kremlin today at the joint session of the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council, with the invitation of the country's leading experts.

[Gorbachev] The agenda is the same. I ask comrades to take the floor to speak on these issues.

[Kisilev] Let us recall that a previous, analogous sitting took place on Saturday. At that time, after the report by Yuriy Maslyukov, the first deputy of the Council of Ministers and the USSR Gosplan chairman, a discussion began, during the course of which it was stressed that it was already impermissible to delay in regulating the new economy. Debates continued today. We are expecting an official report on the results of this sitting from the Press Service of the president of the USSR.

Gorbachev Expresses Thanks for Congratulations

LD1904093190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0850 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—We are transmitting the text of the message of acknowledgement of thanks sent by Mikhail Gorbachev [recipient not specified]: "I cordially thank you for the congratulations which I received in connection with my election as USSR president." "I assess the greetings of Soviet people and organizations as support for the course of imparting greater dynamics to perestroyka and as the strengthening of the guarantees of its irreversibility, the guarantee of the fruitful activity of all state and public institutes aimed at creating a humane, democratic socialist society, an effective economy, a renewing of the Soviet Federation."

"I am sincerely greatful to the heads of states and governments, the political and social figures, representatives of science and culture and the citizens of foreign countries who congratulated me. The new authority acquired by me will be used in the interests of deepening those salutary changes in international affairs, which have become the result of the policy of new thinking, in the interests of peace security, European and global cooperation.

'Political Dialogue' Debates CPSU Statute

LD1804104390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 17 Apr 90

["Political Dialogue" program, presented by Viktor Ilich Lyubovtsev, with guests Georgiy Petrovich Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Aleksandr Alekseyevich Ilin, member of the PRAVDA editorial board; Vladimir Aleksandrovich Mindolin, first secretary of the Sovetskiy rayon party committee in Novosibirsk; and Yuriy Ivanovich Lobov, secretary of the party committee at the Izhmash production association and member of the CPSU Central Committee]

[Excerpts] [Lyubovtsev] Good evening, esteemed comrades! Our regular program in the series "Political Dialogue" is today devoted to the CPSU draft rules. The program is going out live and you can take part in it, esteemed comrades—we urge you to do so—you can pass on your comments, suggestions and questions, you can ask any questions about the draft of this most important party document which will be adopted, as we know, at the 28th CPSU Congress, and which will determine the life of our party for many years to come, perhaps even for decades. [passage omitted]

Answering you today will be Georgiy Petrovich Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Aleksandr Alekseyevich Ilin, member of the editorial board of PRAVDA; Vladimir Aleksandrovich Mindolin, first secretary of the Sovetskiy rayon committee of the party in Novosibirsk; and Yuriy Ivanovich Lobov, secretary of the party committee of the Izhmash production association and member of the CPSU Central Committee. [passage omitted]

[Lyubovtsev] The first question I would like to put to all of you, esteemed comrades, can be expressed like this: what is it in the new rules, or more precisely the new draft rules, that to you personally seems to be the most important and principled difference from the old rules? Perhaps we could begin with you, Georgiy Petrovich.

[Razumovskiy] It so happened that I had occasion to deal in the most direct way with the preparation and editing of the rules on the eve of the 27th congress of the party, when upon proposals from very many communists and nonparty people, upon proposals from party organizations—the party Central Committee received literally millions of these proposals, but as a result of the work done by special commissions and invited academic staff—a wide circle of senior staff was put to work on preparing the amendments to the previous rules—out of this very large number of amendments, let us say, just over 100 of them were selected and incorporated into the former rules. Activity of that kind took place in the preparation, development and amendment of the basic law governing the life of the party; and the result, I would say, did not give rise to any great dissatisfaction at that time, but overall no noticeable change in the cardinal and fundamental document took place. After some time we realized that a great deal of work had been done, but the document that resulted was not calculated to meet the requirements of the long term, it was not even calculated to cope with the immediate future.

In what respects, therefore, do the draft CPSU rules currently under consideration differ?

It has virtually been created as a new document. That is the task that was set, and in my opinion it has been crowned with success because a fairly solid foundation has been created for discussing this document in the party and in society. The document is a great deal shorter—it is one third shorter.

[Lyubovtsev] By comparison with the previous one.

[Razumovskiy] By comparison with the previous one. It is concise, strict, and the most important thing is that in its architecture and form, and, what is very important, in its content, it corresponds to the needs both of the present day, of the present time in this very crucial stage in the course of perestroyka, perestroyka in the party and perestroyka in the whole of society; but it is also designed for the long term. If one were to give a general description of the document, in my view in the degree to which it democratizes internal Party relationships and expands opportunities for political activity by every communist and every Party organization, by all party links within the party, this document, as a draft, is as yet without equal in the history of the CPSU.

[Lyubovtsev] Georgiy Petrovich, if I have understood you correctly, you consider the expansion, the considerable expansion of internal party discipline, to be the most important thing reflected in this document?

[Razumovskiy] Of democracy, of democracy.

[Lyubovtsev] That is to say—do excuse me—of democracy, internal party democracy, yes.

[Razumovskiy] On the basis of everything that has been enshrined in this fundamentally new document the primary task was set of making a priority of the thrust toward democratization of all processes in the life of party organizations, of everything that will help and will assist and actuate potential of every communist in the conditions of perestroyka which is being conducted by the party. This applies to the life of the party itself and its perestroyka and renewal, and it also applies to those public processes which are also being restructured with communists, naturally, taking a most active part. [passage omitted]

[Luybovtsev] And here are already a few questions to the presenter which contain the following critical remarks. Is it really necessary to discuss such a problem as a discussion of the Draft Party Rules on Central Television? This is the business of the communists themselves. And, second—unfortunately, it does not say here who asked the first question. The second question is from Comrade Alyeshin, a pensioner from Moscow, a metro official, a party member since 1947: I am categorically opposed to changes in the party and the rules. I am categorically opposed to the emergence of various currents in the party. If something is not to the liking of party members, let them leave the party and join the party which is to their liking. In the last resort the party must remain the party of the Bolsheviks, that is to say, of the majority.

Well, these questions are somewhat contradictory. Nevertheless, Georgiy Petrovich, is it necessary to discuss the problem of the Draft Rules on Central Television and conduct such a conversation not only within the party?

[Razumovskiy] I believe that we must deploy all the possibilities at our disposal, do whatever we can in order to discuss thoroughly such an important document as the Draft Rules. When I started speaking, I already said—and I was backed up by the comrades here—how hurtful it is that on the eve of the 27th party congress, we received, it would seem, very many proposals, and as a result, our work turned out, it can be said, not all that highly successful. We did not obtain the document which was designed for the long term, even though, it would seem, a large number of persons was drawn into this job.

And the second question: I am categorically opposed to changes in the party and the rules.

[Lyubovtsev] Any changes, yes.

[Razumovskiy] And against any changes. [slight laughter by Lyubovtsev] Well, it must be said, for some reason, I would prefer that today we could have fewer such statements, letters and proposals because all of us, the majority of us—I think that here we are all united—we are awaiting, taking part and are doing everything within our power to make the processes of renewal in our society, and above all in the party, proceed without delay and there is still a great deal of work to be done there. [passage omitted]

[Razumovskiy] I would like to join into the discussion of the matter of CPSU membership just a tiny bit. Indeed, there have been, and today proposals are reaching us in favor of maintaining the candidate's probationary period, in favor of recommendations being compulsory. But, if we turn to practicalities, let's ask ourselves this question: Is it a frequent occurrence in life, in practical experience, that we return to this recommendation even when it would, perhaps, be very necessary, to look at who made the recommendation, why he made the recommendation and what the responsibility is of the person recommending. Unfortunately, in practical life, these are simply isolated cases, to say the least. This is almost, this is almost a subject which is not touched upon in the practical life of party organizations.

[Lyubovtsev] Unfortunately, this factor has become somewhat formal.

[Razumovskiy] Formal, formal. [passage omitted: Ilin recalls Lenin's view that people should be recommended personally for party and other work; the party shouldn't be absolutely open to all comers, Ilin thinks. But it is right that the rules should be discussed on television because people are rightly interested in what the party will be like. Lobov then tackles a group of written questions dealing with party subscriptions, in particular with the percentage of subscriptions that should be retained by the primary party organizations. Mindolin adds that it is very important for communists to know in detail the party budget]

[Lyubovtsev] What is your point of view, Georgiy Petrovich, with regard to subscriptions, the size of the subscriptions and how much should be left with the primary party organizations?

[Razumovskiy] I think that having in principle written into the draft that up to 50 percent should be left in the primary party organizations, we have moved toward the wishes of an absolute majority that they should have such resources in the primary party organizations. On the other hand, however, I think that there is a need today in every oblast and republican party organization to look into everything well and analyze the financial possibilities both today and also how they will look after a certain period of time, in order to look into the question of whether 50 percent is necessary in every case—perhaps 40 percent would be more appropriate—doing so democratically and with the participation of the primary party organizations: And of course this will has to be expressed by the party organization itself. It has the right to its 50 percent as is stipulated in the rules today; but bearing in mind the fact that approximately three quarters of the party organizations in our country today receive and live on subsidies from the party Central Committee, some of the oblast and republican party organizations will find themselves in a difficult financial situation.

[Lyubovtsev] A question from Comrade (Volkov) is directly linked to what you have been saying. Where did party subscriptions go to and where do they go to?

[Ilin] Incidentally we described this recently in 'PRAVDA....'

[Razumovskiy interrupting] There was an interview or an article in PRAVDA....

[Ilin interrupting] No, it was an interview, a conversation with Comrade Kruchina.

[Razumovskiy] There was an interview with Comrade Kruchina, CPSU Central Committee administrator, and he explained it in some detail and as far as I remember half of the members' subscriptions go on wages. [passage omitted: Mindolin responds to viewers' suggestions that party subscriptions should not be taken from pensions and students' grants; that veterans of the party should have an extra R40 to 50 per month from obkom, gorkom and raykom funds; and he reads out suggestions that subscriptions should be deducted from net income and that they should be reduced to R1 a month for everyone—an idea with which he disagrees. Razumovskiy then speaks]

[Razumovskiy] I would like to explain a little my answer to the question asked by Comrade Volkov about where party subscriptions go to, especially in view of the fact that they can amount to up to three percent. I want to say that we have many party workers today in the primary party organizations, especially in the rural party organizations, who have been released and naturally with the changeover to full financial autonomy and with the raised level of labor intensity of many specialists it has been necessary to transfer many people, many secretaries of party organizations, to payment out of the party budget. Therefore, the greater part of the resources—when I talk about them being spent on wages—this refers first and foremost to secretaries of primary party organizations who have been released, and there are tens of thousands of these in the country.

[Lyubovtsev] Another question for you, Georgiy Petrovich. Will party membership cards be renewed or exchanged in connection with the new rules? Generally speaking there are quite a lot of questions about party membership cards. What are they going to look like, and so on?

[Razumovskiy] For some reason or other people have again started to ask this question, quite often without linking it with the proposal that a reattestation should be carried out, as it was put about five years ago, or even a purge in the ranks of the party. Today, these questions are being asked about an exchange of party documents. So far, this question is not on the agenda.

[Lyubovtsev] Here is a question which Comrade Solovyey from Zhitomir asks of all those taking part in the program. It is a sharp, acute, question, but I'll read it out. Why does a party, which came to power in 1917 and which established a regime of party dictatorship in the country leading to economic, political, and moral collapse, still not want to quit the positions of command? Aleksandr Alekseyevich, you, too, in your discussion page are sometimes obliged to answer such not impartial, shall we say, sharp questions. Would you begin this discussion now?

[Ilin] It is not just the discussion page that I have edited: There was a time when I edited the history page in PRAVDA and I am therefore familiar with criticism of this kind. The comrades are somewhat idealizing history, that is to say they are attributing to it a purely subjectivist character: The Bolsheviks took things, they seized things, they carried out the revolution. There is a lot of talk of this kind taking place now. Lenin repeated many times that no party, that no group of people, is capable of carrying out a revolution: Revolution is carried out only by the millions. He says that politics begins where the millions are active. Secondly, the party, in October of 1917, as we know, did not seize power for itself. The first government was a coalition government, as is known, left wing Socialist Revolutionaries also belonged to it. Furthermore, there were representatives of different parties in the soviets which were the organs of power, both at the center and in the localities. There were Mensheviks, Menshevik-Internationalists, Socialist Revolutionaries along with the Bolsheviks. These were representative bodies of power, in full measure.

As far as the point is concerned that the party brought our country to economic and political collapse, I think it's impossible to answer such questions, because this isn't a question, it's a statement. Ones need to talk to this comrade, one needs to explain it to him specially, but clearly we don't have enough time to do that now. But it seems to me that these are fairly unsubstantiated things. The party has not only carried out.... [changes thought] It really is guilty of some mistakes, including mistakes in carrying out collectivization and in carrying out industrialization and so on, but it was also the cementing force. It did a great deal in order for our country to create the foundations in the economy and in the social sphere which we still continue to use to this day. One mustn't think that all this is beginning only today. We live in the home that was built by our fathers and grandfathers. And one cannot cross out just like that the labor done by many generations which lived before our own day, nor even the labor of many communists who also lived before ourselves.

[Lyubovtsev] Painting things all jet black is just as bad as painting things all sky blue: that's certainly true. Please go ahead, Georgiy Petrovich.

[Razumovksiy] I'd like to give some brief answers. Comrade Landrik, a junior scientific worker from Moscow asks whether the name of the party is going to be changed. For the present this question is not on the agenda. I think that it is possible that it will not be discussed at the congress, either, or rather it might be discussed, but what decision will they take? This question was rejected at the party Central Committee plenum.

To continue: Anishchenko, Pavel Valentinovich, from Moscow asks: How will Comrade Razumovskiy explain the use of cadres trained at the higher party school? In what way are they used after completion of their training at the higher party school?

We do indeed have a broad network of higher party educational establishments throughout the country. They train party and administrative workers. The requirement for these is very high, and today, bearing in mind the complexities that have occurred in their work and the newness of style and method that has to be inculcated first and foremost in party workers, the role of the party schools is not declining. We need such cadres and as a rule they are used on party and administrative work.

The next question is from Sevastopol. Comrade Ivanov, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, asks: Do you consider it expedient for servicemen to be communists? The opinion has arisen in our country that the army has remained subordinate to the party because all officers and warrant officers in our country are communists. Is it expedient for communists in the army to leave the party? I consider that the section in the new draft rules has been formed in a way that is new in principle and that this will provide the opportunity where formalism has occurred, including formalism with regard to membership of the party, where—one may assume that this is what the questioner has in mind—where all are accepted according to formal requirements. I believe that if these rules are adopted the party organizations will operate in a new way and that formalism will decline. They will act more independently and they will carry out the admission of communists into the party in a truly strict and responsible way, and that this will apply to the army, too. [passage omitted: Lobov answers a question about whether it is right that there should be professional party workers; and Mindolin talks about the nature of democratic centralism as opposed to bureaucratic centralism]

[Lyubovtsev] Thank you, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, but I would like you, Georgiy Petrovich, to comment on this question, which is interesting in my view.

[Razumovskiy] I fully agree with Vladimir Aleksandrovich. A creative approach is what is needed in this matter, the more so as life is changing, the working conditions of party organizations are also changing. And this flexibility in handing over, in redistributing functions, flexibility in structural entities—it should not be centralized, it should be corrected by life itself, in the region, in the town, in the party organization where some or other conditions are arising. I would not bring all this work under one denominator. And if we go over to such a form of work, I think that we will only gain, the more so as lying ahead of us are quickly changing conditions, tasks which are growing and becoming complicated quickly and it will be necessary to react to them very quickly. In such conditions we will be able to do that. That is who I support Vladimir Aleksandrovich.

[Lyubovtsev] Georgiy Petrovich, I....

[Razumovskiy—interrupting] It seems to me that I must reply to one question....

[Lyubovtsev—interrupting] And, afterwards, I will already be combining the response to the answer given by you.

[Razumovskiy] Okay.

[Lyubovtsev] I'll be doing three things at once.

[Razumovskiy] Yes, Comrade Sergiyenko from Voroshilovgrad asks the following questions: Esteemed Georgiy

Petrovich, the new rules canot be high-quality rules, because the old rules have been perfected by the life of communists in the course of 70 years. You have drawn up rules which are unequalled. These rules may be unequalled, but they cannot be viable. They will not be adopted by communists. Judging from the situation in the CPSU today, you are unable to take into the account the questions of the life of communisits for the long-term. In this connection, I request you to tell us of the future of the CPSU.

Briefly describing the new draft rules, I would briefly say that this document, nevertheless, in my view, is designed for the requirements both of the present day and of the long-term. Our long-term future is such that the features of the work functions, the forms and methods of the work of party organizations are changing in the conditions of the democratization of society, of the sovereignty of the local soviets, of the self-government of the people and of all other, so to speak, new conditions, which need to be taken into account and to which one must react subtly and in good time. It is not by governing of the country, relying on the law, but by political methods, by winning the political competition battle with other sociopolitical organizations in free elections and through other forms of expression of the will of the working people that the Communist Party will win its authority.

[Lyubovtsev] Yuriy Petrovich, I have already said that there a few calls from viewers who take issue with you. For instance, Muscovite Aleksandr Ivanovich Martynov asks: The rules contain the well known statement by Lenin: The party is the mind, honor, and conscience of our epoch. Will this not be undermined by the requirement for admission to membership to be simplified? And here is one more question: There must, after all, be recommendations by comrades who know the candidate when he is being admitted to the party' ranks. Here you are, here are a few questions addressed to you.

[Razumovskiy] I think that we often take candidates into the party on recommendations, in effect on recommendations, and not because they are well known by the primary party organization, sufficiently well to advocate their admission unanimously. The candidates' probation period is a norm that has exited for quite a long time, a prescribed norm that we have adhered to, but in the course of discussion of this matter we have carried out quite a large opinion poll among communists, secretaries of primary party organizations, and they have, nevertheless, advocated that the more quickly—having accepted someone as a party member—we introduce him into active social and political work, entrust him with a specific job, test him on specific jobs, the quicker we will obtain a communist who will show his ability and prove that his comrades at work, who if not they, members of the party, communists, the primary party organisation—we can see that the party rules say three people, some people are objecting that there should be at least five communists, and then it could be called a primary party organization—who if not they, the more so with the involvement of the nonparty people of this small, say, labor collective, know best the person in question when he is being admitted into the party? [as heard] [passage omitted: Lyubovtsev quotes a Kiev viewer saying it's not the party that brought us to economic disaster. Ilin agrees with this view, and quotes a remark from another viewer who proposes another addition to the draft rules: That the words "in the interests of the people" should be replaced with the words "in the interests of the working people." A good suggestion to put to the drafting commission. Lyubovtsev comments on the thoroughness with which viewers have read the draft rules, judging by their suggestions. An Izhevsk viewer asks whether party apparatuses really are needed at all levels given a multiparty system. Lobov says he will answer that one later. Mindolin asks what is the special feature of Soviet power? It is the uniting of production and territory, he says. Production is of vital importance. Ilin gives his view on the right of the minority—we give the minority the right to defend its position. Lobov returns to his questions: Yes, an apparatus is necessary and essential, even under a multiparty system. No one should have any privileges. The army and the KGB now are independent of the party. He briefly answers other brief questions]

[Lyubovtsev] Georgiy Petrovich, I know that you have a great many questions, and I would like to offer you some more, but first of all, a question that is repeated in many letters, about the essence of changing the title, general secretary or chairman of the party, and what is the further destiny of the Politburo, that is, what is in mind here is? Why will it now be a presidium?

[Razumovskiy] What is in mind is that the presidium will be a more representative organ. As is clear from the draft rules, apart from representatives of workers, the intelligentsia and all other working people, and those there by dint of their duties, it will include leaders of union party organizations, of the union republics. And so it will be a much more representative body than the the Politburo. Evidently the renaming, the title of chairman of the party goes along with this.

Now, this is the not the first time this question has come up, about the renaming... about the replacement of party cards, and they connect this with the well known pronouncement by Lenin that the party is the mind, the honor, and the conscience of the era. I think that in the course of perestroyka, during the complicated work to renew the whole of the party, we are going to have to do a great deal in order that it is not that people just change their party cards, but that communists bring their moral outlook, their actions and behavior fully into line with Lenin's dictum about this. I would also like to say that the question of a party card exchange is not on the agenda at present.

[Lyubovtsev] And again, Georgiy Petrovich, there are a lot of questions about the party's name. You have even seen some suggestions there: the Party of Renewed Socialism, the Party of Democratic Socialism, and so on and so forth. But you have already answered the question, that (?there is no question of this).

[Razumovskiy] This question was rejected at a plenum of the party Central Committee, but the congress is yet to come. I think that it is hardly likely there will be a change.

I would like to answer some questions which have come from other than Moscow. Comrade Zorin, from Kharkov Oblast, asks: Will on age limit be set for members of the Politburo? Will there be a demand for retirement of all members of the Politburo if they have not managed to cope with their work? The point on suppression of criticism has been thrown out—is one to understand that it is now permissable to suppress criticism, or something? Will members of the Politburo be allowed to take office in other soviet and state organizations? Because what two or three people do cannot be done by just one. Why are the chairman of the CPSU Central Committee and the chairman of the Central Committee Auditing Commission elected outside of the congress, or is this in order to get people who are not to the party's liking into these posts?

As it happens, it is emphasized that it is not only the chairman of the party, but all the secretaries of party organizations that are elected, beginning from primary, rayon, town, oblast, and republican organizations, at the party congress. It is a different matter here, in one of the questions, concerning the kind of mechanism that there will be for replacement after there has been a conference or congress, and the whole congress will have elected the secretary, the first secretary of the party committee. Every party committee will be thinking about this, about what replacement mechanism will be proposed. [Ilin] It would be a good thing to think about this before the congress, it is something which is of concern to communists.

[Razumovskiy] Before the congress, and we are awaiting proposals and not just questions. We will look at them with great readiness, and react to them in appropriate fashion. Concerning the age limit, there is more on this in several notes. I would like to say that the rules set out a term for staying in office, not more than two terms for remaining in the post of an elected worker. It must be said that recently, at any rate, the intensity of work, the rhythm of life, the complexity of the work have had their effect on the process of renewal of cadre workers; it is in progress more intensively than ever, and the problems of stagnation, the problem of prolonged stays in elected work by party workers at all levels, one can say, does not exist in the party today. As far as the age limit is concerned, we have to think about this, but in general, in the majority of cases, they avoid such a limit. The matter is one not of age, but capabilities, physical and creative capabilities of the person who occupies this or that post.

[Ilin] It restricts a person's rights, as was said during discussion of this.

[Lyubovtsev] This is a question which comes up regularly, evidently it could be examined at some....

[Razumovskiy interrupts] And further, there is an interesting question. Evidently it has been asked because not enough attention has been given to one of the provisions of the draft rules, in that one decision establishes numbers for nomination of candidates - this evidently relates to an elected body—but with secret voting, if all the candidates get more than 50 percent of votes, they all remain, mechanically. The new rules exclude this. It is by a relative majority, and it is those who get more than half of the votes who were considered elected, in principle. But this is in strict accordance with a quota, a number of places, and it is only those who get a relative majority of votes compared to the others who will be considered elected.

[Lyubovtsev] Is that all you wanted to say, Georgiy Petrovich? I have to say that very many questions have come in referring to the recent open letter from the CPSU Central Committee on consolidating the party ranks. For example, Comrades (Tsigankov) and Nikiforov from Simferopol ask this: How could the CPSU, without waiting for the congress, cut off the democratic platform and call for organizational conclusions with regard to the leaders of the democratic platform at the same time making declarations about pluralism of opinions? Who would like to answer this question? Or begin to answer it.

[Mindolin] I have to say that the letter from the Central Committee was received with understanding where we are, in the Sovetskiy Rayon and in the Akademgorodok of Novosibirsk. Why was it received with understanding? Because, I think, a great deal depends upon the extent to which democratic traditions are worked out in the various primary organizations or in the rayon and town party organizations: The traditions of normal, democratic party business. When that exists and when people read what really has been written in the letter rather than what their imagination begins to add to and expand upon—and it contains a call for discussion to be intensified, for dialogue to be intensified, for analysis, for the demarcation of ideas during the pre-congress discussions. That, actually, is all that it amounts to. Everything else, so to speak, the possibilities for more thorough political demarcations, organizational divergences and so on—that may be the case, but there is a strict ordering of priorities here: the number one issue—it is a vitally important question for the party, it exists, the party is not united in its outlook, there are many trends and groups and so on: Ideological demarcation we take as a call for ideological discussion that is rich in content, a call for dialogue, for elucidation, for the purity of all viewpoints. What is that if it isn't pluralism?

[Ilin] I was in Kirov recently—a PRAVDA festival was taking place there, we are in fact currently preparing for our festival which will take place at the all-Union Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy on 5 and 6 May—and there, too, this question was asked very frequently and one could hear alarm being expressed as to whether this dosen't in fact mean that a call is being made for a purge of party ranks to be started. Some people even used a tougher expression and talked about a witch hunt and so on. Documents and letters are already known in which this issue is raised in precisely that way and people are already almost shouting for help. I have already had an opportunity to set out my opinion on Central Television. The letter is not a resume of a discussion, but in general terms it is a call for discussion to be businesslike and constructive. In fact we also explained our position on this in the leader which appeared in PRAVDA yesterday. Another reason why I am mentioning this is the fact that I myself edit these discussion pages. What should we be doing? Winding up the discussion or developing it? And there is another side to all this. When comrades send their letters we get quite a few telephone calls saying I sent in a letter or I sent in an article—and I have very many of these—and asking when are you going to publish it? I say that I cannot give any guarantees. But as soon as an article or letter has been published it immediately becomes a subject for discussion and gives rise to different arguments including some that are sharply critical. For example we have published the democratic platform, we have published a roundtable at which this platform was discussed and naturally reactions come in which communists criticize this platform in a fairly tough way and tell us that there are certain divergences between the words and the deeds. Should we be offended by this? No, I think that's wrong, because I make contributions myself and other comrades make contributions and there is virtually no speech or article in any way noteworthy that gives rise to exclusively positive emotions. Nothing of the kind! As a rule some one dosen't like it, someone criticizes it sharply, but discussion is discussion and there's nothing else for it. [passage omitted]

[Lyubovtsev] We are asked how in this connection one should regard the resolution that has been adopted by the 21st Congress of the Komsomol which says that the open letter is allegedly trying to weaken discussion in the party—that's the direct opposite of what we are now saying—or to give the conservative forces an opportunity for dealing with those who think differently. Georgiy Petrovich what would you say about this?

[Razumovskiy] If one turns one's attention to our party press, in my opinion it gives a very good example of the opposite. Both PRAVDA and our other party publications give all representatives of different points of view the opportunity to express themselves on the most varied issues and aspects of party work, the reform of the party and other matters. One example of this are the latest issues which after the congress did indeed, so to speak, step up this work. Literally everyone is given the opportunity to express his point of view. So this in no way fits in with the interpretation given by those who would like to present this as an attempt to wind up the discussion or to express a particular opinion, so to speak, or to set about the persecution of those who think differently. In reality that does not exist in our country. In fact we see a truly widely spread pluralism of opinions and I want to say once again that perhaps other publications besides those of the party ought to follow this example. [passage omitted]

[Razumovskiy] The party's Central Committee addressed itself primarily to the primary party organizations, to that link in the party where people know each other very well, where they will not allow mistakes to be made, where comrades at work and comrades in the party, so to speak, will even put right the person who suddenly, so to speak, as a result of his conservative convictions conceives the idea of doing something that is wrong. In my opinion there is nothing to be afraid of here. On the contrary, the party, reacting to what is taking place in society, with due consideration for the political situation and the discussion which today has become more acute on the eve of the congress, well, the party is reacting, it is reacting in a healthy and correct way, involving the masses of communists who have to sort out who is on the side of whom. [passage omitted: Lobov, responding to a Kishinev viewer's question, says he personally thinks the rules should lay down a procedure for purging party ranks]

[Lyubovtsev] Close to the subject is a group of questions dealing with the principles of democratic centalism, which, as we know, has been preserved in the draft new rules of the party. Vadim Aleksandrovich Sergeyev from Leningrad asks what democratic centralism means? The one in which the lower organ is subordinate to the organ above it or in which all the others are subordinate to the supreme organ of the party? Doronina from Leningrad asks whether two points in the rules are not in contradiction with each other. While Fedorov from Moscow says this: I consider that if a minority I do not agree with a decision that has been adopted I am able not to carry it out but also not to impede its implementation. That is the range of opinions we have.

[Razumovskiy] Evidently what has confused people most of all is the appearance once again in the new document of the words democratic centralism, a concept which is associated with the past, when a tough, hierarchical system did indeed exist on the part of the higher links, the party committees, and party organisations with regard to the lower links in the party. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the draft new rules say that no one can cancel a decision of a party organization, that no superior organ can cancel a decision by a party organization of whatever kind if that decision does not run counter to the program and rules of the party. That is the kind of democratic centralism that is being proposed today. But if we were to depart from the democratic centralism provision as it was understood by Lenin we could bring about a totally different party, without internal discipline, without organizational unity, an amorphous party, incapable of concentrating will and action and incapable of solving the tasks which face us today at such a difficult period of perestroyka. It would be a completely different party as far as its potential is concerned. I would therefore like to draw the attention of all those who are confused by the appearance in the new document of the concept of democratic centralism—again and again they should read the provisions, the sections, and the paragraphs of these rules and convince themselves of the fact that centralism here has been displaced, that the advantage and all the priorities have been laid down in favor of democratism, in favor of the democratization of internal party life, and not the other way around. Upon this basis, upon the basis of intelligent discipline, on the basis of ideological unity, on the basis of organizational cohesion, the party can be strong and capable of solving the increasingly complex issues that face it. [passage omitted: Ilin answers a question about why the party wants to hand over power to the soviets: as he understands it the objective is that power should be in the hands of the people]

[Lyubovtsev] From Grodno, (Yelena Ivanovna Kiriyanova) asks this: What is the attitude of the CPSU to religion? Can a member of the CPSU believe in God? Pensioner (Parfenovich) from Vilnius asks: Will the new rules contain a point about every party member having to combat religious prejudice? (Zaura Abdullayeva) from Dagestan writes: It is a good thing that religion has been resumed, but not once have we had a Muslim moral sermon—evidently she's thinking about the evening Sunday sermon program which follows Vremya on Central Television. That program is made by another editorial department, the literature and drama department, but as far as I am aware, appearances by clergy and representatives of the Muslim faith are also planned. Ivanova from Moscow asks: Are all CPSU members atheists? Or will they go and pray in the church that has been newly opened up? (Zhanitsyn), Boris Nikolayevich, from Lyubertsy, asks: I feel that in our attitude to religion we have gone from one extreme to the other; we have started to propagandize it too actively. I propose that the rules should say this: The communist is an atheist. In his practical work he is under an obligation to implement an appropriate conviction. In addition we have had notes from (Vysova), a teacher from Moscow, on the same thing: Karpenko asks whether a priest may be a party member and so on, especially since the first paragraph of the rules says that any citizen may be a member of the party. Please let us hear your views on this issue, since it is so interesting for many viewers.

[Razumovskiy] I don't think in this respect the Rules will go further than what is written there already. As far as freedom of conscience is concerned, that is a right of any citizen, and we must respect the constitutional right of the individual in this respect, too. As far as the member of the party is concerned, and his world outlook and stance, here I do not think we should change anything. Surely we cannot agree that the principles, approaches, and requirements made of party members should suddenly change sharply here. Attitudes to those who conduct religious rites for masses of people, for millions of people, is one thing, all of this is granted to them by the law, and we must respect it as we respect any other law. But as far as our own ranks are concerned, we have to conduct our work in accordance with the world outlook that we profess in our party ranks.

[Mindolin] I think that atheism must be humanistic and respectful. The atheist is not the person who shouts there's no God and brings down the temple: He's the person who sets against the brotherhood of people in God the brotherhood of people in man, and who does so with the necessary respect and viliance. That is what humane socialism and communism mean.

[passage omitted: Lyubovtsev asks for a half minute contribution from each participant. Lobov begins, reading out a lengthy question from a Kishinev viewer about the alienation of party members from the material resources of the party—all communists, he says, ought to participate in drawing up the budget]

[Lyubovtsev] Georgiy Petrovich, over to you for the final word, because our time is really already over.

[Razumovskiy] A brief question and a brief answer. Please comment on the last sentence of Article 19 on the dismissal of the secretary of a party organization. For some reason or other this is linked with Article 6 of the Constitution, where the leader of a collective can be a member of another party. The point here is that communists should know about the dismissal of the secretary of a party organization and examine that question at a party meeting. A second small question. Please explain whether two points conflict with the principles of democratic centralism and the obligation upon a lower organ to fulfill the decisions of superior organs. We have already touched upon this subject, I think.

[Lyubovtsev] We have touched upon it. Thank you very much. Although there are still a lot of questions, of course, that remain to be answered, unfortunately, as always happens on our broadcasts, I am obliged to conclude it. Thank you all very much for taking part in it, and thank you to our viewers for their attention and active participation in the program. Goodbye and all the best to you.

New Aviation, Health Ministers Appointed

LD1804134990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] From the chronicle of official announcements:

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR, has appointed Boris Yegorovich Panyukov minister of civil aviation of the USSR.

Igor Nikolayevich Denisov has been appointed minister of health of the USSR.

New Ministers Profiled

LD1804211790 Moscow TASS in English 1904 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Boris Panyuk to be the USSR minister of civil aviation and Igor Denisov to be the USSR health minister.

Panyukov is 60 years old. Upon graduating from Yegoryevsk Air School, he worked as an aircraft technician, then continued his studies and graduated from Leningrad Academy of civil aviation in 1959.

From 1962 to 1968 Panyukov worked at first as deputy head of airport and then director of the airport and deputy commander of the Mineralnye Vody Joint Air Transportation Organisation in the Northern Caucasus.

In 1968 he was authorised to represent Aeroflot in Budapest. Later on he was the director of airport, deputy commander of the Vnukovo Joint Air Transportation Organisation near Moscow.

From 1972 to 1979 Panyukov was a member of the collegium and head of the traffic organising department of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and then deputy minister of civil aviation. Recently he was the first deputy minister of civil aviation.

Igor Denisov is 49 years old. In 1964 he graduated from the Kuybyshev Medical Institute. He completed a surgical training and post-graduate course at the same institute. Later on he became the prorector of this educational centre and from 1983—rector of the Ryazan Medical Institute.

Denisov is a surgeon and has been engaging in clinical practice for almost a quarter of the century.

He has authored more than 100 scientific works. Since 1987 he has been working with the USSR Health Ministry—at first as head of the main department for educational establishments and then deputy and first deputy minister. He was in charge of medical science, the training of personnel, health planning and economics, and foreign relations in this field.

Continued Coverage of 21st Komsomol Congress

Ligachev Talks With Delegates

PM1904094190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Own correspondents Lieutenant Colonel A. Kovalev and Major V. Zyubin report: "Think for Yourselves, Decide for Yourselves..."]

[Excerpts] The 21st Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Congress continues. [passage omitted]

Before the next sitting began there was an impromptu meeting between Armed Forces delegates to the Komsomol forum and Ye. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He gave candid and exhaustive replies to their acute and topical questions. We asked a question too:

[Correspondents] Yegor Kuzmich, does the Army Komsomol have a future, in your opinion? People are currently saying—and have said so at the congress—that there is no room in the Army for political youth structures.

[Ligachev] I cannot imagine our Army without the Komsomol. Many of the most varied voices have been raised during our history, but the Komsomol has continued to exist and does so today. It has a strength which it should recognize. And, from my standpoint, both the Army as a whole and the Army Komsomol are—and I would stress this—one of the strongest moral and political forces in perestroyka. In genuine perestroyka... [Ligachev ends]

At the congress delegates' request Ye. Ligachev later covered questions of youth economics. [passage omitted]

Ligachev on Economic Activity

PM1904093490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 1

[Special correspondents G. Sapozhnikova and A. Khantsevich report: "21st All-Union Lenin Komsomol (Communist Youth League) Congress: Day Three. Subjective Remarks in the Margins of the Stenographic Transcript"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Tape Recorder in the Auditorium

Voice: I have the following proposal. We must find out Comrade Ligachev's opinion with regard to the draft that we have just drawn up, and publish it in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

Ye.K. Ligachev: I can answer this question very easily. Some years ago at a special session of the party's Central Committee Secretariat we examined this very idea of the formation and development of a youth economy in detail. I entirely maintain the position I occupied then. I think that for this new, extremely important work—which you are conducting, I suppose, without getting your hands dirty, and fairly effectively and usefully—support is required, and above all the setting up of tax concessions. (Applause). If you trust me, so to speak, then I will add my voice to yours, and try to convince my Politburo comrades and M.S. Gorbachev personally. Although I make no guarantees, for we have now entered new conditions of political life, when not only does the Politburo decide a question, but the same question is also decided by the Supreme Soviet, our parliament (disturbance in the hall). I am explaining to you what complexities and difficulties lie ahead for you and me (laughter). For us to respond to this, as they say, in actions... I am not trying to educate anyone or to preach. But when you all examine the questions, remember the generations which created the Komsomol [Communist Youth League]... [passage omitted]

15, 16 Apr Proceedings

PM1904091390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed "Information Report"]

[Text] On 15 April 1990 the delegates to the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress worked in discussion centers and delegates' clubs.

The "Appeal by the 21st Komsomol Congress to the CPSU Central Committee and the Country's Communists" was adopted 16 April at the morning session.

V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the discussion of this question.

16, 17 Apr Proceedings

PM1804134190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed "Information Report"]

[Text] The discussion of draft documents and congress resolutions continued at the 16 April evening sitting of the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Congress.

Delegates adopted a "Declaration by the 21st Komsomol Congress" and the "Komsomol's Program Goals" at the 17 April morning sitting.

Appeal to CPSU Central Committee

PM1804154190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 1

["Appeal by 21st Komsomol Congress to the CPSU Central Committee and the Country's Communists" adopted at 21st Komsomol Congress 16 April, followed by "minority opinion" giving variant version of appeal]

[Text] Mindful of the close connection between the historical destinies of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] and the CPSU and the complexity and contradictoriness of the situation prevailing within the Komsomol, the party, and society as a whole, the 21st Komsomol Congress deems it necessary to define its attitude toward the CPSU Central Committee open letter "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis."

The delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress note that a precongress debate has been actively under way in the CPSU in recent months. In our view, the existence not only of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the congress but also of other viewpoints, including the "Democratic Platform," does much to lend sharpness and dynamism to the debate.

Certainly neither document is free from shortcomings and both require serious analysis and equally serious additional work.

Aware of this, we are worried by the call made in the CPSU Central Committee letter dated 11 April 1990 right now "...to investigate what is to become of those party members who are working persistently and purposefully toward a split, are creating organizationally formalized factions within the CPSU, reject the Soviet people's socialist choice, and by their views and conduct have effectively placed themselves outside the party. Can such people remain in the ranks of the CPSU?.."

In our view, the CPSU Central Committee open letter is an attempt to weaken the debate within the party.

The appearance of this letter at the height of the precongress debate may mean that conservative forces will use the CPSU Central Committee open letter as grounds for suppressing communists who express different viewpoints.

We appeal to the CPSU Central Committee, to all Communists, and to all party organizations and we propose:

—that they refrain until the 28th CPSU Congress from taking organizational measures with regard to party members sharing a particular platform within the CPSU;

—that "Democratic Platform" supporters refrain during the precongress period from formally organizing as a faction and concentrate on propagandizing their ideas at party organization meetings and plenums and sessions of party committees.

We believe that these steps will be able to ensure constructive development of the precongress debate, ensure real pluralism of opinions at the 28th CPSU Congress, and create the conditions for the adoption of the optimum, considered decisions by the congress.

We are convinced that only the CPSU Congress can determine the party's strategic line, relying in this process on everything progressive reflected in the CPSU Central Committee platform, the "Democratic Platform," or any other platform, and only the congress is entitled to decide whether there is room in the party for supporters of a particular theoretical viewpoint. [Appeal ends]

Of the 1,568 congress delegates who took part in the vote, 426 supported a different version of the decision: not to revise the appeal adopted by the congress 14 April while at the same time reaffirming the decision adopted earlier without a vote on citing a full quotation from the CPSU Central Committee letter in paragraph four. We quote the text of the appeal drawn up as a minority opinion.

[Minority opinion] Mindful of the close connection between the historical destinies of the Komsomol and the CPSU and the complexity and contradictoriness of the situation prevailing within the Komsomol, the party, and society as a whole, the 21st Komsomol Congress deems it necessary to define its attitude toward the CPSU Central Committee open letter "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis."

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In our view, the CPSU Central Committee open letter is an attempt to weaken the debate within the party and to prove by strongarm administrative methods the superior merits of one of the documents without especially troubling over evidence.

We fear that conservative forces may use the CPSU Central Committee open letter as grounds for suppressing supporters of the "Democratic Platform" and all communists who express different viewpoints.

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We are convinced that only the CPSU Congress can determine the party's strategic line, relying in this process on everything progressive reflected in the CPSU Central Committee platform, the "Democratic Platform," or any other platform, and only the congress is entitled to decide whether there is room in the party for supporters of a particular theoretical viewpoint.

Newspaper Representatives Meet

PM1804134290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Collegiums Meet"]

[Text] As already reported, on 15 April many of the 21st All-Union Lenin Komsomol [Communist Youth League] Congress visited PRAVDA. Representatives of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA who are taking part in the congress and covering it also came. During the discussion they expressed the wish for the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial collegium to meet with the PRAVDA editorial collegium and PRAVDA chief editor I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The meeting took place. The talk touched on topical problems of the party and Komsomol press, the prospects for its development, and how best to cover present-day youth themes. The journalists of the two newspapers shared their concerns and plans. A particular place in the conversation was devoted to a discussion of the tasks arising for the party and Komsomol press from the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the Newspaper PRAVDA."

Komsomol Changes Name

LD1804224490 Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT 18 Apr 90

[By TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—From now on the organisation of the Soviet Union's young communists, which existed since 1918, will have the following name:

"The All-Union Leninist Young Communist League—Federation of Leagues Uniting Young People of Communist and Socialist Choice."

"This was decided upon by delegates to the 21st congress of the YCL and added it to the YCL new rules. The congress drew to a close here on Wednesday.

Unlike the organisational structure existing until Wednesday, from now on republican youth leagues as well as YCL organisations of the Soviet Armed Forces, the border troops of the KGB and the Interior Ministry troops are also reckoned full and equal members of the federation.

There was a keen discussion which almost ended with a split over the question of who should be considered sujects of the federation. According to the new wording the Youth League of Russia, set up in February but not formalised organisationally (its rules will be adopted in June), formally is not part of the all-union YCL. This means that 828 delegates had no right either to vote for congress resolutions or elect central leading bodies.

Therefore Russian delegates suggested adopting a provisional amendment saying that territorial, regional and city organisations of the YCL of the republic be regarded as subjects of the federation pending organisational formalisation of the YCL of Russia. The situation became aggravated when the congress rejected this proposal. In response representatives of Moscow and Leningrad intended to walk out of the forum.

And still a way out was found. A majority of delegates voted in favour of a decision that, "pending final organisational formalisation of the YCL of the Russian Federation, its interests as the subject of youth federation be represented by members of the All-Union YCL Central Committee elected from YCL organisations of the republic."

With this amendment new rules of the All-Union YCL were adopted. They correspond to democratic changes in the life of Soviet society. The delegates elected a Central Committee and a Central control Body. Then the congress began to discuss candidacies for the posts of the first secretary of the All-Union YCL Central Committee and chairman of the Central Control Body. Election results were expected to become known later at night. [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 2225 GMT on 18 April reports that "Vladimir Zyukin was elected first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee by a majority of votes."]

Komsomol Leaders Elected

LD1804231490 Moscow TASS in English 2251 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The 21st Congress of the All-Union Young Communist League (YCL) by a majority of votes elected Vladimir Zyukin, 36, to be the first secretary of the YCL Central Committee.

Zyukin is a member of the Soviet Communist Party and mechanical engineer by education. He has been involved in public activities since 1978. He was secretary of the All-Union YCL Central Committee from 1989.

Valeriy Parfenov, 35, was elected the chairman of the YCL central control body.

Parfenov is a member of the Soviet Communist Party and mechanical engineer by education. He has been involved in public activities since 1978. Prior to his election he held the post of the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Young Communist League.

Medvedev, Yazov Address Women's Council Leaders

PM1804092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Morning Edition p6

[TASS report: "Woman and Society"]

[Text] What is the concept behind the state program for improving the position of women in the USSR and protecting the family, mother, and child, how can we aid the recovery of environmental disaster zones, and what is the current state of and prospects in the social sphere—particularly in medicine and public education—in the USSR Armed Forces, and in the system of law and order and the protection of citizens' legitimate interests? These and many other problems of vital importance to our society were discussed during training organized by the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Institute for Enhancing Leading Party, Soviet, and Ideological Cadres' Qualifications and the Soviet Women's Committee.

The leaders of republic, kray, oblast, and district women's councils and editors of women's journals were addressed by V.A. Medvedev, A.P. Biryukova, D.T. Yazov, leaders of ministries, departments, and the mass media, and leading scientists and journalists.

A considerable part of the studies was devoted to enhancing women's councils' role and place in the processes taking place in the country and in society. The lectures and practical classes devoted to means of renewing the CPSU in modern conditions, the art of dialogue, the social and psychological aspects of political campaigns, and exchange of work experience aroused keen interest in the audience.

Lenin Article on 'Opportunists' Viewed

PM1704125190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by P. Vladimirov: "Answer to 'Good Textualist'"]

[Text] In two issues—5 and 12 April 1985—the newspaper VPERED printed Lenin's article "Social Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government." In the article the author, to speak philosophical language, taught a lesson in dialectics—the flexible, subtle understanding of the rapidly changing revolutionary situation. If we resort to political language, then we cannot fail to note Lenin's implacability toward opportunists among the social democrats who "are strenuously dragging the party backward."

The spark that set the forest on fire, as they say, was the slogan "down with autocracy!" Just five years ago, the article stresses, the slogan seemed to many representatives of social democracy to be premature and incomprehensible to the working masses. It was explained and is being explained to the opportunists that they are lagging behind the movement, that they fail to understand the tasks of the party as the leading detachment of the working class, as its leader and organizer, as the representative of the movement as a whole and of its fundamental and chief aims. These aims may temporarily be hidden by daily routine work, but they must never lose their significance as the lodestar for the struggling proletariat.

However paradoxical it may seem, when the revolutionary flames had encompassed the whole country, when the most skeptical people were coming to believe in the inevitability of the overthrow of autocracy in the very near future, the opportunists made attempts... to drag the movement backward, to belittle its tasks, and to obscure its slogans. Their principle was: anything to avoid marching in step with the times.

And Lenin does battle with them. "Polemics with representatives of such attempts are becoming the task of the day," he writes, "and are acquiring (despite the opinion of a great many people who are not overfond of polemics within the party) enormous **practical** importance. After all, the closer we come to the direct implementation of our immediate political tasks, the greater the need to understand these tasks absolutely clearly and the more harmful any ambiguities and omissions or careless thinking on this question."

Ridiculing Martynov (the "good textualist"), the author of the brochure "Two Dictatorships," Lenin shows the inconsistency of opportunistically minded people in the party and the lack of prospects for their positions. Lenin believes in the revolutionary nature of the proletariat who will do everything "to create for itself a truly broad arena of struggle for socialism, an arena truly worthy of the 20th century." History has confirmed the correctness of Lenin's position.

Social Scientist Stresses Private Property

LD0504222590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 5 April carries a 10-minute round-up of proceedings today at the USSR Supreme Soviet's committees and commissions. Lyudmila Semina reports on the work of the committee on science, people's education, and upbringing. Today the committee was discussing social science, she says. She invites Aleksandr Pavlovich Vladislavlev, first secretary of the board of the Union of USSR Scientific and Engineering Societies, to talk about the state of social science in the USSR.

Vladislavlev starts by saying that the development of social science in society is very closely and directly linked to the efficacy of democratic controls on political power in the country. He calls for a genuinely democratic mechanism for controlling political power. He says the question of private property has to be addressed, and goes on: "We are all children born during a time of meaningless political incantations, of meaningless fetishes, meaningless words, disinformation and double standards. When I hear the words 'private property', I will always be reminded of the helpless expression on the face of Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers. He was so shocked by the sound of the words 'private property' being uttered within the walls of the Supreme Soviet. Have you asked the people if they want this, he asked. What is the point of asking the people when for 70 years the people were told things which had absolutely nothing in common with reality. Now you want us to ask them. It is quite obvious that without private property, no country can be prosperous. Private property, and all the other types of ownership based on it, such as shareholding and cooperative ventures, is the only way to achieve the highest work productivity, and this is the task which now faces our society. I think that the worst and most damaging mistake perpetrated by social science, or, maybe, more by social practice than by social science, was the division of society into socialist and capitalist halves, depending on whether private property was allowed there or not. This was a primitive approach to adopt, especially since not one of the classic works of Marxism-Leninism talks about it."

Speaking as a member of the state commission on economic reform, or the 'Abalkin Commission' as he calls it, he says that one of the main obstacles in the way of the economic program is public opinion, which will have to be molded. only then can the revolutionary transformations which the country needs be carried out.

Draft CPSU Auditing Commission Regulations

*PM1004085590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1*

["Draft Approved by CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum: Regulations Governing CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] 1. The CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission is elected at a party congress and is accountable to it. It monitors the fulfillment in the party of CPSU program documents, the CPSU Statutes, and the decisions of party congresses and conferences and monitors the state of party discipline and the observance of the norms of internal party life and party ethics; it audits the implementation of the CPSU budget and the financial and economic activity of the CPSU Central Committee and its institutions, enterprises, and publishing houses; and examines appeals on questions of expulsion from the party.

The CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission takes measures against bureaucracy, subjectivism, arbitrariness, and the influence of personal and random factors on party policy.

2. In relations with the CPSU Central Committee, the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission:

—Monitors the observance of the collegial principle in the adoption of decisions by Central Committee executive organs, appeals against those decisions if they are adopted in violation of the CPSU Statutes and do not correspond to the party's program documents and current legislation in the country, and submits relevant proposals to CPSU Central Committee plenums and party congresses and conferences.

—Checks the observance of the established procedure for the examination of appeals by party organizations and letters and statements from communists and working people to the CPSU Central Committee and its institutions, publishing houses, press organs, and enterprises.

—Monitors the implementation of the CPSU budget, including the state of recruitment and the accounting and distribution of members' party subscriptions, and also checks the financial and economic activity of the Central Committee and its institutions, press organs, publishing houses, and enterprises.

3. In relations with party organizations, the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission:

—Studies, in response to statements from communists or on its own initiative, individual questions relating to the activity of party organizations within its competence and submits proposals to the relevant party organ or the CPSU Central Committee to eliminate shortcomings in the work of party organizations' elective organs.

—Takes part in the examination of disputed issues which occur in mutual relations between party organizations, control and auditing commissions, and party committees, and promotes the strengthening of the unity of CPSU ranks; checks to see that the right of a minority to defend its position is not infringed in party organizations and elected party organs and that majority decisions are fulfilled by all communists.

—Checks the fulfillment by party members of the CPSU Statutes and calls to account communists guilty of violating party ethics and discipline. A Central Control and Auditing Commission decision on expulsion from the CPSU is reported to the relevant primary party organization and in the event of the latter's objections is examined a second time at the Central Control and Auditing Commission with the participation of representatives of the primary party organization, after which it is considered adopted.

—Examines appeals against the decisions of union republic communist party central committees and party kray and oblast committees and the control and auditing commissions of union republic communist parties and kray and oblast party organizations on expulsion from the party.

—Helps the control and auditing commissions of republic, kray, oblast, and other party organizations in their work.

4. The composition of the Central Control and Auditing Commission prescribed by the CPSU congress is elected from among communists recommended by union republic communist parties, kray and oblast party organizations, and party organs of the USSR Armed Forces. Communists elected to the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission cannot be members of other central elected party organs.

Plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission are held as the need arises but at least twice a year.

Central Control and Auditing Commission members are entitled to nonvoting participation in the work of CPSU Central Committee plenums. Combined plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control and Auditing Commission are convened as the need arises.

5. The Central Control and Auditing Commission at its plenum elects a standing organ—bureau—which includes the cochairmen of the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission with at least 10 years' party experience. The cochairmen alternately chair sessions of the plenums and bureau of the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission and take part in sessions of the Presidium and other executive organs of the CPSU Central Committee.

The powers and size of the Central Control and Auditing Commission Bureau are determined by a plenum of the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission based on the present regulations.

6. The Central Control and Auditing Commission adopts resolutions on questions relating to its competence and certifies the results of audits. Leaders of organs, enterprises, and institutions subject to audit are required to report to the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission on measures adopted on the results of remarks and proposals expressed.

7. The Central Control and Auditing Commission conducts its work openly and its decisions are published in the party press.

In the discharge of their duties members of the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission are entitled to make use of all party documents relating to their activity.

8. The Central Control and Auditing Commission has its own apparatus maintained by resources from the party budget and approves its structure and staffs independently.

9. The question of the removal of Central Control and Auditing Commission members from the commission is resolved in the manner prescribed by the CPSU Statutes.

Poll on Party Congress Platform Discussed

LD3003183790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1440 GMT 28 Mar 90

["The Party and Perestroyka" program, presented by Vladimir Korablev, with (Yevgeniy Yegorovich Leonov) and (Mikhail Lvovich Malyshev), department heads at the Sociological Research Center of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee]

[Text] [Korablev] Hello, esteemed listeners! I don't think I'd be wrong to say that the difficulties that the CPSU has encountered today are not explained only by the changed situation in society. To a large extent they are linked with the situation within the party itself. I would even say that they are a sign of ill-health that has affected its organism, which appears strong.

However, many of the proposals being put forward during the current discussion on the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress indicate that a majority of Soviet people, as before, undoubtedly link their hopes for an improvment of life with the party and its policy.

This has also been confirmed by data from sociological research carried out by scientists from the Sociological Research Center of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Commitee. In February and March of this year, specialists from the center carried out a poll of the population in 17 towns and adjacent rural rayons in seven union republics about the possibilities for consolidation contained in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress.

What are the results of the poll?

In order to get the most exhaustive answer to this question, I met the people who carried it out. They are (Yevgeniy Yegorovich Leonov), Candidate of Philosophy and department head at the Sociological Research Center of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee; and (Mikhail Lvovich Malyshev), Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences and head of a department at the same Center.

So let me put the first question to you, (Yevegeniy Yegorovich): What is the overall assessment of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee?

[(Leonov)] The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress received a positive assessment from the majority: Two-thirds of those questioned approved of it, and only a quarter disapproved in some degree or other. It must be said that that assessment was shared not just by so-called rank and file people, but 62 percent of those who belonged to informal organizations also approved of the draft platform.

[Korablev] But evidently party workers were also consulted in the course of the poll?

[(Leonov)] Yes, besides all strata of the population, there are students, engineering and technical workers, scientists, and workers of culture; secretaries of party rayon committees, city committees, and oblast committees were questioned as experts. In short, one can say that the ideas of the platform, the ideas of the draft platform, are creating definite conditions for consolidating a majority of the population around them. They are indeed creating the conditions for consolidation. At the same time, the attitudes of different categories of the population to the platform are mixed. There are more negative assessments in higher educational and scientific circles, among the engineering and technical intelligentsia, among teachers and doctors. There are more positive assessments among workers and those who live in the countryside.

[Korablev] But how do the party workers at lower levels assess the draft platform?

[(Leonov)] Party workers at the lower levels—about 90 percent of them—defined their assessment as positive.

[Korablev] New serious advances are now taking place in public awareness with regard to the party. What is the focus of these?

[(Leonov)] So far, the publication alone—we are still talking about the approaches to implementation—the publication alone of these has had a positive effect upon changing the population's attitude to the party. The number of positive assessments is between three and four times greater than the number of negative assessments of the party and its role in public life. If one speaks of the figures, then of the whole population, 36 percent say that their attitude has changed for the better and 10 percent say that it has changed for the worse following publication of the draft. Even in informal circles, the attitude of 32 percent has changed for the better and that of 10 percent has changed for the worse, although the potential for dissatisfaction with the current political and economic situation is quite high and it continues to be linked with the activity of the party.

The latest decisions of the Congress of People's Deputies, and the party's initiative on giving up Article Six of the Constitution and on gradual transfer to a multiparty system, has also been picked up by public opinion. In principle a definite base for a multiparty system is already being created at present. Approximately eight percent of those questioned would like to become members of another party apart from the CPSU, and this includes four percent of communists. The majority of people wanting to become members of other parties was found among the informal organizations: Among those working in culture, it was more than 30 percent of those questioned, and among workers the percentage was somewhere below nine.

The new attitude toward the multiparty system, the new attitude toward the role of the party in society, is indeed also shown both in the political pluralism of public opinion and in actions, in fact. One indicator of this is the fact that more than 40 percent of those questioned in our research supported Yeltsin's statement on his intention to stand as a candidate for president of the Russian Federation. Naturally, I have to make the proviso that this figure indicates how many supported that statement. Our research does not yet indicate whether they will vote that way if such a situation arises. But facts are facts.

[Korablev] I think that the party will be able to restore the trust among the people that has been lost by changing the state of affairs in the economy. Isn't that no doubt the case, Mikhail Lvovich?

[(Malyshev)] Yes. The research that has been carried out, you know, has shown fairly high interest by our country's contained in the draft platform. The situation is assessed in a contradictory way: Nearly 65 percent of the population support to some extent the idea of a planned market economy, but two-thirds of them fear the possible negative consequences of such a step. From the theoretical viewpoint, we still have to sort out what is understood by the term planned market economy, and whether a combination of that kind is possible.

In public opinion a fairly consistent interest has been revealed in the real multiplicity of forms of ownership. According to the results of our measurements of public opinion in January and March of this year, 46.4 and 46.9 percent respectively of those questioned expressed themselves in favor of cooperative ownership being developed. As we see, there is an increase, albeit a small one. In January, 59.4 percent expressed themselves in favor of the development of private ownership: In March this figure was 57.4 percent. In favor of the use of state property on a leasing basis were 75.2 percent and 64 percent. The figures indicate that there is growing caution about the development of these forms of ownership. Overall, I think that one must proceed from the fact that any form of ownership can be deemed to be socialist if it proves its effectiveness and excludes the exploitation of one man by another.

[Korablev] Yevgeniy Yegorovich, I have a question for you now. the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress says that along with observations and proposals, the party is prepared to examine alternative drafts, too. One such draft is the democratic platform of the CPSU, which was adopted at the all-union conference of party clubs and party organizations in January of this year. That conference took place in Moscow. Possessing a number of common positions with the draft Central Committee platform, at the same time it differs radically from the Central Committee document, both in its concept and content. Has a comparative analysis been made of these two documents; and what did it show?

[(Leonov)] Yes, such an analysis was carried out, and generally speaking we expect that if elections to the congress were direct, according to party constituencies and according to platforms, then in principle up to 35 percent of Communists could support the democratic platform in the CPSU. If one talks about individual positions within this platform, then approximately one in ten of all communists support the representation of factions at the congress and in the elective bodies of the party according to their numerical strength. One in four support the following ideas: rejection of the principle of democratic centralism, rejection of the party apparatus, rejection of the production-territorial principle upon which the party is structured, or support for the idea of a federal structure for the party. That is to say, all these things that I have just named are supported by approximately a quarter of the communists who were questioned. The idea of direct elections to the congress by party constituency is something of a special case: It was supported by nearly 60 percent of those questioned, so on the basis of these figures it is difficult not to agree with our conclusion that in principle up to 30 to 35 percent of communists to some extent share the democratic platform in the CPSU.

[Korablev] Do you think that a split could arise in the CPSU?

[(Leonov)] I would amplify that question a little, insofar as the draft platform is a factor that consolidates the party itself, a factor that creates its unity. If one considers this question precisely from that viewpoint, then I think that two outcomes are equally probably.

[Korablev] Which ones?

[(Leonov)] The first outcome is that it will prove possible to preserve unity, but on the condition that the congress is somewhat more radical than has been stated in the draft platform, if the congress goes further than does the draft platform.

[Korablev] In what do you see the specific nature of this radicalism?

[(Leonov)] More than half the secretaries of the rayon, city, and oblast party committees stated when they were questioned that a force is beginning to gain the upper hand in the party which is capable of radical renewal. This is an objective, definite guarantee of the fact that the congress is capable of being more radical than the draft. And I see greater radicalism possible in the achievement of a timely and reasonable compromise between the radical and the traditional wing—let us put it like that—of the party. That is one possible outcome, that is to say a compromise between these two positions must be sought now, before the congress; otherwise it might be too late. That is one probability.

[Korablev] But what is the other option?

[(Leonov)] The second option, well, in connection with our forecasts that up to 35 percent of communists could support the democratic platform in the CPSU, and this might also be close to the number of delegates, if it isn't possible to reach a sensible and timely compromise perhaps even before the congress, then a split is likely, with, as a minimum, the formation of factions with their own organization and discipline.

[Korablev] Mikhail Lvovich, to many people the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th congress is not totally understandable—and one can feel this, too, from the letters which come to our editorial office. People find it quite difficult to grasp several of the provisions in the draft.

[(Malyshev)] Yes, even in the opinion of the experts—who are the secretaries of party oblast committees, city committees, and rayon committees—the document is understandable to people only partially. Only seven percent replied: fully. In our opinion additional explanations are needed that are understandable to everyone: For example, what is meant by cooperative ownership on a healthy basis, democratic, humane socialism? There must be greater clarity of position with regard to social-democratism and the Marxist-Leninist theory of communism as the goal of social development. It is my deep conviction that it is also necessary to implement more actively a program to eliminate economic illiteracy among the population, to analyze the pluses and minuses of cooperative and group ownership again and again on the basis of the facts, and to prove with sound argument the possibility in principle of the planned market economy and the pluses and minuses of the secession of union republics from the USSR. Claims by the population against the party and the party apparatus as being a privileged and fairly conservative stratum of society now seem to be made largely out of force of habit. It seems to me that they are based on what happened in the past. The reality has changed radically and is continuing to change. The party mass information media ought, therefore, to provide data systematically on the cleansing of the party and its motivation, on how much and how many times the party apparatus has been renewed at different levels since April, 1985, together with information about the way of life and the everyday life of party workers.

[Korablev] Yevegeniy Yegorovich, what observations and proposals were expressed during the poll on the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress?

[(Leonov)] It should be said right away that two sections received the greatest support from the population and from all its categories: that the person is at the center of party policy; and the seventh section on the renewal of the party. We asked the question directly: What pleased you most of all in the platform? These very sections were mentioned by 70 to 80 percent of those who answered these open questions. If one talks about observations and proposals, this is an extremely important question, because the potential to consolidate the draft platform and subsequently the platform confirmed by the congress depends upon the extent to which it will be seriously implemented and the extent to which our attitude toward this question is responsible. In this connection, the main proposals made by those questioned group together around three problems: that an assessment be made of the country's political situation as it stands today; secondly, that a mechanism for implementing these ideas be formulated in the platform—this is very important, because the level of trust in the party and its possibilities for implementing all of this is insufficiently high; and third, that the draft must contain ideas connected with perestroyka in the system of science, education, upbringing, and culture first and foremost. As for the wishes of the experts—I have already said that these are the secretaries of party rayon committees, oblast committees, and city committees—we also asked them what the people think in this connection, what they propose. In their opinion, the range of proposals was somewhat different. They speak of the need to say what kind of society we are building after all; to mention, possibly, changing the name of the party and the attitude toward communism.

[Korablev] What proposals were expressed by party workers on changing the name of the party and about the attitude toward communism in particular?

[(Leonov)] These proposals were formulated in the most general way and we were unable to discern what kind of party they would like. But I think that here, perhaps, it is a question not so much of their desire to change the name of the party as their intention to bring out more clearly the character of the party, be it socialist or communist, because an analysis of the draft does give grounds for reflection. For example, the word communism is not there. That is to say, it does give some grounds for reflection and doubts. And one other point that must be taken into consideration when further work is done on the draft on the basis of the proposals and observations which people are sending in. It amounts to this: The interests of people are not yet sufficiently bound up with the draft platform as they refer to the individual; that is to say the personal, group, collective advantages, in what way it will be advantageous, so to speak, for the person, for the class to which he belongs. Only 32 percent felt that the whole people would gain in the event of the ideas contained in the draft being implemented, and 27 percent said that the party would gain. Half of those questioned made no definition.

[Korablev] They did not express any attitude at all toward the draft on their own part?

[(Leonov)] They expressed it, but four or five percent also felt that the personal attachment to personal interests and group interests had not been implemented. I think that this is a very important point both for those who are going to do further work on the platform and for the propagandists. This work must be continued.

[Korablev] Yevgeniy Yegorovich, as a sociologist, what do you think needs to be done now, as not much time is left before the 28th party congress, in order to step up in some way the interest of people in the draft platform, so that they might express more precisely their proposals and their attitude toward the party and those paths that have been mapped out in the draft platform for the restructuring of society?

[(Leonov)] Here I think two points should be made: First, drawing attention to this document, nevertheless, this document is far from being an ordinary one, despite all its minuses and shortcomings. The mass information media have not in fact shown the attention they should be showing to this problem. The best option where propaganda is concerned I think could be something along the lines of a discussion both on radio and on television and in the press; to address this by means of discussion; and I don't think it would be a bad idea to involve representatives of the democratic movements in such discussions. I think that this is the most politically advantageous point for the party, too, now, because many ideas for which the democratic movements have come out over the past two years are implemented in the draft.

The second point, of course, is the solving of social problems here. People must feel that these are not simply declarations and words; and of course, fulfilling the government's program, providing law and order in the country, harmonizing inter-ethnic relations and the consumer market, these are also of substantial importance along with propaganda efforts in building up interest in the draft.

[Korablev] Our program is drawing to a close. In concluding it, I would like to say that even quite recently it was not done to discuss widely problems that had gathered head in the party, let alone subject them to deep analysis. Precisely out of fear of discrediting the party, it became normal to talk not about its overall problems, but only about individual mistakes and errors in the activity of some organizations and party committees. Was not this why the party was held back at the starting line of the perestroyka that it had itself launched—and found itself under siege? The way out of this situation can be found only if there is a clear understanding of the situation that has arisen. Today this is sought by communists and non-party people as they discuss the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party congress.

Anthology of Yakovlev Works Reviewed

PM1204100990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Review by A. Turkov under the rubric "New Book of the Week": "Looking Truth in the Eye...."]

[Text] "It is hard, very hard sometimes, to deal with the new ideas and feelings that suddenly crowd in, with the insights and discoveries, the unembroidered reality, and the tough exactingness of life." These words are supremely characteristic of the anthology of selected speeches and articles of A.N. Yakovlev published by the Political Literature Publishing House and in terms of their meaning and very intonation are akin to the way many people around us are now thinking and talking.

In one of his speeches, complaining of the crude style of many scientific works, the author recalled that language is "the road to the reader." All that is so, but this road begins primarily with openness toward the reader, with the readiness not to pontificate like an oracle from some scientific or "leading" heights beyond the clouds but to honestly initiate the reader into your thoughts, concerns, cares, hopes, and disappointments—as though the reader had caught the author at the very height of his strenuous work and difficult thoughts.

The book in question begins with something far removed from singing victorious fanfares:

"It would seem that the multidimensional renewal of social life, creative freedom, political emancipation, and the strengthening of the feeling of creating something would inevitably lead to the resurrection of civic awareness, to the triumph of good and justice, and would raise morality, ethics, and culture... But what is the source of this intolerance, this riot of emotions, the frenzied hunt for witches and familiars [domovyye], the craving for accusations, the sinister parading of 'raised bayonets?' Is it really true that only yesterday everything was beautiful and smiling yet today everything is bad and gloomy?"

As you can see, it is indeed "hard, very hard...." But it is not for nothing that the book is obstinately headed "Realism is the soil of perestroyka."

The people who took the helm several years ago received a very grave legacy: enormous gaps, leaks everywhere, completely rusty mechanisms, a mass of unnecessary ballast, tiredness and ferment in the crew and... the drum rolls of propaganda designed to muffle the heavy breathing of the economy and the sober voices of alarm, "life's cry for help," as A.N. Yakovlev himself once put it.

To set to work in earnest true "realism in everything" was needed. It was necessary to turn off the "eulogizing mouthpieces," to put an end to self-deception, to stop "spitting at the mirror" if it did not show us as handsome as we would have liked.

To recall the title of one of Yakovlvev's articles, this was indeed a "stern school in a severe time."

Of course, "the lessons of truth were a bitter medicine" but, on looking into truth's incorruptible eyes, it became clear who was who.

"The new moral atmosphere," the book says, "illumined with particular force its prophets and its poor in spirit—both in the past and in the present. Flattering criticism and journalism, but also honest signals of calamity. The literature of lies but also the anguish of village prose and the civic responsibility of poetry. Science which bowed low to departmental ambitions but also rebellious breakthrough research."

Grown wise with the bitter experience of preceding decades, we now understand that "anticipatory applause is mortally dangerous to perestroyka" and that ugly fools and, to use Shchedrin's expression, toadies eager to serve and ready to go into raptures even over perestroyka's blunders and to zealously aggravate it are associating themselves to perestroyka sometimes, alas, not without success.

"How many revolutions in the world have suffered from the fact that vileness has associated itself to nobility and ignorance and cynicism have taken on the slogans of the forces of renewal and used these slogans to cover up deeds which have nothing in common with the ideals, goals, and means of the revolution!" the book's author once noted bitterly in his report "the great French revolution and the present day."

He is also alarmed by something else—"the dangerous consequences of the eruption of immoderate expectations" of some kind of manna from heaven which exist in society while "a lengthy, strenuous, steady, and purposeful work" lies ahead.

"The desire to leap without looking across the hateful barriers of time" has too often in history cost people extremely dear. A.N. Yakovlev also returns repeatedly to thoughts about the heavy price and tragic fruit of this "impatience."

No, as Chekhov's wise peasant says, "for instance, for example, you want to sow grain on this hill, then first you have to remove and take away all the stones, then plow, then tend it, tend it, until you have mastered it."

Hard? Long? "Heavy" work? But have we not had enough of the other, effective, dizzying but, alas, deceptive projects for rapid success and the shortest routes to the promised land?

Indeed, realism alone is the soil on which we can firmly stand and build confidently!

Economic

State Bank Chairman Views Monetary Reform

PM0504101790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the USSR State Bank Board, by O. Mikheyev under the rubric "Economic Panorama": "There Is No Point in Fuelling Emotions"—date and place unspecified; first two paragraphs are a boxed introduction to rubric]

[Text] The PRAVDA editorial office today launches a new rubric devoted to topical problems of the radical perestroyka of the country's national economy. This rubric will contain mainly short interviews, reports, and commentaries. We invite our readers—workers, specialists, journalists—to make their contribution to the quest for and discovery of the most interesting elements in this important sphere.

The PRAVDA editorial office asked V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the USSR State Bank [Gosbank] Board, to comment on the increasingly insistent proposals for immediate implementation of monetary reform.

[Mikheyev] Viktor Vladimirovich, many people do not believe the official statements that monetary reform is not planned and will not be carried out. Letters to the editor talk about this. As head of the Gosbank, you are responsible for the steadiness of the ruble and monetary circulation. Please be frank: Is reform possible?

[Gerashchenko] The stand taken by the Gosbank on this matter is quite clear: In the present economic conditions monetary reform of the regressive type is unnecessary. States resort to such actions—which cause upheaval throughout society's entire socioeconomic organism—only when the economy and monetary circulation are on the verge of collapse: usually after a major war or when a substantial proportion of the country's production potential has been devastated. That kind of situation does not exist in our country.

[Mikheyev] But what is happening in the consumer market? You can see: Money has gone mad....

[Gerashchenko] That is true in many respects, but the government measures are nevertheless beginning to take effect. Since about November last year, money and goods thrown on the market began to come together, largely speaking. In January this year the population increased its income by 6.6 billion rubles but also spent R5.5 billion more. The gap did not widen in February, and growth in expenditure could exceed growth in income in March. The wave of "hot" money is not growing at present: The government has knocked the crest from this wave.

[Mikheyev] In people's minds monetary reform is directly linked to the idea of social justice. Of what possible interest could rampaging "hot" money be to those people who can barely survive to the next wage packet, which is a pittance when compared to prices? After all, these people are in the overwhelming majority. They are demanding that the screws be put on swindlers and underground big shots!

[Gerashchenko] Pressure must certainly be brought to bear on these people, I agree, but monetary reform will not do anything in this sense. What is more, it will entail major additional outlays. Do you know how much it costs to carry out this kind of reform? At a rough estimate, more than R5 billion.

[Mikheyev] Evidently the high cost of the reform is not the most serious argument against it?

[Gerashchenko] Any expenditure, particularly such high expenditure, must be justified. But in this particular case it would simply be pointless. Monetary reform is not so frightening for the "shadow" economy big shots. At the start of this year savings bank accounts totalled R338 billion. I would say that 99 percent of savings bank account holders have normal, earned investments of up to R10,000 (and more than half have no more than R1,000). Only one-tenth of the total amount of savings bank deposits is concentrated in the remaining one percent. But these are not the millions accumulated by the "shadow" economy. Taking our vast country as a whole, only 3,000 saving bank accounts contain more than R50,000, and their total potential is R220 million. I think that most of this has been earned by working.

I will add that this savings account structure has not changed for decades. This also shows that, if it were to be implemented, monetary reform would not seriously affect the "shadow" economy big shots. Their iniquitous millions are either safely hidden in the form of personal valuables—gold, diamonds, fashionable cars, and dachas—or invested in business and earning more money.

[Mikheyev] Old people remember that in the twenties speculators exploiting the New Economic Policy were more afraid of financial inspectors than the secret police.

[Gerashchenko] I have heard that that is so. An inspector knew his client inside out: He knew when he took a box at the Bolshoy Theater, he knew that a horse-drawn cab stood at his front door all day, and he knew what kind of fur coat or jewelery he had bought for his wife. Only a properly thought out taxation system and skilled financial control can develop civilized methods for the socially just redistribution of high income. We must form a body of tax inspectors as quickly as possible.

[Mikheyev] But if monetary reform is not going to be an act of social justice, perhaps it makes some economic sense?

[Gerashchenko] I must deny even that at present. Had the national economy's oversaturation with money had been eliminated, large commodity reserves accumulated, and preconditions created for an efficiently functioning market at the point of launching reform, the question of its economic advisability could be discussed. But, conditions being what they are, even if monetary reform were to give the consumer market some breathing space, it would not be for one or two years as its supporters claim, but at best for two or three months. Then the situation could only become worse—much worse.

[Mikheyev] Clearly, the bank is opposed to monetary reform. But what must really be done to stabilize the ruble?

[Gerashchenko] We think that the three years which the government has requested from the Supreme Soviet to make the transition to market relations is too long. The time scale must be shortened. By May the government will have prepared a package of new proposals to speed up the transition to a market economy. It is very important that the laws on ownership, the leasing system, and land already adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet be supplemented by laws on taxation, price formation, the USSR Gosbank, and banks and banking activity. Finally, it is planned to index-link the cost of living in order to protect people with fixed incomes and low-income categories of working people.

[Mikheyev] But what does the Gosbank itself propose to do to strengthen the ruble?

[Gerashchenko] We must encourage enterprises and organizations to sell non-disposable items, outmoded machine tools and equipment, and some of the materials from uncompleted production to the population, cooperatives, and lease collectives. This would yield goods worth R10-15 billion. You can see that in stores selling remnants from enterprises, everything is bought up in a minute. We could double the quantity of construction materials available in the consumer market by making savings on these materials at construction sites through rapid transition to leasing and joint-stock methods. And we could expand cooperative construction and the sale of housing to the population by abolishing the restrictions which have been introduced in some places at local level.

Finally, it is time we created a securities market.

[Mikheyev] Is it within the power of the Gosbank to raise interest rates on investments, which are still ludicrously low in the context of the present inflation level?

[Gerashchenko] We are doing something in this direction. Commodity loan bonds have been issued this year for the first time. And treasury bills with a total value of R5 billion will come onto the market from the second quarter. It will be a 16-year loan with a five percent annual interest rate. A new type of short-term four percent investment account is soon to be announced. But at the moment all our banking innovations have to go through the government. It is time the Gosbank was given a free hand and the possibility to solve long urgent problems exclusively within its field of expertise. For example, people in the 40-45 age bracket could be allowed to have pension investment accounts with an eight to 10 percent interest rate. It is also time we introduced medium term five or six percent investment accounts.

I am sure that the endless talk of monetary reform, prompted by appeals from the rostrum and the press, only fuels emotions and confuses people.

Agricultural

Ligachev Interviewed on Agricultural Reform

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
8 Apr 90 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with Ye.K. Ligachev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, by unidentified SELSKAYA ZHIZN journalists at close of conference-seminar in Moscow for SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondents and central apparatus workers: "What Is Good for the Peasant Is Good for the Country"; date not specified]

[Text] A conference-seminar of the newspaper's correspondents in conjunction with workers of the central apparatus was in session for three days in Moscow in the editorial staff conference hall. They discussed the collective's tasks during the course of and in connection with the perestroyka in society and the party, and in connection with the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress. Suggestions were made regarding increasing the newspaper's role in the elucidation of the life and work of party and other social organizations, in the activity of the soviets of people's deputies, in the improvement of the principles of the work, structure, and development of the agro-industrial complex, and in solutions to social problems in rural areas.

In conclusion, Ye.K. Ligachev, Politburo member, CPSU Central Committee secretary and chairman of the Central Committee Commission on Questions of the Agrarian Policy, spoke to seminar participants. He answered many questions from journalists concerning the situation in the party and society, problems of solving the food problem, social problems in rural areas, and the development of the country's agro-industrial complex.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Yegor Kuzmich, a year has passed since the March (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum which worked out the basic directions of the party's modern agrarian policy. How is the implementation of these decisions proceeding? What are the pluses and minuses here?

[Ligachev] I shall begin with the fact that the March plenum opened up good and also realistic prospects for carrying out urgent transformations in rural areas and increasing the country's food resources. First let me note that the state is moving away from the administrative-command system of leadership of the agro-industrial complex. We are assimilating principles of democratization of management, thus providing for a maximum of independence on the part of the producers and labor collectives in combination with their responsibility for the fulfillment of the state order and contracts. Production relations are improving and we are changing over to real economic accountability as a basis for management. Cooperation, leasing, and the contract are being introduced into rural life, and Soviet peasant farms have appeared. All this is directed toward maximum utilization of the existing production potential of the agro-industrial complex.

As we know, the Central Committee Plenum spoke in favor of a diversity of forms of management and actualization of socialist ownership in rural areas. While resolutely supporting this fundamental thesis, I think that state and cooperative property in the form of kolkhozes (collective farms) and sovkhozes (state farms) integrated with personal property—family farms (farmsteads)—are priority forms of socialist property in agriculture. The selection of the forms of socialist property should be a purely voluntary and economically substantiated matter.

Quite recently the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Fundamentals of Land Legislation. This is an important law. The peasant is becoming the master of the land and the means of production, that is, the master of the situation with respect to the land. I am convinced that this will have a positive effect on the productivity of the entire agrarian sector. But under one mandatory condition: the peasant's complete appropriation of the implements of labor and the creation of modern conditions for his life in rural areas. The type of property, like the form of management, is exceptionally important but it is far from the only factor determining progress in material production.

In keeping with the principles of the Central Committee plenum, the structure of capital investments in the agro-industrial complex is changing significantly. Under the current five-year plan allocations for the development of the sociocultural complex in rural areas has increased 1.5 times. The average annual introduction of housing increased by 19 percent as compared to the last five-year plan, schools by 28 percent, and highways by 82 percent.

Rates of technical reconstruction of bases for storing and processing agricultural products are increasing.

The process of implementing the decisions of the Central Committee Plenum is taking place under various conditions. What should be included among the favorable factors?

Undoubtedly the circumstance that the implementation of the agrarian policy is being conducted during a period of extensive democratization of society and eradication of wage leveling.

The reduction of military expenditures and the switching of a certain part of the defense industry complex over to the production of machines for agriculture and the food industry are contributing to practical implementation of the agrarian policy.

At the same time, if we are to be realistic we cannot but see that there are factors in operation that fundamentally complicate the implementation of the agrarian policy.

Above all, these include the slowing down of industrial production, interruptions in the operation of transportation and industry, declining discipline for delivering machines and materials for the agro-industrial complex, and interethnic conflicts. The decisions of the March Central Committee Plenum, unfortunately, have not yet been reinforced by price reform or additional material and financial resources. Moreover, as a result of the disarray of the economy rural areas have now begun to receive less of individual kinds of machines, mineral fertilizers, and construction and other materials.

And another. Under the forthcoming 13th Five-Year Plan the production of foodstuffs is to increase by 26-30 percent, and it is planned to increase the overall volume of capital investments in the agro-industrial complex by only 19 percent. There has never been such a risky incongruity before in a single five-year plan. Usually the growth of capital investments has outstripped the earmarked growth of output. During the past 30 years the increase in agricultural output for every percentage point of increase in capital investments has amounted to 0.2 percent.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Is it not possible even now to determine the basic results of the development of agriculture under the current five-year plan?

[Ligachev] Under the current five-year plan the average annual production of agricultural products has increased by 10 percent as compared to the preceding five-year plan. The rates are somewhat higher in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. While in 1986 agricultural profitability amounted to 19 percent, in 1989 it was 34 percent. Certain peasant advocates "moving in the orbit" of agriculture are persuaded that our food problem has reached an impasse, the country is on the verge of famine, and "agriculture has been destroyed." But this is not true. The peasants will have to overcome many difficulties, but they are working hard and are not engaging in rallies or strikes. True, there is still a good deal of irresponsibility and extravagance in the work of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Under the current five-year plan the situation in agriculture has deteriorated in the Transcaucasian republics.

At the same time we must state plainly that no radical progress in the development of agriculture has occurred so far. The food situation, especially in the meat industry, has considerably worsened. In 1989 the kolkhozes and sovkhozes obtained the highest yields of grain crops in all the history of rural areas (almost 19 quintals per hectare) and the highest milk yield per cow (2,854 kg). But again we had to resort to purchasing grain abroad—35 million tons (17 percent of our own grain production) and 700,000 tons of meat (4 percent of our production volume).

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] The March plenum confirmed the socialist path of development of our agriculture and the restructuring of the rural areas. But there are still discussions about the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and owner-operated farms. In particular this was discussed by certain speakers at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and there have been many articles in the press. What is your personal position regarding this, Yegor Kuzmich?

[Ligachev] My position is as follows: The policy of perestroyka means not only transformations but also continuity. This pertains to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes as well. All kinds of calls to disband the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and distribute the land among the peasants are irrational to say the least, and might even be fatal for the country. Today these farms are the only ones capable of taking responsibility for producing the main volume of the country's food supply.

One might object that history does not yet give us justification for a simple positive assessment of the public sector. But here one must take into account that the hardships that have been placed on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes were linked to the excessive removal of funds from agriculture over many decades, the application of violent methods with respect to the peasantry, and the distortion of Lenin's principles of socialist cooperation. We must not forget this.

The kolkhozes and sovkhozes ended up in the grip of the command-administrative system and began to stagnate. We must restructure the kolkhozes and sovkhozes economically and administratively and make them cooperatives of autonomously financed leasing collectives. And the farms are already developing this way. More than 200 farms in the country, while retaining their organizational and production integrity, have been transformed into associations of cooperatives and associations of small leasing collectives, whose leaders form a council for managing the farm. This gives the producers independence in management and real participation in the administration of production.

Independent peasant farms have now received all rights as well. They must be supported and conditions must be created for their development. Socialism means a diversity of forms, methods, and means. But there should be no coercion or pressure here, either organizational or psychological. Let the peasants solve their own problems. They can see them better. But what are the difficulties here? So far the country has no infrastructure for serving the peasant farms and has not organized production of technical equipment for farms with up to 100-150 hectares.

As concerns kolkhozes and sovkhozes, their possibilities are far from exhausted. And if the productivity of our peasantry is much lower than that of the American farmer, this is explained primarily by its poor material and technical support. The Soviet peasant obtains the same yield of crops and milk the American farmer had at the beginning of the fifties. At this time the American farmer was technically equipped the way the peasant is today.

Briefly, we need it all: to change production relations in rural areas, to provide the peasant with productive technical equipment, to improve his living conditions, and to make him the master of the land and the results of his labor. Then we would undoubtedly be successful. It would be good for the peasant and good for the country.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] If we return to the decisions of the March Central Committee Plenum, we can see in them the tasks, both long-term and immediate. What can you say about that?

[Ligachev] This is a very pithy question. The large-scale tasks require time and, of course, a good deal of money. But the fact that the food problem in the country is so critical makes it necessary to have immediate actions and results. This is why literally immediately after the March plenum it was decided to draw attention to the subsidiary farms of the citizens and enterprises, mutually advantageous ties between industry and agriculture, and the participation of cities and industrial regions in increasing food resources and improving the supply for city dwellers. Seminar-conferences were held on this subject in Omsk, Stavropol, Kaluga, Astrakhan, Brest, and Tashkent.

I especially wish to discuss private farmsteads. They produce almost one-fourth of the overall volume of agricultural products.

One-fourth! Here it is time to clarify the term itself. What kind of subsidiaries? These are a solid family business—family farms in rural areas and in worker settlements. They are becoming more and more commercial and a considerable share of what they produce goes to the market.

I shall not go into the history of personal farms—there were many ill-considered decisions, unjustified restrictions, and blatant mistakes here. As we know, the March (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum considered it necessary to restore the full rights of citizens' personal farms as one of the forms of socialist agricultural production. And they are to be run on a scientific basis and have highly productive cattle and crops.

Unfortunately, certain managers are still adhering to old positions and regard the personal farm as something almost alien. We must quickly overcome this idea, this backward position. The farmstead is not a private but a state matter. People who are actively working on the kolkhoz or sovkhoz and are doing a good job of running their family farm should be the most respected in the village or settlement.

Recently I have had occasion to learn about personal farms in many oblasts. I have visited the families and the farmsteads and spoken with the people. There is a good deal that is interesting and useful everywhere, but perhaps what made the biggest impression was the way things are done in Omsk Oblast. A system of aid to family farms through cooperatives providing support with young animals, feed, and cultivation of the farmstead plot has been created and is in operation here. But the main achievement is that the Omsk workers have a thoroughly developed procurement network and local processing of products from family farms, which is still poorly arranged in many other oblasts.

One should especially mention the land plots on subsidiary farms. It is now permitted to allot as much land as the family is capable of working, receiving as great a yield as possible from it. Here one can speak of plots amounting to hectares. And we must provide for this.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Yegor Kuzmich, SELSKAYA ZHIZN is receiving letters saying: Our dream is to have on the farm a small tractor, a self-propelled mower, and a small milking machine. When will all this be available to the rural resident?

[Ligachev] Yes, there is a good deal of heavy manual labor in agriculture. A man comes home from work and he must take up the pitchfork and spade. I thought about all that recently when I was in Tushinskiy Rayon in Moscow at the Machine Building Association imeni V.V. Chernyshev, where power units are produced. I can say quite definitely that the matter has gotten off the ground. Capacities are being created in the country for producing this agricultural technical equipment that is in short supply. This year it is intended to produce more than 300,000 mini-tractors and power units, which is more than in the preceding four years of the five-year plan. I understand that this is quite inadequate. But the output volumes will increase. The country needs literally millions of mini-tractors, power units, and means of small-scale mechanization for animal husbandry.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] What new approaches are the cities taking to participate in the solution to the country's food problem? Is it possible to limit everything here to the so-called traditional patronage assistance?

[Ligachev] We are now speaking about something else. Namely: taking advantage of the considerably increased production capacity of the state and cities, we must retool agriculture in a short period of time and create a food industry and modern bases for storage of raw material and sale of foodstuffs.

The time has come for economically mutually advantageous relations between the city and the country. Good experience in this respect has been accumulated in Belgorod, Dnepropetrovsk, Moscow, Kharkov, Vitebsk, and a number of other oblasts. The enterprises are investing financial means and material resources in the development of the production and social spheres in rural areas, and they help them with manpower and equipment during peak periods. In turn, in keeping with the agreement they are guaranteed meat, milk, vegetables, and other agricultural products for their collectives. Cooperation between industrial and agricultural enterprises on an economic basis is, you will agree, a mutually advantageous thing.

The relationship between prices for industrial and agricultural products is very meaningful. The exchange between the city and the country must be equivalent. The scissors must be closed here.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] There are obviously many factors generating the food shortage in the country. But is it not time to shout the main ones at the top of our voice—the underdevelopment of the rural areas, the lack of roads, and the primitive living conditions? We are speaking about social justice—this is good, but when will it come with respect to living conditions in the country and the city?

[Ligachev] Each time I visit the republics and oblasts I am saddened when I see the neglect of many villages. These are facts, but it is more correct to speak not about facts but about phenomena. I agree: One of the fundamental reasons for the prolonged food problem in the country is that life in rural areas is less well developed than it is in the city. This has led to an outflow of rural population to the city. The producers of food have been added to the ranks of its consumers.

Serious measures have now been adopted to step up housing and road construction in rural areas and introduce gas services. They are known. But the backwardness is still so great that we must double or triple our efforts. We must take into account that the peasant is most frequently working out in the open—in the scorching sun, rain, and freezing weather. This means that when he comes home from work the peasant has a greater need to be in a heated home where he can take a bath and rest.

The development of the sociocultural complex depends on many factors. The most important thing is to increase the capacities for producing wall, roof, and finishing items, and sanitation equipment. In turn, in order to move this forward it is necessary to have an abundance of production lines for their production.

I found a very interesting example in Belgorod Oblast. On the initiative of the local organizations and the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, in Staryy Oskol they developed the construction of a whole group of plants for production construction materials and structures. And foreign equipment is purchased with the agreement of the labor collectives using hard currency they have earned. As you can see, the workers and specialists have foregone the deficit consumer goods which could have been purchased with the currency for the sake of creating large-scale production of construction materials. This benefits both the city and the country. It is an example worthy of emulation.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] We would like to touch on the issue of losses in agriculture. Sometimes, one gets to think: Why expend so much energy and nerves to grow agricultural products if it is known ahead of time that a considerable share of them will not reach the consumer and will perish anyway?

[Ligachev] This is one of the focal problems of contemporary agrarian policy. It has already been noted many times that further increasing the amounts of agricultural output is absolutely meaningless unless we create in an accelerated manner up-to-date facilities for its storage and processing. The more we produce, the more we lose. Losses amount to between 20 and 30 percent of the volume of products received. This is a tremendous waste of the peasants' labor!

There can be only one conclusion: We need different approaches and a different way of thinking in our foodstuffs policy. At present, the creation of a modern food-processing industry in our country—specifically, a modern one, based on the accomplishments of science and technology—and the development of its extensive network is for us the decisive premise for the reliable supply of foodstuffs.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] We have analyzed the letters on this topic coming to SELSKAYA ZHIZN. What is characteristic of them? In the countryside, they do not produce meat and smoked meats (there is nowhere to do so). In a rayon, it would be hard to find a shabbier organization than the rayon food combine with its primitive, worn-out equipment. At the meat-packing combine, work is hard, social conditions are poor, and the people do not stay long. The readers ask: Could this be the reason why the foodstuffs one would like to buy cannot be bought at the stores?

[Ligachev] Indeed, it is so. I will add to what you have said a fact which sort of describes synthetically the underdeveloped state of our food-processing industry. In many foreign countries, expenditure on storage, processing, and sales accounts for about 80 percent of the value of the agro-industrial complex's final product, whereas in our country it accounts for less than 30 percent. Do you see the difference? This is to say nothing of the fact that in our country the production of containers and packaging materials was not considered important. Meanwhile, the reliability of storing products and preserving their high quality depends on this, as does their pleasant appearance which, you would agree, is not unimportant either.

What is being done in this sphere as a whole? First of all, revisions have been made in the investment policy and the structure of capital investment. Understandably, this is the fundamental issue. This statistic has already been quoted; nonetheless, it bears mentioning again: Seventy-seven billion rubles (1988 through 1995) have been allocated for the development of storage facilities. This is the first time an amount that considerable has been allocated.

Another issue of principle has been resolved: The ministries of the defense industry and machine building, as well as the construction organizations and industry of large cities, have joined in the technical retooling of processing enterprises and the creation of new ones. There is no other way; there is no choice in the matter; as they say, it is either one or the other. We will not improve the supply of foodstuffs in the absence of modern storage and processing facilities.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Criticism of large processing enterprises has been mounting. Should such giants be created given our distances and roads? Is now not the time to reconsider our approaches in this matter?

[Ligachev] It has now been found necessary to expand substantially the construction of small-capacity plants, especially of prefabricated-unit design, without abandoning the construction of large and medium-size enterprises where it is justified. We should bring the plants as close as possible to the sources of raw materials, that is, start building them in the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, rayon centers, and small cities. This offers considerable advantages, and will first of all make it possible to preserve products, use labor resources more completely, and develop rural infrastructure more vigorously.

Certainly, the country should take care to ensure that the foodstuffs people need are also supplied to rural shops. This year, the plan calls for delivering to rural areas hundreds of small-capacity plants for producing meat products and canned fruits and vegetables.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Many judgments (which are at times mutually exclusive and extremely contradictory) are being made concerning the issues of managing the country's agro-industrial complex. In various oral discussions and presentations, management employees are portrayed in the image of bureaucrats as the main culprits for the failures of agrarian and foodstuffs endeavors. However, regardless of which sphere of human activities we look at, it is clear that it cannot do without management organs. Meanwhile, agrarian management personnel are for the most part frequently maligned. Is this always justified?

[Ligachev] Our country's agro-industrial complex is an elaborate, multisectoral system that has no analogs. It unifies more than 111,000 kolkhozes, sovkhozes, industrial, construction, support and other enterprises and organizations. It accounts for about one-third of the gross social product, fixed production assets, and number of employees.

How is the regular management of this complex organism to be ensured? In short, management should be based on the self-management of labor collectives, whereas the main task of the agro-industrial organizations is to create favorable economic and organizational conditions for the efficient operation of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, processing and other enterprises.

In conjunction with this, it has become necessary to clearly define the functions of the agro-industrial organs at all levels, and to design the structure and composition of the management apparatus proceeding from this. The main functions of the management organs include organizing the production of the necessary amounts of foodstuffs; coordinating the work of farms and enterprises on solving production and sociocultural issues of an interfarm nature; developing agricultural specialization; organizing the sales and processing of the output of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, peasant and personal farms; training cadres; and ensuring the development of scientific-technical progress in the agro-industrial complex. Among other things, this is accomplished by economically accountable rayon cooperative associations. agro-industrial combines, associations, and joint-stock entities are becoming widespread.

The elected organs of economic self-management created on the initiative of the grass roots are being set up within the management system of autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts. The creation and development on an economic basis of production and scientific-production associations for the assimilation of intensive technologies for producing corn, rape, soybeans, potatoes, sugar beets, and other crops on the farms merit our attention.

The organizational structure is being improved and the functions at the level of union republics are being changed, taking into account the expansion of their sovereign rights, self-management, and self-financing, and giving them the full weight of responsibility for the delivery of products to the all-union consumption fund and for the provision of foodstuffs to the populace. In a word, I am in favor of a complete variety of forms of management in the agro-industrial complex, taking local conditions into account, and granting extensive rights in this matter to the republics, oblasts, and rayons. Naturally, there are issues that only the center is capable of handling—the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin, the State Planning Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Foodstuffs and Procurement, the State Committee for Prices, and the union ministries—in particular, price setting, subsidization and credit, and development of the main directions of scientific-technical progress in the agro-industrial complex. Incidentally, it is sometimes believed here that only in the USSR does the state subsidizes the production of foodstuffs. By no means. For example, in Canada subsidies to agriculture amounted to more than $8 billion in 1989.

I would like to stress in particular that established management organs, managers, and specialists should be given an opportunity to work with confidence and in a stable manner. It is very important to protect them from unjustified attacks and at the same time to resolutely root out red tape and incompetence. The frequent and at times ill-conceived reorganizations of management are the scourge of our economy.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] In your opinion, to what degree do the style and involvement of the rural party organizations and committees correspond to the requirements of the time? What is the essence of perestroyka in party work?

[Ligachev] Since the March (1989) plenum I have visited dozens of farms and processing enterprises, and met with many workers, kolkhoz workers, specialists, and secretaries of party committees and organizations, in various republics and oblasts. My impressions have been extensive. With reference to the party organizations, my conviction is quite firm: At present, the most important issues are resolved in the collective, in the primary organization. It is natural. The independence, enterprise, and responsibility of collectives are increasing.

On the whole, republic, oblast, and kray committees, soviet and agro-industrial organs do much work in the rural areas, in the agro-industrial complex. The party rayon and city committees and the rayon and city executive committees are a great influence in the countryside. At the same time there is still a lot in their operations that requires revision and critical interpretation.

Perestroyka of party work consists primarily of the extensive democratization of intraparty life. The expansion of the rights of lower echelons envisaged by the draft CPSU statute creates new opportunities for the participation of every communist in developing and carrying out decisions, in forming the elected organs of the party. It is beyond any doubt that this will boost the vigor and militancy of party organizations.

Improving party work means resolutely switching to political methods and not supplanting soviet and economic organs. However, we cannot fail to take account of the fact that the soviets have not yet acquired the necessary power. Under such conditions the mechanical withdrawal of party committees and organizations from agriculture has already done a great deal of harm.

Furthermore, perestroyka in party work is a resolute shift toward the social problems of rural areas, toward improving the living and working conditions of the people. This has always been significant, and it is especially so at present, when we are entering the era of a multiparty system. In this case, the party that works more and better on the needs of the people and on issues concerning people's material and spiritual life will enjoy greater authority.

In the course of cadre selection now it is very important to take into account political position, and skill in communicating with the people, in persuading them, and in taking care of them. We need to study in more depth the opinion the labor collectives have of their leaders. I resolutely reject as malicious slander the attempts to brand the peasant a slave and the kolkhoz chairman or sovkhoz director a landowner.

The party cannot let go of the cadre policy. Otherwise, it will lose its position as the ruling party, the leading force of society.

Finally, party work includes propagating the policy of perestroyka, Marxist-Leninist ideology, developing the dialectical thinking of the people and the skill to discern the interests of classes, social groups, organizations, and individuals behind events and phenomena. It should be kept in mind that the class interests of workers and all toilers reflect common human interests, and that socialist values incorporate common human values.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] There has recently been talk of setting up a USSR Peasant Union. What is your attitude toward this idea?

[Ligachev] I know that this idea was discussed by agrarian specialists among USSR people's deputies and in the Union Council of Kolkhozes. In the field, the inclination toward creating a peasant union is growing. This kind of powerful public organization of the peasantry could facilitate economic and social transformations in the agro-industrial complex, the creation of a new economic mechanism in the agrarian sector of the economy, the defense of the interests of rural workers, and ensure the increase of foodstuff production.

The peasantry firmly stands on the platform of the CPSU. With the formation of the USSR Peasant Union and participation of the communists in its activities, the party would acquire a significant channel for ideological influence on the peasant class, which would undoubtedly reinforce its position in our society.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Political life in the countryside has become more active; this is illustrated by the newspaper's mailbag, where many trenchant and sometimes difficult questions are raised. In particular, we would like to ask Yegor Kuzmich how we are to understand the question of the demarcation within the party today—precisely today—and the cleansing of its ranks of those people who have taken up other ideological positions?

[Ligachev] There are forces operating in society which oppose socialism. Such forces are also present within the CPSU. The fact that we have allowed the party to weaken and grow loose [razrykhleninye] is the most dangerous thing. Those are our mistakes, the fundamental mistake made by the political leadership. Of course, the burden of the past takes it toll on the party's prestige; the grave consequences of Stalinism, stagnant phenomena, and instances of some leaders' moral decay.

Communists have set the task of renewing the party. I believe that renewing the party does not only mean democratizing it and strengthening its ties with the masses but also ensuring its real dissociation with those people within CPSU ranks who hold revisionist, nationalist, and social democratic positions. That is the task of cleansing the party. This must be done on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee's platform for the 28th party congress.

The point is that factions, groupings, and opposition forces are now at work within the party. On the basis of the "Democratic Platform," individual groups of communists want to transform the CPSU from within into a parliamentary party with factions. They rank themselves as radicals. Their position is not in fact new or radical. It is utter revisionism. The organizational foundations of the kind of party which they are proposing were laid last century when bourgeois democratic and social democratic parties were set up.

I would like to add that individual communists are not only involved in but also head nationalist separatist organizations. I believe that we must not delay in effecting this demarcation; otherwise, there may be a split within the party. This has already happened in Lithuania and Estonia. It goes without saying that the work of cleansing [ochishcheniye] CPSU ranks must be conducted in a resolute and responsible fashion without any mistakes, in strict accordance with the CPSU Statutes and the USSR Constitution. To use Lenin's words, the cleansing of the party represents a "vast increase in its power and weight."

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Yegor Kuzmich, our readers are asking about events in East Europe. What is your opinion?

[Ligachev] Everything that has happened in Europe still needs in-depth analysis. I would like to say the following now. In politics, it is important to view the development trend—from what and toward what. In some countries socialism is being lost, while NATO is reinforcing its position. An extremely strange conclusion is cometimes drawn form this fact. It is alleged that the changes occurring in the countries of East Europe have revealed new opportunities for overcoming European states' alienation. Really! By forfeiting socialist values? That's a dear price to pay!

I want peaceful coexistence to develop and cooperation between various states to become more active. But not if socialism is to be overthrown and capitalism reinforced. If things go any further, only the Soviet Union may join the "common European home" as a socialist state.

The creation of a united Germany via the absorption of the GDR will herald the end of postwar Europe and result in European stability being dangerously upset and the results of World War II being completely erased. Under present conditions our task, as I understand it, is to help create an effective system of collective security in Europe, prevent another war, and support those forces which are engaged in the socialist renewal of their countries.

I believe that, historically speaking, this is just a temporary regression for socialism. I am convinced that communist ideas will prevail.

Late March Weather, Crop Conditions Detailed

904B0197A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 6 Apr 90 p 2

[Report by T. Ivashneva, agrometeorologist: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] As before, the weather is still unusually warm over the European territory of the USSR. Until recently the air temperature exceeded the many-year average by four-eight degrees. In the south of Belorussia, the central Chernozem, and the Povolzhye regions, the Ukraine, Moldavia, and the northern Caucasus during the daytime the air warmed up to 18-24 degrees.

On the fields of the northwestern, central, the south of the Volgo-Vyatka, and the north of the Povolzhye regions, vegetation began to appear on the winter grain crops and grasses 20-30 days before the average dates over many years. Their condition is basically either satisfactory or good. In the south of these regions the winter grain crops continued to grow and were in the phases of bushing and stem extension.

The warm, mainly dry weather that remained in the southern half of the European part of the USSR contributed to the increased expenditure of soil moisture. In the southern half of Moldavia, a number of regions of the southwestern oblasts of the Ukraine, and in places in lower Povolzhye the supplies of productive moisture were inadequate and amounted mainly in the plowed layer to 10-15 millimeters and in the one-meter layer to 60-100 millimeters, which is 50-80 percent of the average amounts over many years. In a number of regions of Cherkassy, Kirovograd, Dnepropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts these amounts were even less in the plowed layer. In the remaining regions of the Ukraine, Moldavia, and most of the territory of the northern Caucasus region the productive moisture is adequate so far in the one-meter and plowed layers of the soil.

In the southern oblasts of the Ukraine, Moldavia, the south of Rostov Oblast, and Krasnodar Kray the apricots, peaches, and cherries blossomed two to three weeks ahead of schedule. The conditions for the blossoming of fruit crops were favorable during the first half of the 10-day period. In certain regions where there was frost in the second half of the 10-day period, the blossoming fruit trees could be damaged.

In a large number of the Transcaucasion republics the average air temperature was two to four degrees higher than the many-year average. There was not enough precipitation in the majority of the regions (1-10 mm). In a number of places in Azerbaijan the winter grain crops were in the phase of stem extension, and on the rest of the territory they were in the stage of tillering and the third leaf. The apricots, peaches, and cherries had blossomed.

In the farming regions of Siberia and Kazakhstan the weather was also warmer than usual.

Here the greatest quantity of precipitation (11-30 mm and more) fell in the east of Omsk, in the west of Tyumen, Tomsk, and Novosibirsk oblasts, in a number of regions of Altay Kray and Kemerovo Oblast, in the north of Ural, Aktyubinsk, and Kustanay oblasts, and in the west of Kokchetav and Tselinograd oblasts.

It was cool in the republics of Central Asia at the beginning of the 10-day period. The winter grain crops continued to grow. Their condition was mainly good and satisfactory. In the south of Turkmeniya, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan there was separation of the buds on the apple, cherry, and pear trees, and in places they had blossomed. The peaches, apricots, and cherries had also blossomed. On the rest of the territory on the areas planted in fruit and berries the buds were swelling and opening and the first leaves were developing. In the western half of the region the temperature of the soil at a depth of 10 cm warmed to 8-12 degrees, and during the last days of March to 12-14 degrees.

April Weather, Crop Conditions Reported

904B0197B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 2

[Report by T. Ivashneva, agrometeorologist: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] Unusually warm and dry weather continued over a large part of the 10-day period on the European territory of the USSR. In the middle of the 10-day period south of the line formed by Kaliningrad-Smolensk-Kalinin-Cheboksary-Kuybyshev the air warmed to 20-25 degrees, and in the more northern regions to 12-19 degrees.

In Moldavia, the south of the Ukraine, and the Northern Caucasus in the winter wheat and barley the lower node of the stalk had appeared over the surface of the soil. On the rest of the territory the winter grain crops grew and were mainly in the tillering and stem extension phase. In the majority of the Ukraine, the southern half of Rostov Oblast, and the Northern Caucasus in the spring grain crops planted in the second half of March shoots had appeared, and in the southern and southwestern regions of the Ukraine they were in the phase of the third leaf. The development of the plants is ahead of the average dates over many years by 20-30 days. Because of the shortage of precipitation and the high temperature of the air in Moldavia, the southern half of the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, and lower Povolzhye, there was intensive drying out of the soil, especially in the upper layers. For four to seven days there were dry winds. But the rains that fell during 8-12 April augmented the supplies of moisture in the soil.

There was a sharp drop in temperature during at the end of the 10-day period. There were frosts everywhere. In Moldavia, the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and Central Chernozem regions and over a large part of Povolzhye and the Central Regions the minimum air temperature was minus 1-5 degrees, and on the surface of the soil (snow) in the central regions of the Ukraine, in places in the Northern Caucasus, and in the central region it was minus 6-8 degrees. The cooling was accompanied by precipitation. In the western, central, and northern oblasts of the Ukraine, in the west of the central Chernozem region, and in places in the Baltics, Belorussia, and the central and northwestern regions there was a temporary snow cover 2-18 cm deep. The frosts and the temporary snow cover on certain fields caused damage to the above-ground mass of grain crops and the development was retarded in the early spring grain crops. In Moldavia, the Ukraine, and places in the Northern Caucasus the frosts were unfavorable for the flowering fruit and berry crops, especially the stone fruit crops. There was also damage to the swelling buds and leaves on the grapes.

Cool weather prevailed in the Transcaucasian republics but it warmed up at the end of the 10-day period. The blossoming of the apricots, peaches, and early strains of pears and cherries continued. In Georgia and Azerbaijan the blossoming of cherries began at the end of the 10-day period.

In the farming regions of Siberia and the northern half of Kazakhstan the average air temperature was 2-6 degrees above the many-year average. In the southern part of Western Siberia the winter crops have come out from under the snow but active growth has not started. North of the line formed by Tyumen-Omsk-Barnaul, in places in the north of Kazakhstan, and also in the northern regions of the farming zone of eastern Siberia the snow cover has remained. Here the winter crops were in a state of winter dormancy.

In the republics of Central Asia the weather was unstable. In the majority of the regions during periods of cooling there were torrential rains accompanied by strong wind. In the Karakalkap ASSR, in places in the north of Kirghizia, and in Khorezm and Bukhara oblasts there were frosts. Most of the winter grain crops were in the phase of stem extension, and in the south of the territory the lower node of the stalk appeared above the surface of the soil. The condition of the plants was mainly good, and in places excellent. In the extreme north of Turkmenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Fergana valley the first blossoms appeared on the grapes. The rains and strong winds were unfavorable for pollination, and the frosts could cause damage to the blossoming fruit and berry plantings.

Military

Work of Baltic Naval Border Patrol Described

PM1804224590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Samsonov article: "Alarming Wind of Pursuit"]

[Excerpt] "I order you to guard the state border"—with those words ships of the USSR Border Guards' naval units put out to sea. They were heard on board our border guard vessel too. And the tall outline of the ancient city's towers and spires were soon disappearing in the mist.

"Our vessel has been tasked with defending the state border in the Tallinn area," Captain Third Rank N. Gerasimov, commander of the border guard vessel, said. "It is the most difficult area in the sector covered by our unit. It is distinguished by the proximity of a neighboring state's territorial waters, and the intensive movements of shipping, including foreign shipping."

The state border. I listened to the commander but kept looking ahead, where our ship's course lay. I wanted to see the line I had been shown on the map. But it is invisible, and only the border vessels protecting its inviolability are a reminder of its existence.

We once turned a border into a solid wall impenetrable from either side. But times change, and we are opening our doors ever wider to those who visit us with good intentions—they are welcome.

Moving along the motherland's invisible border, we contacted vessels traveling to and from the port of Tallinn, ascertained their names and courses, and warned them what would happen if they violated the demands of the border procedure. Was this, perhaps, just the usual caution? Of course not. Let us not forget that the NATO states are in no hurry to reduce funding for intelligence purposes, such funding has even been increased recently in certain areas.

One other point. The situation in the Baltic today is very difficult. In nearby Lithuania the very concept of the inviolability of our state's borders has become a subject for emotion and adventurist decisions. What is the border guards' attitude to this?

"Recently I've felt that the unit personnel have taken a clearer and more serious attitude to concepts such as the border and the motherland. The political events in Lithuania have forced many people to look differently at those concepts," Captain Third Rank A. Shukputov, deputy chief of the political department, told me before putting out to sea. That is just one characteristic, incidentally. As Akhmetzhan Mauleshevich told me, the number of unit members seeking places in military colleges has doubled in comparison with last year. [passage omitted]

Moiseyev Gives Lecture on Soviet Defense Doctrine

PM1804121990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 First Edition p1

[Colonel A. Manushkin report: "On Soviet Military Doctrine"]

[Text] On 14 April Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, gave a lecture at the Air Force Engineering Academy for students, lecturers, and professors on Soviet defensive military doctrine and answered a number of questions. He was informed of the main aspects of basic research to create aviation equipment and arms and improve the efficiency of the instruction process.

He has delivered similar lectures in other USSR Armed Forces academies.

Intelligence Chief on GRU Activities

PM1704160090 London DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 17 Apr 90 p 17

[Report on interview with USSR Defense Ministry Main Intelligence Directorate chief Colonel General Vladlen Mikhailov by Carey Schofield: "Encounter With the Spy Master"—date, place not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] While researching a book about the Soviet Armed Forces, writer Carey Schofield was permitted by the military and political chiefs of the Red Army to interview whte head of military intelligence, Colonel General Vladlen Mikhailov.

Such an interview with the head of the most sensitive department in the armed forces offers a clear indication of where the army wants to be seen to stand on the question of reform. It is expecially significant in view of the assumption that the Red Army is the greatest potential threat to glasnost. The colonel general speaks directly, punctuating his conversation with precise and disciplined movements of his hands. He has been the head of the GRU (the Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye) [Main Intelligence Directorate], since 1987. The equivalent organisation in Britain is MI5, though the briefs of the two organisations do not coincide exactly. It is important to understand that the GRU covers both army reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, unlike Western intelligence agencies.

Though both of his predecessors in the job worked for the KGB before they joined the GRU, Mikhailov did not. I had been asked to submit advance questions to Colonel General Mikhailov, but when I met him he brushed all that aside. "Just ask me what you want to know," he said.

I was interested in why this man, whose uniform bore an impressive palette of military honours but who had never worked in intelligence, was appointed to this post. "It was decided to reinforce the GRU with people who had field training. Naturally it was quite hard for me to master this new position at first. Now I am beginning to get the hang of it."

Could the colonel general explain how the roles of the GRU and the KGB differed? He was circumspect.

"Comrade Kryuchkov (chairman of the KGB) described the responsibilities of the KGB when his nomination was confirmed. As far as the GRU is concerned, we are responsible for purely military intelligence: radio reconnaissance from Soviet territory, and air reconnaissance; listening to foreign radio stations. We are in charge of carrying out work that would be needed if war were to break out, although I hope there will not be war.

"We are interested in all new developments in the West. The same as your intelligence is interested in ours. Of course, the details differ with each side. But the methods that were used in the past, stealing things and bringing them over, are never used now.

"Now our lives are so full of information that you can find out almost anything without getting deeply involved in secrets. We take los of magazines; we send people openly to exhibitions, conferences and airshows."

But people like Kim Philby, did they work for the KGB or the GRU? "They were not working for us. As to whom they did work for, think it out for yourself. By the way, Kim Philby lived next door to my house in Moscow, right up to the end of his life. He had a small house and garden. He used to walk and rest there." Sometimes, he says, the flood of information, both open and classified, comes as such a rate that they have difficulty processing it. But he is not complaining about that. In fact, he says, the careful diminution of military capabilities will mean that "the role of our intelligence and NATO intelligence will be increasing."

He is well enough up on the technology, and says he is particularly impressed by some Western equipment. "If you take for example, air reconaissance, there are American aircraft such as RC135, the AWACS system, TR-1, U-2, Orion, Hawkeye... But I will tell you right out that the West and we move in parallel in the development of reconnaissance equipment. There are some areas where you are ahead of us and some in which we are in the lead. But these are delicate matters. We probably shouldn't talk about them."

Instead we talked about Vladlen Mikhailov. He was born in 1925 and has been in the army since 1942. His parents were collective farmers; he became an officer in 1944 and graduated from military college in Vladivostok, on the Pacific coast of the Soviet Union.

"Although I was born in Europe," he says, "I feel that the Far East is somehow closer to my soul."

Now his working day starts at seven in the mornings, though on Sundays it may be a little later. His wife Ninel Valentinevna makes him a small breakfast before he leaves his house in the Sivtsev Vrazhek district, not far from the fashionable Arbat. He has a state-owned dacha too, about 15 minutes by car out of the city, but he will lose that when he retires.

Every day he reports, usually in writing but sometimes in person, to the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Moiseyev, the man who gave the final go-ahead for our interview. His normal days end about nine o'clock, though he tries to find an hour to run or walk in the forest when he arirves home. "On the whole I devote all my time to work," he says. "There is a huge stream of information to be processed and reported."

He notes, however, that the sources of the information are changing—from the shady despatches of operatives in the field to the sterile signals of spy satellites bustling around the stratosphere. Now, he says, "we do not have to send an officer to Great Britain to find out what is happening there. He can simply eavesdrop from here. They used to say that if you wanted to steal something, you should try to open a safe and extract what you wanted. Somehow you had to gain access to the building. Now things like that are not done."

But he must have people who could do it if necessary?

"I will tell you frankly that it is extremely difficult nowadays. The security systems which exist in Great Britain for example make such operations almost impossible. A lot of information is picked up from conversations and in other ways.

"Space reconnaissance is of the first importance. Let us begin with the Americans. They have KH-11, the optical-electronic reconnaissance satellite. Its resolution is 0.2 to 0.3 metres. It is able to stay in orbit for nearly three years. So in favourable conditions you can see not only a tank on a road, but even a man. But it has a drawback. If there are clouds it is not able to take good photographs. So the Americans have sent into orbit a satellite capable of radar intelligence which can function through the clouds. Probably we have something of the same kind."

Technology lets people out of the morality of spying, but Mikhailov displays, publicly at least, a remarkably liberal attitude. Did he think that a spy should be executed if caught?

"Nowadays I believe people should not be condemned to death. To my mind capital punishment should only be applied where one man has killed another man."

I told him of a story I had heard in the West, about a Soviet called Popov who had been caught working for Western intelligence. He was reportedly burnt alive and a film was said to have been made of his execution to be shown to young GRU officers.

"Personally I have never heard the name Popov," said Mikhailov. "It is very unlikely that this film exists."

Among the Western intelligence services, the colonel general rates the British as the most experienced, who "come up with the most delicate interpretation", though "the Americans have the biggest and most developed service". And the Israelis?

"They certainly give us something to think about. They know what is happening in the Arab world, but also in Europe and America. It is easy for them because there are Jewish populations all over the world who open all doors, including those of government."

Such competition means his own people must be of the right stuff. What qualities did he consider the most important in a young GRU officer?

"Number one is bravery and the ability to find one's bearings in all situations. Our intelligence officers must be capable of taking decisions on their own." Is there a college from which GRU selects most of its cadets?

"There is the Combined Arms College in Kiev, for example. At the Frunze Academy there is also a faculty which trains future reconnaissance people." People who start in military intelligence, he says, try to stick with it for a long time. "There is a particular fascination about the job." And what about the qualities for people in military intelligence abroad?

"Military attaches attend receptions and meetings; they meet military attaches from other countries. Of course the person has to be erudite, trained, know more than one language and have a whole range of other qualities."

And they should be good at making friends?

"Well...if you know the principles of the work of these people, then apparently yes."

"I'm guessing," I said.

"Well, I'm also guessing," said the colonel general.

Katusev Rebuts Shevardnadze on Tbilisi Probe

PM1704114590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Justice A. Katusev, chief military prosecutor and USSR deputy general prosecutor, by Colonel L. Nechayuk: "Whose Side Is the Prosecutor On?"; date, place of interview not given]

[Excerpts] [Nechayuk] For a long time the work of the military prosecutor's office was a closed zone to the public at large. This is probably why many people have an extremely vague or even distorted idea of who military prosecutors are. It has been said that even the government includes people who believe that you can't remain objective once you become a military prosecutor, that "like it or not, your are forced to defend departmental interests notwithstanding the facts." Such, for example, is the view which USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze recently expressed in public in OGONEK. Would you clarify the situation, please: What is your relationship with the Ministry of Defense?

[Katusev] In making serious but extremely far from truthful accusations of unobjectivity against me Eduard Amvrosiyevich did not cite any facts to substantiate his claims. And such facts simply do not exist. But the very suggestion that a military prosecutor has to defend departmental interests rather than the supremacy of the law because of his position gives rise to perplexity when heard from the lips of a state figure of such rank. Who if not a member of the government cannot know that the chief military prosecutor, who is simultaneously deputy chief prosecutor of the USSR, is subordinate only to the chief prosecutor and not in any way to the USSR minister of defense. The same applies to the military prosecution service as a whole.

Of course our workers cooperate closely in their practical work with the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and commands and political organs at local level. Some commanding officers and military chiefs do sometimes attempt to exploit this to exert pressure. And it is no secret that there is the occasional military prosecutor who, having lost his sense of duty, betrays his principles. We have never tolerated this and will not tolerate it in the future, either. A prosecutor is always obliged to be on the side of the law, and only the law. [passage omitted]

[Nechayuk] In the interview which Comrade E.A. Shevardnadze gave to OGONEK I sensed irritation, for example, that the facts established by the military prosecutor's office investigation into the circumstances of the Tbilisi tragedy did not tally with the prevailing opinion. You spoke about them at the congress of USSR people's deputies, but most of our readers are not familiar with them since there was no television broadcast and the central newspapers did not publish the text of your speech. Could you say something, even if only a few words, about the most substantial facts?

[Katusev] Let me make it clear straight away that I spoke at the congress not on my own initiative but on the instructions of the USSR general prosecutor. He is the one, I believe, that is authorized by the law and commanded by common sense to inform the deputies about the facts established by the investigation before they adopt a political decision. There haves already been instances in our history when courts have been railroaded into making convenient political assessments. The lamentable results of such actions are common knowledge.

The public in the country and abroad was waiting for a clear answer to the question: How could it have happened, this tragedy that gave rise to feelings of grief and commiseration among all honest people on earth? There are three available assessments which do not coincide in many respects: Those made by the Georgian Supreme Soviet commission, the USSR people's deputies commission, and the Military Prosecutor's Office investigation group. The differences in their conclusions lie in their different methods for elucidating the circumstances of what happened. Commissions talk to people whereas an investigation interrogates; commissions consult specialists, whereas an investigation appoints scientific establishments to provide expert assessments. And, most importantly, an investigation does not accept any piece of evidence without checking it and analyzing it in conjunction with other pieces of evidence. In other words, it is not appropriate for a prosecutor to guess; he must rely only on reliably established facts. And at the time of my speech these were as follows.

Of the 21 people who reported that they had been injured with shovels, experts established injuries consistent with this in seven. There were no severe bodily injuries at all, not to mention fatalities. Of the 427 people who received injuries on Rustaveli Boulevard and outside the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Building, 290 suffered them during the rioting and 137 as a result of actions by servicemen. Crushing was the sole reason why 18 people, including women, died.

As for the 2,000 people initially registered as having been subjected to the effects of tear gas of the "Cheremukha" type, UN experts confirmed this in only 54 people.

I did not only read out these facts from the congress rostrum. On 9 April last year I was in Tbilisi as the country's deputy general prosecutor, looked into everything on the spot, and experienced everything for myself. I bear all the responsibility—professional and human—for the objectivity and reliability of the facts.

No matter how much you may want to, you cannot find in my speech either accusations against the Georgian people or a desire to save "the honor of the uniform" at any cost. [passage omitted]

Yazov Attends Marshal Savitskiy's Funeral

PM1804141590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On His Last Journey"]

[Text] On 10 April soldiers of the USSR Armed Forces and Moscow working people saw off on his last journey Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Savitskiy, prominent Soviet military commander, active participant in the Great Patriotic War, holder of the Lenin Prize, and twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Red Banner Hall of the Central House of the Soviet Army named for M.V. Frunze, where the coffin with the body of the deceased was put, was somberly decorated. There were many wreaths around the base.

The guard of honor comprised the following: Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, USSR deputy defense ministers, and military commanders.

There was a funeral meeting at the Novodevichye cemetery, where Ye.Ya. Savitskiy was buried.

'Distortion' of Scrapped Warhips Report Deplored

PM1804142590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov article: "This Is How They Want To Scare Readers"]

[Text] A report from Kiev by IZVESTIYA's own correspondent S. Tsikora entitled "Whose Ship?" was published in the Saturday issue of that paper. The author writes: "In the center of Kiev on the Dnepr the militia noticed a fully armed warship. And...without a crew."

On Saturday my telephone never stopped ringing. Colonel V. Stepanov, deputy military prosecutor of the Kiev garrison, was the first to get through to me:

"We are checking this report, but it is already clear that the story published is another 'false report' on the military... "

"Do you know the telephone number of 'your' colleague Comrade Tsikora?" retired Captain 1st Class G. Rozhmanov, director of the "Albatros" young seamen's club in Kiev's Minskiy Rayon, was the next to shout down the phone. "How can such nonsense feature in a central newspaper?"

And another call. It was V. Kravchuk, deputy chief traffic controller of the Kiev River fleet:

"I never knew that journalists could react so flippantly to facts."

So what sort of "submarine hunter," allegedly so carelessly abandoned by the military, did the correspondent see in Kiev's territorial waters? It was a coastal minesweeper built 30 years ago in 1960 which did combat service as part of the Caspian Military Flotilla. In 1981 it was decommissioned and handed over to the "Yunga" young seamen's club in Kiev's Zaliznichnyy Rayon. Its arms were first put out of action. And as of 1987 it belonged to the "Albatros" club. Over the years its hull became useless, in a few places leaks formed, and it threatened to sink. The "Albatros" club concluded an agreement with the leadership of the Kiev river fleet to hand over the former minesweeper for scrap. Then the vessel was moored to the same bank where the IZVESTIYA correspondent was located.

All the same it was best to take a look... At 1530 last Saturday Captain A. Ryabokon moored his little T-53 motorship to the dilapidated, rusty side of the former minesweeper. We went up onto its deck with the motorship captain and motor mechanic A. Khaylak. A. Menyaylo, chief of the workshop shift, met us here with a laugh:

"Sailors, the militia, and the prosecutor's office have already visited us today. I myself have now read the item, and if I had not been standing on deck I would not believe what was written about the minesweeper. I was here on that day when a militiaman arrived with the correspondent. An imposing man, already gray... He was always chuckling... "

They approached the guns and the machineguns. "Everything was well oiled, the bolts in place. Behind the conning tower there was a pair of heavy machineguns. Also in good working order," S. Tsikora wrote in the newspaper.

I have never encountered such a distortion of the facts. The bits of gun and machine gun, which are rusty and full of clay and sand, just could not be hammered into shape, not to mention the fact that many of them simply do not exist. The gunlocks and other parts were removed, as they are supposed to be, when the ship was decommissioned and handed over to the pioneers. The day before the welders cut off the barrel because they had started dismantling the vessel.

"Why did he write like that?" my interlocutors wondered. "Doesn't he understand... "

It is difficult to understand. Another recent fact springs to mind. Without going out of Kiev to the training range, on 18 March this correspondent published in IZVESTIYA a report on air and land battles during a Kiev Military District exercise, although there were still several days to go before it started. Such haste is by no means accidental because all this was served up with a spicy sauce: He said that on the day of the runoffs in the Ukraine the generals specially presented this surprise in order to influence the progress of the elections.

At the end of the report about the unattended ship the author exclaims extremely anxiously: "All military organizations in the city have 'disowned' this warship, and the criminal investigation staffers had really reached an impasse... Where could they find the people in charge of it?"

"Let the correspondent come to us or to any of the river port leaders whose territory he visited," Major of the Militia N. Savenko told me, "and he will receive a full report right away."

On Sunday a new article appeared in IZVESTIYA entitled "A Complex Story." I read it and thought: "He's talking utter nonsense." Now two unmanned ships, this newspaper's correspondent claims, "are ready to fire in any direction."

I shall explain this "report" too. The first ship was the former minesweeper. I think I have said everything about this. The second ship was the Voron, which was built in 1955, withdrawn from the Navy's combat forces and towed from Poti via Kherson to Kiev. Last Sunday near the water transportation workers' island to the accompaniment of the Soviet and Ukrainian anthems it was handed over to the "Shkval" young seamen's club in Kiev's Leningradskiy Rayon. The ship was given to schoolchildren at the request of the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee and on the orders of the USSR Navy Main Staff.

Now about the arms. On the Voron, unlike the minesweeper, there are three 100 mm guns and eight smaller-caliber guns. But all of them have been deactivated.

This is the whole "complex" story. It is as simple as a blank sheet of paper, despite the author's efforts to confuse and sensationalize it.

And what about the children which, the author of the notes in IZVESTIYA claims, the people of Kiev are educating in a "combat environment?"

"I am already in my third year studying at the club. Now we have our own ship. That's great!" Volodya Litvinenko, an eighth grader from secondary school No. 254, told me.

You will agree that adult pursuits on the decommissioned ship are better for the boys from Kiev than loitering in basements and passageways. For a month in the summer the young sailors live on the shores of the gulf, study the "war" ship, take part in sports and swimming, and take care of themselves.

What alternative can those who want to use the Army as a means to intimidate society offer to Volodya Litvinenko and his comrades?

Baltic Republics

Prunskiene Arrives in Norway, Discusses Aid

LD1904005390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0017 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Oslo, 19 Apr (TASS)—Late on Wednesday evening, K. Prunskiene, chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, and A. Saudargas, Lithuanian foreign minister, arrived in the Norwegian capital. It was announced here that this is an unofficial visit, and that the invitation was sent in the name of the parties that make up the Norwegian coalition government.

On the visit itinerary are talks with leaders of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, meetings with the deputies of the country's parliament, a speech at the Storting's foreign policy committee, and a trip to Stavanger.

The developments in Lithuania, the provision of Norwegian economic aid, and the expansion of Norwegian-Lithuanian cooperation will be studied during the three-day visit.

On arrival at the Norwegian capital's airport, K. Prunskiene declared that one of the main aims of the visit is to study the possibilities of purchasing Norwegian oil. She expressed the wish that Western European countries demonstrate greater resolve regarding the events in Lithuania.

Oil, Gas Ministry Cuts Fuel Supply to Lithuania

LD1904064190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] As has already been reported, USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the country's Council of Ministers, sent a telegram to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the republic's Council of Ministers on 13 April. They proposed that illegal decisions be abolished. Otherwise, it said in the telegram, an instruction would be given on ceasing supplies to Lithuania from other Union republics of those goods that can be sold on the foreign market for freely convertible currency.

As was reported to us this morning in the USSR Ministry of Petroleum and Gas [as heard—these ministries are listed as two separate ministries, i.e. Ministry of Petroleum Industry and Ministry of the Gas Industry] Supplies Department, yesterday evening the pipeline from which Lithuania receives oil from the territory of Russia was sealed off.

Refinery Has Reserves for 3 Days

AU1904085390 Paris AFP in English 0840 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 19 (AFP)—All supplies of crude oil to Lithuania have been cut and the republic's sole refinery has reserves for only three days, its director, Bronius Vainora, said Thursday.

Work has already been stopped in half the plant at Mazeikiai, in the norhtwest of the breakaway Baltic republic, he told AFP in a telephone interview.

The refinery, which employs 3,000 people, normally receives 37,500 tons of crude per day, Mr. Vainora said.

The flow of oil from neighbouring Belorussia began slowing Wednesday at 9.30 p.m. (1830 GMT) and stopped an hour later.

This followed the Lithuanian parliament's failure to respond to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachv's demand that it cancel recently-adopted laws to enforce its unilateral declaration of independence.

The refinery, which would take a week to come onto line again if all production stops, provides Lithuania with seven million tons of petroleum products per year, the director said.

It also provides about one million tons to the Kaliningrad region of Russia, near the Polish border, and another million tons a year to Latvia and Estonia, the other two Baltic republics, he added.

In addition, some 2.5 million tons of refined products are exported to East European countries, he said.

Gas Deliveries Cut 85 Percent

AU1904101290 Paris AFP in English 1007 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 19 (AFP)—Soviet natural gas deliveries to Lithuania had been cut by 85 per cent by midday Thursday (0900 GMT), Radio Lithuania said.

The decision to cut supplies was notified to the breakaway Baltic republic's gas distribution centre by an official in Belorussia from where Lithuania gets its natural gas.

The official, named only as Macherniuk, was acting on instructions received in a telegram signed by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, the radio said.

Reports Differ on Lithuanian Fuel Supply

LD1804215190 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Excerpts] After a two-day discussion the Lithuanian Supreme Council adopted a resolution today on the development of relations between the republic of Lithuania and the Soviet Union, as well as a reply to the Soviet leadership.

The documents proposed that the Lithuanian parliament will not adopt new political legal acts until 1 May, if preliminary parliamentary consultations are started between Moscow and Vilnius. There will be more details about the work of the parliament after the news.

In spite of the warnings from Moscow that energy supplies to Lithuania would be reduced, no news of an actual use of these economic sanctions reached us till this evening. The anonymous phone call saying that early Wednesday morning supplies of oil to the oil refinery in Mazeikiai, north of Lithuania, would be cut off turned out to be false. The phone call came from the Belorussian town of Novopolotsk, where the administration of the Druzhba pipeline has its headquarters. When a call was made back to the office in Novopolotsk this morning, the answer was given that there had been no instructions on cutting energy supplies to Lithuania. The same reply was received from the Ministry of Oil Industry of the Soviet Union.

Contrary to the official warning, the supply of natural gas even went up today. This morning the administration of the Lithuanian Gas Association got in touch with a regional gas supply association in Minsk, Belorussia, and asked for an increase in the supply of gas to Lithuania's largest thermal power station, in the town of Elektrenai. The thing is that the thermal power station in Elektrenai has to cope with an extra task after another major power supply source—the atomic power station in Ignalina, east Lithuania—had been stopped for repairs.

The Lithuanian appeal was taken into consideration and the supply of gas to the thermal power station in Elektrenai was increased this morning.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Army seems to be getting interested in the power supply process in Lithuania. In the northern Lithuanian town of [name indistinct] a group of soldiers, uninvited by the administration, set up a post in the station of the pipeline branch to Mazeikiai. The soldiers do not interfere with the work of the staff, but carefully check up the documents on entering the station. The local population held a protest, picketing among the armored personnel carriers of the invaders. An increased movement of military vehicles was also noted in Vilnius last night. [passage omitted]

As for the atomic power station in Ignalina, official information has come today that its first power unit was stopped for emergency repairs. The cause is a minor leakage of water from the pipe next to the temperature sensing element. The disorder is reported to have had no negative radioactive effects upon the situation in or around the power station. The first power unit is expected to be repaired in five days, while the planned repair work on the second atomic power block is scheduled until 23 May.

Reports say that leaders of the Lithuanian government had a meeting with the inhabitants of the Snieckus settlement. Snieckus was founded as the dwelling estate for the builders and now the staff of the atomic power station in Ignalina. The absolute majority of this population are people who have come from various repubics of the Soviet Union. This vast migration to Snieckus has resulted in a bundle of problems, and the guests from Vilnius came to discuss those problems with the local population. Among other issues of the talk with the people of Snieckus was the status of the Ignalina atomic power station.

The prime minister, Kasimieras Prunskiene, said that the Lithuanian government was doing everything in order that the power station become the property of Lithuania, and be put under the subordination of the Lithuanian Ministry of Power Engineering. She did not exclude an alternative: A joint enterprise of the republic of Lithuania and the Soviet Union. However, this question can only be settled at a negotiating table with the Government of the Soviet Union, Kasimieras Prunskiene said.

Sweden Offers To Mediate for Lithuania, Moscow

LD1904083490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] The Swedish Government has offered to be a mediator in the negotiations between Moscow and Lithuania. A visit by the chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis, is planned for May.

Council Session Debates Gorbachev, Ryzhkov Letter

LD1804164690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1409 GMT on 18 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius after a 31-minute interval.

At 1410 GMT Aleksandras Abisalas invites Minister Kuolys, minister of education and culture, to the rostrum.

At 1416 GMT M. Misiukonis, minister of interior affairs, takes the rostrum. He is asked why the militia do not wear any Lithuania insignia, which would distinguish them from the USSR militia.

At 1420 GMT it is noted that three Lensoviet deputies from the Leningrad Council of Deputies, Aleksandr Seriakov, Aleksandr Khromov, and Sergey Berezinskiy, arrived in Vilnius and are in attendance at the Supreme Council.

At 1422 GMT Seriakov takes the podium and expresses greetings messages from the Leningrad City Soviet. The message he reads notes that the Leningrad City Soviet will firmly follow the path of freedom, democracy, humanism, and other values. He says this message was adopted at the session of the Leningrad City Soviet today. He continues, "Apart from that I would like to add that the Leningrad Soviet at its first session has adopted a message to the USSR president which calls upon the USSR Government, the Supreme Soviet, and the president not to use force in solving political problems. This has been our attitude always and we will adhere to it".

At 1425 GMT questions to members of the government continue.

At 1449 GMT a draft, edited text of the Supreme Council's resolution concerning the economic blockade is read.

At 1453 GMT a letter from the Supreme Council to Gorbachev and Ryzhkov concerning the blockade is read.

At 1455 GMT debates on the draft, edited document begin.

At 1502 GMT the first three paragraphs of the resolution are accepted by the majority of deputies. This is confirmed by the majority of votes. Concerning the fourth paragraph, several opinions about the order of ideas are expressed.

At 1505 GMT a vote is taken on the resolution under the title Concerning the Development of Relations between the USSR and the Republic of Lithuania. A vote is taken on the resolution; 90 deputies vote in favor, one deputy abstains.

At 1508 GMT the letter to Gorbachev and Ryzhkov was placed for further discussion. There were quite a few suggestions concerning the wording of the text. Some deputies proposed to vote for the essence and not the syntax or grammar of the letter. Everything was left in the text of the letter except the second sentence. The editors' group is free to edit the grammar and syntax, leaving the ideas unchanged.

A vote is taken on the proposal; 90 deputies vote in favor, none vote against, three abstain. Thus, the text of the letter is approved by the majority of votes.

At 1517 GMT the issue of deputies taking two posts—as local deputies and deputies of the Supreme Council—was raised again and discussed.

At 1537 GMT a decision was reached that clarification concerning the application of the Basic Law regulating this issue would be made this week.

At 1538 GMT the session concludes. The next plenary session will be held on Friday, 20 April at 0700 GMT.

Lithuanian Supreme Council Responds to Gorbachev

LD1804154890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1449 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Resolution read at the Lithuanian Supreme Council Session in Vilnius on 18 April—live]

[Text] The Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, affirming its loyalty to the acts of 11 March 1990 and steadfastly striving for the consolidation of the independence of the republic of Lithuania, being convinced that it is possible only by dialogue to find solutions acceptable to the Soviet Union and Lithuania, resolves:

1. During the period of preliminary parliamentary consultations between Lithuania and the USSR, if they take place, not to pass new political legal acts until 1 May 1990.

2. Invite the Soviet Union to renounce any, including economic, coercion against the republic of Lithuania and its citizens.

3. Urge Lithuania's economic organizations and citizens to be strictly disposed to the economizing of all resources and to spiritual endurance.

4. Propose to the Soviet Union to begin consultations about negotiations with an authorized delegation of the republic of Lithuania.

5. Send to the Soviet Union an authorized delegation of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania led by deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, Bronius Kuzmickas.

Supreme Council Letter to Gorbachev, Ryzhkov

LD1804161790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1453 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Letter from Lithuanian Supreme Council to USSR President Gorbachev and USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov read at Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] The Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania has attentively read and examined your message concerning possible economic sanctions and planned on preparing a reply with previously adopted proposals. Unfortunately, the actions of economic destruction which are planned, and which are known to you, have hampered the preparation of the proposed document. Having received more detailed reports about future sanctions yesterday, we have little to add to the statement of 16 April 1990 by the Council of Ministers of the republic of Lithuania, apart from expressing regret over the USSR's attitude and methods. For our part, we are ready, as before, to examine any questions, taking into consideration all legitimate interests of the USSR, its citizens, and its strategic interests. During preliminary consultations, if they take place, during the period until 1 May 1990, we are ready to refrain from passing new political laws. For such consultations we are forming a delegation of deputies to come to Moscow in the nearest future; hoping to meet with persons authorized by you for the consultations.

TASS on Lithuanian Supreme Council Documents

LD1804183990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1735 GMT 18 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Kaziz Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius, 18 Apr TASS—The Lithuanian Supreme Council adopted a resolution today "On the Development of Relations Between the Lithuanian Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and also a reply from the parliament of Lithuania to Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR president, and to Nikolay Ryzhkov, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, regarding their message of 13 April.

In the first document the Lithuanian Supreme Council confirmed its faithfullness to the acts of 11 March 1990 and its "aspiration to consistently strive for confirmation of the independence of the Lithuanian Republic." The document stresses that "only by way of dialogue can solutions be found that are acceptable to the Soviet Union and Lithuania."

The Supreme Council of the republic decided "during preliminary parliamentary consultations between Lithuania and the USSR, if they are begun, not to adopt new political legislative acts before 1 May this year," "to call on the Soviet Union to renounce the use of various sanctions, including economic, against the Lithuanian Republic and its citizens, and to begin consultations on talks with an authoritative delegation from the Lithuanian Republic." The resolution urges "the economic organizations of Lithuania and its citizens to prepare for severe shortages in all resources, and for spiritual endurance."

The reply from the republic's parliament to the president of the USSR and the USSR Council of Ministers chairman says that "yesterday, having received concrete information on future sanctions, we can add little to the 16 April statement by the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian Republic, other than to express regret regarding the standpoints and methods adopted by the USSR. In our turn, as previously, we are ready to discuss any matter, taking account of all legitimate strategic interests of the USSR and its citizens." Again, the reply also endorses readiness "for a period of preliminary parliamentary consultations, if they should begin, not to adopt new political legislative acts before 1 May 1990."

Those taking part in the session acquainted themselves with information on preparation of a draft law "On Employment of the Population of Lithuania," they heard replies from members of the goverment to enquiries and questions from deputies, and examined certain other matters.

Tomorrow the deputies of the Supreme Council of Lithuania will work in the standing commissions.

Prunskiene Discusses Gorbachev, U.S. Attitude

AU1804124390 Prague PRACE in Czech 13 Apr 90 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Kazimiera Prunskiene, Lithuanian premier, by Michal Olbrich, in Vilnius; date not given: "You Cannot Force a Genie Back Into the Bottle"]

[Text] Lithuania, which has declared its independence so impressively, has had a new government since Wednesday [11 April]. Its premier, Kazimiera Prunskiene, answered a few questions of our correspondent immediately after taking the ministers' oath.

[Olbrich] After Lithuania's declaration of independence it seemed that a complete political and economic divorce from Moscow would take place. Now it is apparent that you intend to maintain economic relations with Moscow. Will this be possible, at all?

[Prunskiene] To this date, there are no indications that the USSR will disrupt these relations. Of course, these relations are not the best, but this is a consequence of the well-known disorganization and disintegration [rozval] of the USSR, caused by the fact that market relations are still not working. Some enterprises themselves took the initiative of not cooperating with Lithuania, yet this week we have been receiving telegrams that they want to continue. We have no proof that we are being treated worse than is customary among enterprises in the USSR. We are making efforts to fulfill our economic obligations precisely and completely. This quarter, we have fulfilled them by 99.7 percent. No other Soviet republic has managed this. This means that the attacks in Moscow's press that we are disrupting economic life are absurd.

[Olbrich] How is your reform different from the restructuring in the USSR?

[Prunskiene] The USSR is not bringing its economic reforms to an end. Our starting point is the open admission that the Soviet socialist system in this country is coming to an end. We have passed a temporary law on ownership, which puts all forms of ownership on the same level. Now we are working on the mechanism of privatization by issuing shares and selling small enterprises to private hands. We have heard enough about exploitation of man by man. The greatest exploitation may be contained just in the system that we could call state-monopolistic system, the system under which we have lived for such a long time.

[Olbrich] What if M. Gorbachev retains the tough policy he has practiced so far, and, at the same time, adopts economic sanctions against the Lithuanian Republic?

[Prunskiene] Were an economic blockade to come, a hard and extensive one, then fuel would be our most sensitive area. Yet some states have promised to provide us with crude oil and they guarantee us survival for a few months. We can be happy that we have no food problems, since we produce so much food that we export 45 percent of it.

[Olbrich] A political blockade already exists. What form does it take?

[Prunskiene] The president of our bank has just returned from his trip to the FRG and Switzerland where he discussed the possibility of printing our own banknotes. He learned that the USSR, which also cooperates with them, has told them that if they print our banknotes then the USSR would sever relations with them. For two weeks already, the USSR Embassy in Washington has not been issuing any visas to Lithuania. Of course, we can also understand this fact to mean that the USSR does not issue entry visas to another country. Yet it does not recognize our visas either. This is a clear diplomatic blockade and I believe that the world will make its own judgment about this.

[Olbrich] Do you not believe that M. Gorbachev and G. Bush concluded some secret agreement on Lithuania, under which Lithuania belongs to the USSR sphere of interest?

[Prunskiene] I believe that President Bush and very esteemed Mr. Gorbachev are much more dependent on public opinion than Molotov and Ribbentrop were in their time. In view of the fact that they understood each other so well in their personal talks, this, of course, is a possibility. Yet the public begins to understand that sacrificing Lithuania makes no sense. What for? Because of ambitions? Because of reluctance to bring perestroyka to a reasonable end?

[Olbrich] What are the international aspects of the Lithuanian question?

[Prunskiene] Our relations toward the West have become much more active. For instance, at the end of the month I am going to Canada and later to the United States. We will be talking about the possibility of establishing a direct connection, about the exchange of goods, and also about the forms of help to Lithuania—let us say, the loan possibilities. It would be good if nobody obstructed us in this. I believe that in the near future we will sit at the negotiating table with states which have similar historical experience in central and eastern Europe and will be exploring specific programs of our relations.

[Olbrich] Last question: What is your attitude toward M. Gorbachev?

[Prunskiene] I was among his greatest admirers immediately when he begun his new policy of restructuring. Now he has come to a halt. And this is not possible. He has let the genie out of the bottle and he will never be able to force him back in again.

Supreme Council Discuss Relations With USSR

LD1804202290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Our special correspondents have reported from Vilnius today: [video shows correspondent S. Medvedev, identified by caption, standing outside the Supreme Soviet building]

[Medvedev] Today is the second day of work for the republic's Supreme Soviet after the Easter holidays. And for the second day discussions are in progress on the answer to the letter from the president of the USSR and the prime minister of the USSR. [video shows Supreme Soviet in session]

The discussions revealed various points of view on what this document should be like. I think that the opinions of participants in the sitting will be of interest. [video shows deputy V.A. Palyunas, identified by caption, being interviewed by Medvedev]

[Palyunas] We think that fine, good-neighborly relations are quite possible, which will rely on mutual respect and on the observance of interests, both economic and political and strategic. I mean of course the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. But we cannot back down from the decision of 11 March. [video cuts to show Ch.A. Yurshene, independent Lithuanian Communist Party deputy, being interviewed by unidentified correspondent]

[Correspondent] During the discussion of the draft of these documents today the independent Lithuanian Communist Party came forward with rather strong criticism of these documents. What did this consist of?

[Yurshene] The essence of the matter is whether to give a harsh reply or a mild, diplomatic reply. We are now proposing a number of compromise formulas. We are for the time being saying that a decision has not been taken, but I think that it will come. Let us say, we propose during the period of possible parliamentary consultations, specifically up to 1 May, not to adopt any new political, legislative acts which, well, let us say, could provoke some kind of reaction in Moscow. [video again shows Supreme Soviet in session]

[Correspondent] Two hours ago the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet approved the text of a reply to the address of the president and the prime minister of the USSR. We, together with our collocutors, have practically set out the essence of it. A special delegation has been authorized to deliver the text of the document to the leadership of the USSR.

Rally Scheduled To Support Supreme Council

LD1904074890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Sajudis Information Agency reports: The Lithuanian League of Liberty and the Union of Lithuanian Deportees urged everybody to join a rally at 1300 today in support of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. The rally will take place outside the Supreme Council building.

The appeal by the League of Liberty and the Union of Lithuanian Deportees to the nation concluded as follows: The occupiers have declared that the Lithuanian nation, which has risen to achieve independence, is not united politically. Let us demonstrate to the world our unity and determination to the world to be politically independent from Russia.

Further on Possible Economic Blockade

LD1804134390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Lithuania is also the focus of attention today. On Monday some observers expected that Moscow would, to a certain extent, reduce the supplies of raw materials and materials to Lithuania. A letter sent to the leaders of Lithuania last week by Comrades Gorbachev and Ryzhkov contained the demand that the decisions of the Lithuanian parliament—those decisions which are in contradiction to the Soviet Constitution—should be abolished. This demand was not accepted by Lithuania.

As is reported from Lithuania, yesterday they received notification from Belorussia of the possibility of a future reduction in gas supplies. This report has not been confirmed in Moscow.

But no matter what happens, the question of possible economic measures with regard to Lithuania at the present time is being actively discussed abroad. A few hours ago President Bush stated that the United States has a negative attitude to such steps and will take its own measures. Bush did not define precisely what these measures would be.

Commentator on Lithuanian, Uzbek Events

LD1804224990 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] Developments concerning the Baltic republic of Lithuania assumed new urgency since last Friday when Moscow issued a warning that it would cut off crucial supplies to the republic unless its parliament rescinds a string of legislative acts, adopted since the declaration of independence of Lithuania from the Soviet Union. After a two-day discussion the Lithuanian parliament finally endorsed a response to the Moscow statement offering some concessions in its initially intractable stand. The question now is whether Moscow finds the response adequate for launching a full-scale dialogue or for making further efforts to bring the two positions closer. Meanwhile, we take a look at some of the possible implications of the economic stand-off between Moscow and Vilnius and here in the studio with me is Radio Moscow's Nikolay Gorshkov. Now that the verbal exchange, however cool, has been getting under way I think the possibility of economic retaliation either way is more remote. And I also think that the initial postures were not entirely realistic. Here is a view from Doctor (Leonid Dobrokhotov) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow:

[Begin (Dobrokhotov) recording] Nobody wants to sell them raw materials, the oil, gas and so on, by these low prices as they are receiving now from the Soviet Union. But nobody in Europe want to buy their products, because the quality of it is very bad. [English as heard] [end recording]

[Announcer] Dr. (Leonid Dobrokhotov) in Moscow. We have also spoken over the phone to Algis Cekuolis, an adviser to Lithuania's parliament. Here is his view:

[Begin Cekuolis recording] One thing should be clearly stated: We are not going to cut our relationships with the Soviet Union just simply in order not to damage the Soviet Union.

[Unidentified speaker] Not to damage the Soviet Union?

[Cekuolis] Yes, and ourselves too, of course. We are really interested in the prosperity of the Soviet Union and also in our prosperity, absolutely so. And the way to it is not to cut (?over) the live flesh. And that live flesh is our national economical ties. [end recording]

[Announcer] Algis Cekuolis in the Lithuanian mission in Moscow. Now, let's see how realistic these views are. Nikolay Gorshkov has been looking into the issue of the economic stand-off:

[Gorshkov] I think this stand-off will adversely affect both sides. I've just looked up some statistics in our latest handbook on Soviet economy and it appears that Lithuania is in a position to fight back, so to say. Statistics show that Lithuania is doing much better than other republics in quite a number of areas. It's leading the way in the industrial output and in productivity of labor, and it is honoring its contracts with other republics to a much greater degree than the rest of them. If you take Uzbekistan, for example, it has just been announced that this Central Asian republic will temporarily cut off supplies of most of its products to the rest of the Soviet Union starting this Friday. There are no political or nationalist reasons behind this move, I hasten to say. Uzbekistan is simply trying to stabilize its domestic maket, and it looks like things are moving in this direction in many other republics. It's a fact of life that across the Soviet Union many consumer goods are already being sold only to local residents who are asked by shop assistants to present their credentials.

[Announcer] Well, consumer goods shortages is no news to us all. We've already proved that we can endure them. But oil and gas are the life blood of any economy. Can Lithuania endure without them for too long?

[Gorshkov] No, I don't think so. But the situation looks like being that of a guaranteed mutual destruction, if I'm allowed to use this morbid term from the Cold War lexicon. Those statistics handbooks I looked say that 62 percent of industrial goods produced by Lithuania are vital to the Soviet economy. And more than 70 percent of those vital goods do meet international standards despite what (?Dobrokhotov) says. Many of these goods are produced only in Lithuania and other republic rely heavily on their supplies.

[Announcer] What sort of goods?

[Gorshkov] It's electronics, robotics, plastics, medical equipment, welding equipment, construction materials, pulp and paper, to name but a few. And industrial enterprises elsewhere in the Soviet Union may experience severe problems if they are cut off from Lithuanian supplies.

[Announcer] Are you saying that Lithuania may win this trade war if it does break out?

[Gorshkov] In no way. We've seen many trade wars in the West and never there were clear winners or losers. A trade war is a dead end. And in our specific conditions of economic instability any trade skirmish may be devastating. What we really need is a compromise and it seems to me that continuing supplies of oil and gas to Lithuania are a clear indication that a compromise may be in the offing.

U.S. Firm Proposes To Halt Trade With USSR

LD1904084990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Sajudis Information Agency reports: According to the foreign press, on 6 April Louis Du Pont Smith, heir to the world Dupont firm whose wealth reaches, according to modest estimates, $10 billion, has put forward an important initiative to the forthcoming traditional annual shareholders meeting.

He proposes to halt all economic and financial activity which the firm has established with the USSR until the Soviets recognize the sovereign rights of the republic of Lithuania and withdraw all their troops from the territory of Lithuania. This attitude, said the head of the firm, follows traditionally respected principles of freedom and independence which made it possible to establish this firm in the 19th century. Powder and ammunition supplied by this firm helped the United States win the war against the British Empire in 1812.

The Dupont Company cannot idly watch the Soviet totalitarian regime destroying the Lithuanian nation and carry on trade with the USSR as before. The volume of this trade amounts to several hundred million dollars. Smith stated that the company should start another vitally important political activity such as, for example, making use of the company's extensive connections to support diplomatic efforts in Washington to ensure that the United States recognizes without delay the independence of the republic of Lithuania by sending an ambassador to Lithuania. The company should triple the sum of $30 million allocated last year for humanitarian purpose to $100 million, allocate all this sum to Lithuania, and authorize President Landsbergis and Sajudis to use this money at their discretion.

If the company does not support this initiative, added Smith, it would be supporting the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact, because as a result of this pact the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were occupied by Stalin. Furthermore, refusal by the company to support these proposals should be regarded as an intention to perpetuate its condemned policy of 1920 pursued by the firm's head Pierre Samuel Dupont II. At that time, being one of the most influential persons in the New York international corporation, he helped Bolshevism to survive at a decisive period of time. This corporation helped to draw up five-year plans for the Bolsheviks led by Lenin at a time when they controlled only Moscow and Leningrad. More than once historians have said that the Bolshevik regime, which had not firmly established itself at that time, would have been suppressed but for that vital economic aid and other support from the corporation.

For this reason the Dupont Company must not continue trading with the Soviet regime now, when it is suppressing the freedom of Lithuania and its people.

Lithuania Called 'New Problem' in Relations

LD1804191490 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] It seems that the complicated knot of international reactions begins tightening around Lithuania. The optimists, however, are not inclined to dramatize the situation so far. They still believe that the Lithuanian question will be no hindrance to the Soviet-American dialogue. The pessimists advance their own arguments. The White House has given to understand in the most unambiguous way that Moscow's economic sanctions in relation to Lithuania will have their effect on relations between the two countries. When asked if he is pessimistic or optimistic about the situation our commentator Mikhail Mayorov said.

I am optimistic though I begin to share in the concern of those who have been sensitive if not to the threats then to the warning made by Washington. Can we talk now about the certain shift in the American administration's position? There is no reason to hurry with a positive reply to this question, though it becomes more and more difficult to speak about a guarded and cautious approach to the Lithuanian theme at a time when variants emerge threatening to frustrate the signing of a Soviet-American trade agreement. There are even more decisive variants, not to hold the Soviet-American summit scheduled for the end of May.

As we can judge by now the character of President Bush rules out the appearance of a decision based on emotions. Up to now Soviet- American relations have been benefitted from this trait but the American President does not work in a vacuum. Passions ran high around him even long before the current developments in Lithuania. After all, there could be or there could not be the Lithuanian dilemma but attempts to exert an influence on the American President in order to make him pursue a tougher policy towards the Soviet Union have always been there.

The Lithuanian question is a new problem in relations between Moscow and Washington but the pressure brought on the President by the hardliners, inspired by the ideas of Cold War time, is an old policy. There is nothing orginal in it but just because this policy is too familiar it is high time for us to learn to carefully weigh all that happens in order to be able to avoid a mistake that may prove to be fatal, not only for Moscow and Washington but for the rest of the world as well. Those who attempt to blackmail the Soviet leadership with a future summit have to my mind an odd logic. There can be no unilateral advantages or unilateral concessions in such matters as disarmament or the improvement of the international climate as a whole; nor can there be in an equitable and mutually advantageous trade, which Moscow is striving for by planning a correspondent agreement with Washington.

It is not so difficult to find or invent the reasons that would make the carefully planned and much awaited top level Soviet- American dialogue devoid of its content or would cancel it altogether but this will only mean that the scales will be tipped by the petty considerations of the moment, by egotistic motives inherited from the old thinking. For the two powers this is the question of responsibility, not only before themselves but also before the entire humanity waiting to be relieved from the burden of the arms race. Can we dare not to justify this trust and hope?

Klaipeda Customs Impounds Sports Gun Ammunition

LD1804133690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Television News Service" Program]

[Text] In our Lithuanian section today we also have a report from Klaipeda. There is a conflict there caused by the unique dual authority in the republic. Some organizations are subordinated to the Union and the others to the Lithuanian parliament and ministries.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Stanislav Chekalin, identified by caption] We are in the commercial sea port of Klaipeda where a motorship has arrived from the FRG on which a slightly unusual cargo have been discovered. This is, as you see, ammunition for sporting guns. What surprises one, moreover, is that there are very many of them for Klaipeda—300,000 cartridges.

[Kolpachek] And besides that very large charges. Comrade major, who stopped the cargo and on what grounds?

[P.A. Pitsukha, head of department of the port frontier inspection, identified by caption] This cargo was detained by representatives of Customs on the basis of the fact that the necessary documentation did not exist for it to enter the country.

[Chekalin] The import of arms and explosive substances into the country should be sanctioned by the minister of internal affairs of the USSR at any time. As Sokalauskus, the representative of Latimpex, who is present here explained, this time the permission for the import was given by the minister of internal affairs of Lithuania.

Lithuanian Journalists Assail CPSU Decision

LD1904093990 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Union of Journalists has published a statement on the refusal by the leaders of the CPSU organization in Lithuania to accredit representatives of popular newspapers at the party's congress this coming Saturday.

The refusal to accredit is applied to journalists of the newspapers ATGIMIMAS, RESPUBLIKA, LIETUVOS RYTAS, and the Sajudis Russian-language weekly SOGLASIYE.

The Union of Journalists draws attention to the fact that this violates the press law of the republic of Lithuania. If the leaders of the CPSU organization in Lithuania do not revoke their decision, the Union of Journalists reserves the right to ask its colleagues to boycott the coming congress.

However, threats to Lithuania's national newspapers have not ceased just because of the intentions of the CPSU organization. The supporters of the CPSU, supported by Moscow, are striving to misappropriate the largest printing works in Vilnius together with the stocks of paper. The independent Estonian newspaper EESTI EKSPRESS has announced that it is prepared, if need be, to lend one of its issues to Lithuanian journalists. The EESTI EKSPRESS is ready to hand over to Lithuania's journalists its entire edition of 50,000 copies, and this issue will be distributed in the republic of Lithuania.

Lithuanian Deputies in 'More Realistic Mood'

PM1804155590 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 2

[Dispatch by correspondent N. Lashkevich under the "News from Republics" rubric: "Faced With a Choice"]

[Text] Vilnius, 18 Apr— The two-day deadline within which Lithuania's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers were to respond to the message from M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, and N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, expired last Monday, but the deputies of the Lithuanian parliament did not start discussing it until Tuesday. For three days Lithuania celebrated Easter, and Monday was officially declared a non-working holiday. In the meantime the republic Council of Ministers asked the USSR Government to explain the essence of the economic measures which would be applied if the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet refused to revoke the decisions which it had adopted earlier. However, as distinct from V. Landsbergis, the republic Council of Ministers confirmed its resolve to abide by all contract commitments to the country's other Union republics.

Although it is not yet definitively clear what specific types of goods sold on the external market for freely convertible currency, and in what volumes, would not be supplied to Lithuania, economists have already calculated the potential losses. According to their estimates, material resource stocks are sufficient for two weeks at most, and of gas for 20 days. There are also other, more optimistic forecasts. However, frankly speaking, the population of Lithuania, irrespective of nationality, is in a state of profound dismay today. Will there be electricity to light up homes, will people be able to use their cars, how will hospitals, kindergartens, and schools function?

Ideas about obtaining immediate credit from Western countries are circulating. Many people are pinning great hopes to the Baltic market which was set up a few days ago, and which, in the intention of the leaders of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Councils of Ministers, is to integrate their economies "on the basis of a comprehensive qualitative development of commodity-money market relations." However, that is only a long-term prospect.

Nor is it possible to seriously count on the establishment of a Baltic market monetary fund, the creation of an information system, and specific results of economic cooperation between the three Baltic republics at present. In short, the Lithuanian economy does not possess any firm guarantees of independence right now. And likewise, the government does not possess any profoundly elaborated program for radical economic transformations as a whole. Outlines of this program, scattered through numerous newspaper articles by economists, parliamentary speeches, and a number of laws, have always been linked with questions of economic cooperation with the USSR. Although it was taken into account that a "foreign state" may not accept "economic friendship" foisted upon it in conditions of political confrontation, for which, as is known, the USSR is not to blame, yet for some reason the view prevailed in the republic that no retaliatory measures of an economic nature would be taken; it was expected that oil and gas, paid for in rubles, would continue arriving via the pipelines, and that raw materials, vehicles, and equipment would continue being delivered at the same prices.

And so Lithuania is again faced with a choice. Where is the way out of the crisis? How can the impasse be overcome? Normally, it is quite simple: You take a step back and look for a way out. However, so far there is no evidence of any such intentions. It is true, the Lithuanian Council of Ministers is planning to send a representative delegation to Moscow headed by Prime Minister K.-D. Prunskiene.

The discussion of the message from the USSR president and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers which opened in parliament on Tuesday has shown that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies are now in a more realistic mood and that, judging by appearances, they are not seeking confrontation, especially not economic confrontation. During the debate many compromise options for a reply statement were put forward, but the deputies were unable to reach a consensus during the first day of the session.

Writer Urges Lithuanians To Stand Firm

LD1804130890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Speech by writer Kazys Saja from live relay of Supreme Council session in Vilnius]

[Excerpts] When I was younger quite often I reproached myself for not speaking out, yet now I do the same, asking myself why I am sitting here and not saying a word. [passage omitted]

I must admit I am not a very good politician. However, it seems to me that we haven't got a clear scale of values, even freedom on this scale is below the truth. Why did we declare the act of 11 March and what were we thinking then while doing this?

It seems to me that either we have forgotten this or we declared this act very lightheartedly, if we can say today that ambitions of a small state are ridiculous as compared to those of a big state.

However, I think that an ambition of a small state is majestic and attractive and that we must hold on to it [whether we] sink or swim. By all means hold on to it. [applause] Or let us take this saying: The USSR and us are like two goats. Let us not compare ourselves with the demoralized, decaying, collapsing superpower smeared with blood from head to foot from the victim which had been constrained and which somehow managed to crawl out and escape from this den of syphilitics covered with wounds. And now we begin to think how we can lick their boots, how we can ingratiate ourselves with them, how we can satify their whims. What kind of presents and favors can we expect from this? From this decaying empire? [passage omitted]

Quite often we quote Gandhi, however, we have not studied his writings properly. He said: As long as falsehood is hiding behind the mask of the truth, there is no need for us to lose heart. We remain attractive to the world and people as long as we are defending our truth. [passage omitted] In the name of Lithuania we should not go fishing with the devil, because a big serpent or a small one is still a serpent.

Rallies, Demonstrations in Lithuania Viewed

90UN1484B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 8 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by N. Lashkevich: "Lithuania Spent Last Week Engaged in Rallies. Do They Always Lead to Agreement?"]

[Text] Rallies, rallies... There is every reason to call last week in Lithuania a week of rallies. Pickets, rallies, and demonstrations have become a kind of calling card for the republic these days.

In the city stadium in Klaipeda a rally was held by many thousands of residents of the port city in support of the decisions of the republic Supreme Soviet. Before this in the same place there was a rally protesting against these decisions.

Next to the House of the Press there was a rally of Vilnius residents, organized by deputies of the city soviet, protesting against the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers concerning renaming the publishing house of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania to the Lithuanian publishing house of the CPSU, and against the publication of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA in three languages with the subsequent curtailment of the printing of several Sajudis newspapers.

In front of the Supreme Soviet building there was a rally that gathered an audience of many thousands. Participating in it were USSR People's Deputies V. Alksnis, G. Tikhonov, S. Shuvalov, and other representatives of the deputy group "Soyuz." Participants in the rally, which was organized by the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania, adopted decrees and a resolution calling for abolishing the decrees of the Lithuanian parliament, the retirement of the present republic leaders, a rejection of negotiations, and the introduction of presidential rule in Lithuania. In the event that these demands were not met, it was emphasized in the document, there would be a general strike. Last Friday there was a warning strike in a number of enterprises.

And, finally, on Saturday in Vingis Park in Vilnius there was a large demonstration of proponents of the independence proclaimed by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

The tense "Lithuanian situation" requires some kind of social outlet. The people are tired of the "war of nerves;" of the constant waiting, worsened during the night by the rumble of military equipment on the streets and the whirring of helicopters over their heads; of the sometimes unpredictable steps of the Lithuanian parliament members; of concern for the fate of their own and others' sons who were deceived and fled from the Armed Forces after the republic Supreme Soviet declared the USSR Law on Universal Military Service to be invalid; and of many other things.

The rallies are becoming something of a moral safety valve, and people are trying to find there answers to tormenting questions about their future. But, as a rule, the expectations are rarely justified for the rally environment, especially in a period so filled with indeterminate prospects, and frequently leads to a worsening situation and gives simple answers, leaving no room for dialectics, compromises, and reason. Just let anyone at a rally try to say anything that goes against the mood of those who have gathered—too bad for him! This, for example, is exactly what happened during a demonstration organized by the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania. A young person, who had climbed up onto a metal platform where the cameraman was, raised a placard whose content absolutely contradicted the mood of the people on the square. The result was this: They pulled him down and the platform collapsed along with the cameraman—then they knocked him down, and it was only because of the police that he was saved from the raging crowd. A similar fate probably would await this kind of anti-"hero" at the Saturday rally if in front of the many thousands of people who had gathered there he had dared to raise a slogan that was insulting to the independent Lithuania.

And this kind of outburst of emotions and agitation of the crowd, fanned by unclear expectations and mysterious premonitions about how the Lithuanian question will be resolved are the most alarming thing of all today. Common sense, reason, and the desire to find compromises in solving the problem are drowned in the sea of rallies that has engulfed Lithuania. A rally never asks, never recommends, never contemplates—it demands.

"No negotiations of any kind!"—demands one rally. "To the negotiating table with our own conditions!"—demands another. Won't the people who are shouting loudly and shaking their fists feel deceived in both the former and the latter case when, say, a compromise variant of the solution to the problem is found? The foam of provocations can cap this wave of rallies. Blood has always brought more blood. And God forbid (!) that it cause a chain reaction of vengefulness, malice, and hatred among people with different convictions and of different nationalities.

Lithuania is holding rallies as though it is trying in the general hum of mass protest or support to find an answer to the main question: Is it to be independent or not? But there in the harsh cry of rallies, in the strained silence of picket lines, in the resolute step of processions, there are no answers. There are only more and more questions...

Legality of Lithuanian 'Loyalty Oath' Viewed

90UN1484A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by R. Motskus in Vilnius: "Landsbergis in the Province"]

[Text] **Citizens in Lithuania are signing a declaration of loyalty to the regime. Is this democracy according to Sajudis?**

A meeting of 300,000 republic residents was held on Saturday in Vingis Park in the Lithuanian capital, at which they approved the parliament's current steps.

A day later in Klaipeda there was a meeting of residents of this port city—here everything was the opposite: They condemned the actions of the Supreme Soviet and called for protection of civil rights, refusal to carry out decisions, and disobedience to the local authorities. Incidentally, there have already been one-hour warning strikes at several enterprises in Vilnius.

There are plenty of problems and troubles in Lithuania. But the most life-shattering one is still the fate of the boys recruited into the Army. The Supreme Soviet again adopted an appeal for them to refuse to serve in the Army. The Council of Ministers even issued orders for the enterprises, institutions, organizations, and executive committees of the republic to stop keeping military records, to use the released workers for other jobs, and not to give the military commissariats lists of boys obligated to register for the draft or other data. The city and rayon executive committees were instructed not to grant premises to military commissariats before 30 April 1990 unless the problems of military service were resolved through agreements before that time.

These "legal" acts cannot be called anything but instigation. Is it really humane to play with the fates of thousands of young people for the sake of the political ambitions of a small group?!

It has also been decreed that at their request citizens of Lithuania may be issued a temporary passport to use until the new passport is ready. According to a previously adopted law, a citizen of Lithuania can be anyone who has a permanent residence and a job in Lithuania. Now individuals certifying their Lithuanian citizenship sign a commitment with the following content: "I... (last name, first name), by receiving a certificate of citizenship in the Lithuanian Republic, agree to observe the laws of the Lithuanian Republic and to respect the independence of my state and its territorial integrity." This immediately evoked a wave of false interpretations. And how could it not? For in reality it is also required that people living in a constitutional state sign a loyalty oath. And history teaches us: In places where they begin to check on people's loyalty they end up with a "witch hunt." Or other repressive measures.

Among other innovations they decided to abolish the people's control committee and in its place they organized a department of state control, which from now on is answerable only to the Supreme Soviet. The state environmental protection organ is being given the same status.

Last Saturday there was additional voting in elections to the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets. Another five deputies were elected to the Supreme Soviet and 800 to the local soviets. But there are still about 1,000 vacancies and, according to predictions, the elections will drag on until the end of June.

Last week there was an abundance of all kinds of public opinion polls. Thus, as before, the most popular leader in the republic is still A. Brazauskas. Following him are V. Landsbergis and K. Prunskiene. More than 73 percent of those questioned think that military force will not be used in solving the "Lithuanian problem."

Endless disputes continue regarding dividing up the property between the two communist parties of Lithuania. All the main buildings have been taken under protection by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the CPSU platform) thinks that it is the only legal heir to this property. But in a letter to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev, the leader of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania, A. Brazauskas, considers this interpretation of the issue to be wrong.

Lithuanian KGB Denies Ties to Prunskiene

90UN1458B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 Apr 90 p 4

[Special correspondent S. Doronin report: "Forgery Concerning the Prime Minister?"]

[Text] Vilnius—The article, "Inquisition of the 20th Century. Yesterday Berezov, Today Prunskiene, Tomorrow...," was published in issue 74 of the Lithuanian newspaper RESPUBLIKA. It reports that back in 1980 K. Prunskiene, the present prime minister of Lithuania, was recruited by the republic KGB. As an agent, she was given the pseudonym "Shatriya." A photostat, completed according to form No. 3, of a card which is allegedly in KGB archives is adduced as confirmation also.

This is what A. Rukshenas, leader of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Press Office, had to say about this publication:

"The Lithuanian KGB states officially that the publication in RESPUBLIKA containing references to the alleged cooperation of certain persons, including K. Prunskiene, with the KGB authorities is the most flagrant provocation and slander. Such publications are not news to us. We have formerly refuted items in the 'Sajudis' newspaper ATGIMIMAS and other publications discrediting the activity of the state security authorities and their officers. Such publications have just one purpose—compromising honest people who are respected in the republic, discrediting the KGB authorities in the eyes of the public and counterposing them to the people."

As A. Rukshenas reported, the KGB is making inquiries about the persons engaged in open falsification. This publication was the result of the political struggle which is under way in the republic and the actions of the forces which are endeavoring to destabilize the internal situation, complicate the already difficult atmosphere and counterpose the Lithuanian SSR KGB authorities to the current government and the USSR KGB.

Commenting on the interview with Prunskiene, the author of the publication, V. Tomkus, writes: "It is hardly likely that KGB officers who are 'patriots of independent Lithuania' would begin to attack the leader of the government had she really been 'introduced' to 'Sajudis' and was on a special assignment. As practice shows, the KGB does not give away its informers."

I would like to ask the esteemed editor and author of the publication: But should totally unconfirmed information be presented at all? To whose benefit is such a game?

Lithuanian Supreme Council Issues Decrees

On Status of Enterprises

90UN1318C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 15 Mar 90 p 3

[Decree of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic on the Status of Enterprises, Establishments, and Organizations of Union and Union-Republic Jurisdiction on Lithuanian Territory]

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council resolves:

1. To establish that all state enterprises, establishments, and organizations of union and union-republic jurisdiction on Lithuanian territory the day this decree is adopted are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian Republic.

2. In accordance with the laws of the Lithuanian Republic, state control of all the said enterprises, establishments, and organizations is entrusted to the Lithuanian Republic Government.

3. Contracts of enterprises of the Lithuanian Republic with partners from the USSR remain in force.

4. Questions concerning the acquisition of the facilities specified in clause 1 of this decree are to be decided through negotiation with the USSR.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.

Vilnius, 13 March 1990.

On USSR Military Commissariats

90UN1318D Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 15 March 90 p 3

[Decree of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic on Termination of the Activity of the USSR Defense Ministry Military Commissariats on the Territory of the Lithuanian Republic]

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council resolves:

1. To terminate the activity of the USSR Defense Ministry military commissariats as establishments of a foreign state on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic.

2. The decree takes effect as of the moment it is adopted.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.

Vilnius, 14 March 1990.

On Establishment of Working Groups

90UN1318E Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 15 Mar 90 p 3

[Decree of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic on the Establishment of Temporary Working Groups of Supreme Council Deputies]

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council resolves:

To establish temporary working groups from the ranks of Supreme Council deputies and to appoint leaders thereof:

1. Working group on restoration of the general principles of the state.

Leader—Deputy Romualdas Ozolas.

2. Working group on principles of the structure and activity of the Supreme Council.

Leader—Deputy Lenginas Shepetis.

3. Working group on principles of the structure and activity of government and other managerial institutions of the republic.

Leader—Deputy Gyadiminas Vagnoryus.

4. Working group on principles of the legal system.

Leader—Deputy Yonas Prapestis.

5. Working group on the principles of preservation of the country.

Leader—Deputy Zigmas Vayshvila.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.

Vilnius, 13 March 1990.

Hijacker Disarmed by Assault Group in Vilnius

LD1804144890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1329 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondent Yuriy Kozmin reports:

Today a passenger airliner on flight No. 2443 from Moscow to Leningrad made a landing at Vilnius Airport. A TASS correspondent was told at the Ministry of Civil Aviation that the crew had been forced to make a landing in the capital of Lithuania on the demand of Igor Kalugin, 35-40 years of age, who is registered at a psychiatric hospital of one of the towns in the environs of Moscow.

"We either fly to Vilnius, or I shall blow up the aircraft," he told the crew of the passenger liner after the aircraft had set out for Leningrad. "I belong to the caste of immortals and I have nothing to lose." Kalugin demanded that the passengers should remain in the aircraft as hostages after it had landed at Vilnius Airport, and that a meeting be organized for him with the assistant of the president of Lithuania.

After the aircraft had landed at Vilnius Airport the criminal was disarmed with the help of an assault group [gruppa zakhvata]. The motives for the seizure of the aircraft are being elucidated by the competent bodies.

Western Media Cited on Lithuanian Situation

PM1804125590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS roundup under the rubric "On Events in Lithuania": "Annoying Haste"]

[Text] 17 Apr, Washington—"Although the candidates supported by 'Sajudis' have won the overwhelming majority at the elections to the Lithuanian parliament, the decision to proclaim independence was known only to a small group of politicians," writes THE WASHINGTON POST correspondent A. Bramberg, who has been in Lithuania, writes. The members of Sajudis explained this secrecy and haste to declare the republic's independence to him by the "need to present M. Gorbachev with a fait accompli before he was given new presidential powers and by the fact that the fait accompli will force the West to recognize the new Lithuanian government."

"These arguments struck me then and still strike me by their exceptional naivety and discrepancy with previous statements," the journalist notes. On 15 February the Vilnius newspaper LITHUANIAN REVIEW, which reflects the position of 'Sajudis', published an interview with 'Sajudis' leaders and they nearly all called for caution and for holding a referendum on the independence issue. Even President V. Landsbergis expressed himself in favor of 'agreement with the Soviet Union on states which will make it possible to restore relations between two equal states without a sudden shock to either side.' But on 11 March this caution was forgotten. The next day the eminent Lithuanian philosopher and Sajudis member A. Sliogeris told me that he and his university colleagues had been 'unpleasantly struck' by how rapidly independence had been proclaimed and in general by the 'lack of pragmatism, the inclination toward sensation, and the excessive reliance on outside forces' on the part of the Lithuanian leaders. He could have added one more critical remark—the annoying reluctance to consider the feelings and sentiments of the largest groups of the non-Lithuanian population living in the republic, the Russians and Poles, who make up 18 percent of the entire population."

"Although the present impasse is fraught with dangerous consequences, practical considerations dictate the need for moderation and compromise," A. Bramberg believes. "Possibly Moscow's recent proposal to introduce a moratorium on the declaration of independence is a step in the right direction."

Canberra—The Soviet leadership's actions with regard to Lithuania "have been provoked almost entirely by the other side," the Australian CANBERRA TIMES believes. In the newspaper's opinion it is a case of "its obstinate refusal to use time and diplomacy to reach an agreement about something which both sides from the outside regarded as a possible subject for talks. And if the Soviet reaction becomes tougher that is only a small proportion of what could be done."

Madrid—Commenting on the events in Lithuania, the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS points out that "secession is a complex process which requires time and coordinated transitional measures. You cannot cancel out at a stroke the Baltic republic's membership of the USSR without causing very serious economic damage, probably to both sides."

London—"Great Britain is trying not to interfere in the dispute between Moscow and Lithuania and so far has no plans to render aid to that Baltic republic if President M. Gorbachev carries out an economic blockade," the newspaper THE GUARDIAN writes. "British Prime Minister M. Thatcher hopes that she will not have to review this position and takes steps which will disturb relations with Moscow. She continues to believe that M. Gorbachev's presence in the leading post is the most important condition for the process of peaceful change in East Europe."

Touching on the legal aspects of the problem, the newspaper notes in particular: "Britain claims that diplomatic recognition of Lithuania will be based on the criteria also used in recognizing other countries. London must satisfy itself that there is a viable government in Lithuania with full control of its territory."

Soyuz Deputies in Lithuania View Problems

90UN1458A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 Apr 90 p 2

[S. Brilev, S. Kucher report on interview with Soyuz association delegation: "Deputies From Soyuz: What We Saw in Lithuania"]

[Text] *Delegations of groups of deputies and various public organizations are going to Lithuania now one after another. Eleven members of the Soyuz association of USSR people's deputies returned from the republic recently. At a press conference on Friday they answered questions from journalists, among whom were our stringers S. Brilev and S. Kucher.*

"Our association was formed to combat the threat of growing nationalism and separatism in the name of the preservation and renewal of the federation," Colonel N. Petrushenko, a people's deputy, said. "We were invited to Lithuania by the USSR Citizens' Committee. I initially went by myself. Having familiarized myself with the situation, I called for reinforcements—10 people's deputies from Soyuz. I was astonished: The republic has set about marking out a 'Soviet-Lithuanian border'—

border signs have already been installed (in the form of wooden pegs and posts as yet). Customs control activities are not being exercised yet, it is true, although I believe that they also are being surreptitiously prepared. And the Union customs recently came across a document signed by Premier Prunskiene on the sale abroad of high-grade timber disguised as timber waste..."

[Question] The two most polar forces in Lithuania are the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) and Sajudis. What can you say about them?

"The ideas of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) are closest to our association. The defamation of the party is under way currently throughout the country. But, as I have seen for myself, the ordinary people and the workers connect their hopes precisely with the communists of this organization. I concluded my speech at a mass meeting in Snechkus, center of Lithuania's nuclear power engineering, with the words: 'If I were a nonparty individual, I would at this difficult time be joining only the Lithuanian Communist Party which supports the endeavors of the CPSU.' And these words were greeted with applause.

"As far as Sajudis is concerned, I may say that there are in its leadership many petty intriguers, not politicians. I have a great amount of material at my disposal and I can say that Sajudis is not only rocking the Baltic but is also inciting what is going on in the Transcaucasus. The atmosphere created by Sajudis is similar to the atmosphere in Stalin times. Fear and mutual suspicion reign in the republic, particularly since the enactment of the notorious Law on Criminal Responsibility for Propaganda Against the 'New State'."

Ye. Kogan, a deputy from Estonia, sees as a way out of the current situation the imposition of direct presidential rule in Lithuania.

[Question] Are you not afraid that this would lead to an escalation of tension, a growth of confrontation and, consequently, a state of emergency?

"In my view, Lithuania is itself seeking a state of emergency. It is counting on assistance from abroad. Calls for the commitment of foreign forces are being heard. And this, as you yourselves understand, could have unforeseen consequences.

"The president has taken the oath, where, however, are the actual deeds? No power can be exercised without its organs. The first thing that should be done is to strengthen the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and KGB authorities and the procuracy. It is essential to analyze the activity of the mass media; they should be affording everyone an opportunity to canvass for and against on an equal basis. There should be no alluding to the people, they should be afforded an opportunity to have their say, that is, there should be a referendum."

[Question] What further paths to a solution of the problems of a way out of the crisis are being proposed in Lithuania?

"We met with representatives of the older generation of Lithuanians," Deputy G. Tikhonov said. "These people believe that in the event of Sajudis replacing its present leader, there would be a prospect for a balanced dialogue based on the Law on the Secession of a Republic from the USSR."

[Question] The deputies of the Soyuz group consider an important direction of their sympathizers' work in Lithuania the mounting of an act of civil disobedience—boycotting the laws enacted by the new parliament.

Vilnius Peace Movement Schedules Congress

90UN1318B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 15 March 90 p 3

[Article: "Peace, Democracy, Development"]

[Text] The endeavor to preserve peace worldwide is the most humane goal of all people of good will. Lithuania in revival needs not only working hands and patriotic hearts. Like all mankind, our nation needs primarily peace. Our Lithuania must be a safe home and land which is not trampled by militarist forces and which is not oppressed by military blocs.

The peace movement in the years (decades) of stagnation was one- sided and statized. We must impart to it new national and general impetus and view it as an invigorating river in springtime, ramified, but flowing in a single direction—in the direction of humanism, national concord, and fraternity. We must endeavor to ensure that all political and public forces in Lithuania are guided in their political struggle by peaceful methods and that their programs and methods of activity correspond to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of international law.

It is essential to exert every effort to ensure that the army of occupation be withdrawn from Lithuanian territory and that nuclear weapons be removed. Our society must today even obtain full information about the Army formations in our republic and about the types thereof and the places where they are stationed. It is necessary to have done with the "closed status" of the majority of cities limiting civil diplomacy and international contacts. Lithuania must be a demilitarized, nuclear-free, and neutral state.

It is essential to assist all institutions and public movements which are at the present moment tackling problems of Army service of the young men of the republic.

The Committee of Struggle for Peace and the Peace Fund could be replaced by a new movement of Lithuania's peace supporters—a movement of various associations and pacifist organizations and groups.

We hope that all supporters of the struggle for peace will come together in this movement. Let it unite people of all nationalities living in Lithuania, young and old, and people of different professions, religious beliefs, and party affiliation.

A congress of Lithuania's peace forces will be organized in Vilnius on 28 April. We ask all who are not indifferent to Lithuania's peaceful tomorrow and who are concerned about the future—ours and that of our children—to support the congress of peace forces. Persons who are interested and groups of such persons are requested to apply to 36, Kostyushkos Street, Vilnius 232600, tel: 62-58-81, 22-45-45; 36, Barshausko Street, Kaunas 233000, tel: 74-31-95 between the hours of 6 and 11 pm.

We will expect a display of initiative on the part of public and professional organizations, schools, religious denominations, political movements, parties, and individuals. Those wishing to participate in the congress are asked to give notice prior to 10 April.

What the peace movement in Lithuania will be like in the future will depend on all of us.
[Signed] On behalf of the Lithuanian Peace Forces Organizing Committee, Ya. Ignotavichene.

Consequences of Lithuanian Independence Discussed

90UN1495A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Colonel General V. Denisov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff: "Let Us Weigh the Consequences. A Military View of the Events in Lithuania"]

[Text] **On 10 April TRUD published a conversation with A.N. Troshik, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Commission], about economic problems related to the possible withdrawal of Lithuania from the USSR. Today a military specialist shares his ideas about this.**

Certain forces in Lithuania are trying to present the Army almost as the main obstacle to an independent state. I will say at the outset: The Army is not against the self-determination of the republic. We are in favor of having each people decide its own destiny. But the main condition for making a decision is that the people be fully informed of the possible consequences. In my opinion, this is precisely where there is a shortage in the republic. As a military person I consider it my duty to express my opinion regarding this.

First of all I wish to emphasize: In my opinion, the realization of the course of today's Lithuanian leaders toward alienation is fraught with serious negative consequences for the security not only of the Baltic republics and the USSR but also for the entire European continent. I would like to speak about this candidly, understanding that this will evoke varying reactions. Well, let us argue.

Today security in Europe is based, figuratively speaking, on three pillars: military equilibrium, recognition of the inflexibility of the present boundaries, and a dynamic negotiating process for reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. And, imagine, here suddenly arises a state whose economic system and policy, including military, are not yet really known to anyone. How will this affect the existing system of European security? It is clear that questions are inevitable, and complications and destabilization are possible...

And such misgivings are already being expressed. "The separatist aspirations of the Lithuanian state are creating obstacles on the path to peaceful European development," declared, for example, the eminent West German politician K. Ewen, Bundestag deputy from the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs G. De Michelis, speaking about the processes taking place in Lithuania, emphasized that they affect the question of boundaries, which have been declared inviolable in Europe.

I think it would be a mistake to ignore these warnings. Automatically (although it is not a very good comparison) one recalls in this connection the question of the unification of the two German states. As soon as the question of a unified Germany came up the revisionist forces became more active and a certain growth of neofascist attitudes followed. And what kind of alarm did this evoke, for example, in Poland, when the question of the inviolability of its western borders has been raised with new acuteness?...

It seems to me that today nobody can guarantee that Lithuania's hasty withdrawal from the USSR will not enliven the aggressive intentions of the revisionist forces with respect to it. Naturally, the question arises: Militarily, can Lithuania oppose any territorial encroachments and thus make a contribution to the overall security? To count on this would be unrealistic, to say the least. There is an immense distance, as they say, from the unconstitutional steps of forming detachments to "guard the region" that are now being taken by the Lithuanian leaders to the creation of any kind of combat-ready army. For this requires the corresponding material and technical base, personnel, military training institutions, military equipment, and arms. As we know, the republic does not have a single one of these elements of defense capability.

Someone might say in this connection: Once it has separated, Lithuania will be able to establish military cooperation with other states or enter on the path of adhering to a policy of neutrality and thus provide for its own security. But, as historical experience shows, "newcomers" cannot count on being quickly introduced into the existing interstate military and political structures, and a policy of neutrality, as is shown by the practice of those European states that adhere to it today, is also impossible without making expenditures to maintain a modern army. One cannot but take into account the fact that Lithuania belongs to a geographical region that is traditionally restless in terms of military concerns.

I should especially like to mention the negative consequences of such hasty actions for our entire state. It is no secret that at the present time the Baltic territory is reliably protected by troops of the Baltic Military District and forces of the Baltic Fleet. One need not be a strategist to understand that Lithuania's withdrawal will create a certain breech in the integrated grouping and will violate the signal, command, and communications systems. Many routes of access for our troops to western borders will be cut off and it will be difficult to monitor shipping in the central part of the Baltic. And this will significantly complicate the defense of the Baltic coast if it is necessary (and under any circumstances we must not rule that out), as well as prompt deployment of the forces of the fleet.

An important role in protecting the industrial base of the entire northwestern region of the country from possible air and missile attacks is played by anti-aircraft defense subdivisions and units currently stationed on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. It is quite obvious that separating them from the current system for anti-aircraft defense of the territory of the republic is fraught with the threat of violation of the unified anti-aircraft defense system not only of our country but also of the entire northern flank of the Warsaw Pact.

In this event there would be many problems related to supporting the troops and naval forces stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast. Considerable harm would be caused to the interests of USSR security.

From what has been said, I think it should be clear that Lithuania's withdrawal from the USSR without taking all the consequences into account, if it is done, cannot but entail considerable new expenditures for defense needs. This means that the social programs directed toward improving the life of the Soviet people are in jeopardy. And in this sense I think that such ill-considered and hasty actions can be regarded as a blow to perestroyka and the plans for improving the well-being of the people.

There arises, naturally, the question of compensation for expenditures. On the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, in addition to purely military facilities, there is a developed system of social, cultural, and domestic services for the Army. It includes residential buildings, kindergarten, polyclinics, stores, and so forth. More than R1.3 billion have been spent on creating it. It would take four to five years to move these facilities from the territory of the republic and to build them in a new place and also, without exaggeration, colossal expenditures. So even with what might be called the most loyal approach, Lithuania's legitimate share in reimbursement for possible expenditures would amount to many millions. Unfortunately, the current Lithuanian leaders are not telling the people of the republic about this.

At the present time about 10,000 pensioners of the Ministry of Defense are living on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR. And, taking family members into account, they would amount to 25,000. They have housing. About R20 million are spent annually for their pension support. If these people are unable or unwilling to remain in Lithuania it will be necessary to construct no less than 10,000 apartments for them in other regions of the country. And, as calculations show, this will take more than R120 million. Understandably, the question of compensation for these expenditures will inevitably arise.

I am convinced that the forces that have now come to power in Lithuania are acting not only irresponsibly but also in a less than moral way by encouraging young people to evade service and by the same token, inciting them to crime.

These, as it seems to us, are some of the facets of this very complex problem. But that which has been said, in my opinion, allows us to draw the following conclusion: The announcement of the current Supreme Council of Lithuania to the effect that its decisions completely correspond to the interests of Lithuania, the Soviet Union, and other European countries is nothing other than an attempt to disguise the real aims of the authors of these hasty decisions. Only one who does not consider the profound interests of the peoples of the republic, Lithuanian and non-Lithuanian, their security and well-being, could act so thoughtlessly and short-sightedly. If at this point they do not listen to the voice of reason, the events could have serious consequences for all.

RSFSR Shipments to Lithuania Detailed

PM1804133990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Industry, Transport, and Construction Department report under the rubric "At Readers' Request": "With the Mark 'Made in RSFSR'"]

[Text] The message from USSR President M. Gorbachev and USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N. Ryzhkov to the leading organs of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] was published Saturday. In particular it contained a warning about the possible suspension of shipments to Lithuania from other Union republics of those types of output which are sold on the foreign market for freely convertible currency. Many readers are asking the editorial office to state what the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] delivers to Lithuania and at what prices.

The level of shipments of potential export output can be judged by the figures announced to us at the RSFSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee]. In 1988 Lithuania received the following from our republic: 385,000 tonnes of rolled ferrous metal, 68,000 tonnes of steel pipes, 13 million tonnes of oil, 817,000 cubic meters of merchantable wood, 318,000 cubic meters of lumber, 5.1 billion cubic meters of gas...

The plans for this year include shipments of 13.1 million tonnes of oil, 7 billion cubic meters of gas, 5,400 tonnes of synthetic rubber, 86,500 tires for trucks, 6,700 tonnes of polyethylene, 6,500 tonnes of caustic soda, and 26,100 tonnes of soda ash. Let us note that we are naming only a few of the goods and products which Russia could sell on the foreign market.

It is important to note that our domestic prices are quite often considerably lower than world prices. Thus, according to figures for 1989, (PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO No. 3, 1990) a tonne of oil delivered to the Baltic republics cost R30 at domestic prices and R64.5 in world prices; the figures for gas were R21 and R38 and for diesel fuel R68 and R78 respectively. At the same time the stockraising products in which the Baltic region specializes are delivered to the all-Union fund at prices higher than world prices. Thus a tonne of meat and meat products at domestic prices costs R1,980 while at world prices they cost only R800; the figures for dairy products (as the cost of butter) are R3,500 and R750 respectively...

If we are speaking of the intersectorial balance throughout the country as a whole, in 1987 the cost of goods imported into Lithuania was R6,968 million at domestic prices and of goods exported R5,870 million. The negative balance reached R1,098 million.

The distortions in regional policy have led to a great differentiation in material and technical provision and the capital-labor ratio. Thus, power capacities per 100 hectares of sown land in the RSFSR total an average of 336 horsepower while in the Lithuanian SSR the figure is 746.

The discrepancy is just as great at the level of land reclamation, which has been fully implemented at the state's expense. The level of reclaimed land in the Baltic republics has reached three-fourths of their total area as against 2.9 percent in Orel Oblast, for instance, and 3.9 percent in Ryazan Oblast.

To this day many regions of Russia, surpassing some Union republics in terms of their volume of production of the national income per capita and exporting a substantial proportion of their resources, lag substantially in social development, living standard, and the population's provision with food and services. Should we be surprised at the statements of the present Lithuanian leaders embarking on confrontation with the RSFSR and the other republics that they do not intend to break off existing economic ties...

Further on Tanks Entering Vilnius

90UN1403A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 14, 4 Apr 90 p 11

[Commentary including report on 24 March interview at the Supreme Soviet building in Vilnius with Professor V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, by O. Moroz under the rubric "Facts, Problems, and Judgments": "A Spring Night in Vilnius"]

[Text] Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, promised to receive me for a conversation on Friday 23 March at 2200 (such a time is not at all uncommon considering that in recent days he has been working almost around the clock). At about 2130 my colleague Pyatras Keydoshyus and I took our places outside his waiting room. There was little hope for a meeting right away: The Supreme Soviet was still in session. In addition there was an unexpected announcement that he would be making a live broadcast at 2200 for Canadian television. Excusing himself to the deputies, he left the session. He also apologized to me:

"I am going to be working endlessly today. So wait around, and we will talk a little..."

Pyatras went home to sleep—he had important business in the morning—while I immediately moved into the waiting room onto a soft, spacious modern divan.

Landsbergis returned at about midnight but again occupied himself with more immediate business, as I understand it (when I asked him questions earlier in the day, he told me firmly, "This is not immediate business. I am sorry.").

I did not especially insist on being received immediately, hoping that the flock of journalists who follow Landsbergis and his assistants everywhere would thin out with time and it would be possible to speak in peace.

And this was most important for me: A peaceful conversation. So that we could move beyond the bounds of Landsbergis' usual steadfast, concrete "We are a separate state! Leave us alone!" and catch, if not in words then in his voice or his intonation, some doubt as to the correctness and finality of the 11 March decision. There are no people without doubts. And for a literary man, doubts are more interesting than any of the other manifestations of human nature.

There were two secretaries in Landsbergis' waiting room. Regina, the more imposing one, is the personal secretary of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. She was also here under Brazauskas, and before that. The lesser of the two, Yadviga I believe, is Landsbergis' assistant from Sajudis. She is a recent addition to the staff of the Supreme Soviet, as of 12 March. She is something of a reviewer, an assistant.

People were constantly entering Landsbergis' office. They entered without reporting, without questions to the secretary, and without knocking on the door (by the way, the office is huge—a knock would not be heard from where the master of the office sits). The visitors were of two types. The first were elegant bearded men in civilian suits. These are deputies and leaders of Sajudis (by the way, many combine both roles). The second were young kids with the look of athletic students (jackets, jeans, and running shoes). These are Sajudis activists, and several of them are already employees in the apparat of the Supreme Soviet.

At about 0100, Kyucharyants, the correspondent with MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, began to telephone. From Yadviga's first answers I knew what they are talking about—my journalist colleague was asking if Landsbergis would receive him on Sunday. He insisted that he be given an answer immediately. At that moment Landsbergis was receiving two American senators. According to all the canons of secretarial etiquette, she should not have opened the door. But the fellow asked Yadviga for help (although there were crowds of such journalists asking for help even in the parliament building itself!), and she decided to make an attempt, although she knew in advance that the matter was hopeless. Two minutes later she returned from the office and again lifted the receiver:

"Unfortunately I cannot help you in any way. He is ignoring me. That means that I must leave and go back to my own area."

That is a conventional sign. But then something completely inconceivable happened. Apparently the journalist continued to urge Yadviga, and she went into the office a second time. The result was the same.

"No, he is ignoring me."

With any Moscow secretary the whole business would have taken exactly five seconds: Three infuriated interjections, and the receiver would have been thrown onto the cradle.

At about 0130 there was some activity, and more people than usual appeared in the waiting room. There was general conversation, a little agitated. They were speaking Lithuanian, but from snatches of Russian and English phrases that someone said on the telephone, I learned that something was happening on the Kaunas-Vilnius highway.

A little later Yadviga approached me:

"I am sorry that we have made you wait so long. But apparently the chairman will not be able to receive you. The problem is that tanks are approaching from Kaunas and Vilnius."

"Tanks?" I fell back into the divan. My drowsiness was snatched away from me.

"Yes, tanks, very many tanks. The residents are telephoning us about it. Someone has counted more than 80 of them."

Had they really sent tanks again? I was seized by horror.

"You should not have done it!" I said despite myself.

"Done what?" Yadviga did not understand.

"What you did on 11 March. You had to do just what you wanted—for economic and political freedom! Why was it necessary to force events?"

"But someone had to begin! How long could we put up with all this?"

Yadviga cried. One of the young men began shutting the curtains on both sides. Just in case. Blackout.

I left to wander up and down the floors. The whole building had already heard the news about the tanks. Everywhere there were groups of journalists and Supreme Soviet workers. They were talking. There was no panic. They were all awaiting the outcome with weary curiosity.

A "Zhiguli" flew out of the darkness on the square in front of the building and raced straight to the doors. Some fellow jumped from it without turning off the headlights or the engine, rushed like a bullet past the startled militiamen and, leaping five steps at a time, flew up to the third floor. There, picturesquely making a fool of himself, he threw himself to the floor at full length directly in front of Landsbergis' office. Just like a runner in ancient Greece bringing bad news. Recovering his breath, he sat up in Turkish fashion on the carpeted floor and, striking himself with his fists, pronounced one word:

"Tanks!"

He thought that he was the first to warn us of the danger.

At 0225 Landsbergis left his office.

"Has the situation become more complicated?" I asked him.

"Yes..." he answered unwillingly. "You know, we would just be losing time if we stopped to talk with you. If they arrest me, who would print all this? Who needs to publish what a prisoner says?"

"Have you tried to get in touch with Gorbachev?"

"No..." He shrugged his shoulders vaguely.

At 0230 Landsbergis ascended the speaker's rostrum of the Supreme Soviet (the parliament was still in session—Prunskiene was presenting the candidates for minister). He reported to the deputies that a column of tanks was approaching the city. Their intention is not known. He has no information. He had repeatedly asked the military leadership to inform him of any troop movements on the territory of the republic, but as before they were not doing it despite all the protests the Supreme Soviet might lodge.

The Supreme Soviet decided by a vote that if, "as a result of certain forcible steps" its "rights to function and freely reflect the will of the people were to be limited," that it would endow citizen Stasys Lozoraitis, representative of the independent republic of Lithuania in Washington and at the Holy See, with special powers to represent the restored republic of Lithuania.

Apparently recalling my question, Landsbergis asked the deputies whether he should telephone Gorbachev.

Exactly one person grinned and waved his hand—such was the general reaction of the audience.

The deputies rose from their places. An atmosphere of mischievous gaiety broke out. Someone launched a paper airplane, and then another... Someone whistled... There was a feeling of being in a student auditorium relaxing immediately after some unusually important and serious action. They had been allowed to play at democracy, and now the toy was being taken from them.

The telephone continued to ring. The column was approaching. Thirty kilometers... twenty... ten...

Prime minister Kazimera Prunskiene walked past the journalists and, aware of her sacred obligation to keep the press informed of the matter, explained without waiting for questions:

"In five minutes we will have information as to whether the tanks are going around the city—to one of the garrisons—or are crossing through the city. There are very many of them—80 to 100."

For the most part the journalists speak English, but Prunskiene spoke in Russian. Everyone understood.

"The tanks have stopped!" Yadviga's face shone with happiness.

"They have stopped?" I asked her to repeat. "Who stopped them?"

"The militia."

"Did they block off the road? Did they put trucks and busses in the way?"

"No, they gave a signal for them to stop. Talks are under way right now."

Blessed naivete. As though tanks could be stopped with a militiaman's traffic baton. It was explained afterwards: The lead tanks stopped at the entrance to the city to wait for the rest—the column was stretched out for kilometers.

A few minutes later it became clear: There was no more talk of going around the city. The tanks were coming directly here.

Mechanically I felt in my pocket for my press card, and I immediately laughed inwardly at my gesture. Who does not know what would happen! Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles approach. Camouflaged boys with assault rifles filter into every nook and cranny and scatter through the stairs and the floors. You get a fist in the teeth, a rifle butt in the back, and a boot—a little lower, and only afterward do they try to figure out who and what you are.

"We would like your advice," asked Yadviga, approaching. "Should the name Lukyanov be spelled with a soft sign in it? We want to send him a telegram."

Yes, it should. The soft sign is absolutely necessary. I was glad that I could help them even with something like this.

Foreign correspondents at their tiny computers hurried to finish printing their reports up to the line, "And the tanks have arrived at the parliament building..." Afterwards everyone gathered at the staircase gallery of the third floor and tensely looked through the building lobby's aquarium-glass wall at what was happening on the darkened square in front of them.

At approximately 0340 I went outside. A continuous hum of engines already hung in the air. The tanks would become visible at any moment. The lead tank appeared, turned about on its tracks, and headed straight toward me, splashing the bright light of its headlamps in my eyes. I shrank back mechanically. Then I saw that it was a common taxi. My imagination had been playing tricks with me. Disgusted, I walked to the entrance of the building. In the meantime the hum had not grown weaker, although it had not gotten stronger either.

About 10 minutes later I went out again. The hum was noticeably softer. Some people were running toward me. I grabbed one fellow by the sleeve:

"What is it? Where are they?"

"They have set off for the garrison to the north of the city," he answered breathlessly, pointing somewhere into the darkness.

Thank God! It was over.

"Has the danger of an attack passed?" I jokingly asked Prunskiene when I saw her again on the third floor.

"Yes it has passed, but no good will come of it," she answered seriously.

"Do you think that this was a show of force?"

"What else? And what a way to do it—to drive around the city in tanks! They leave tracks and damage the pavement." She poked a finger in the direction of her beautiful polished shoes.

I could see immediately that she is a thrifty worker. The prime minister. She worries about the pavement.

"What kind of fool thinks it necessary to put on a show of force?" said Arturas, Landsbergis' press assistant, who showed up just then. "It is clear enough that Lithuania cannot oppose the Union militarily. What is there to demonstrate?"

The show was finally over: All the tanks entered the grounds of the garrison. There was general relief.

Afterwards it was said that they were not tanks but tankettes, light tanks, "tanks for transporting an assault force."

"Armored personnel carriers? Infantry fighting vehicles?" I asked.

"No, they had caterpillar tracks."

If one were to judge by the rumble, that was probably correct (Footnote) (As we reported to you, on the night of 23-24 March, a column of airborne fighting vehicles moved across Vilnius—a regiment of airborne troops). The cab driver who drove me to the hotel at 0600 showed me the route along which the column passed, not far from the building of the Supreme Soviet. In one place the route ran under a bridge that, undoubtedly, intensified the rumble.

Whatever did happen, I did not see any of it with my own eyes.

It was 1600. In the waiting room a lanky correspondent appeared in a shirt without a coat, and addressing himself to an unknown person he said:

"I work at the newspaper L'ESPRESSO. My newspaper will go to press in two hours. I need a comment from the president about the tanks."

Yadviga blocked the entrance into the office:

"The chairman is busy at the moment. He is working. He is thinking"—and she pointed with her finger to her head. "He is writing a response to Gorbachev. It is very important. He cannot be bothered."

"But my newspaper cannot go out without a comment from the president!" groaned the correspondent, as though from a physical pain.

Who would have thought just a month ago that one of the largest Italian newspapers would not be able to go out without a few words from a professor of music, a specialist on Chyurlenis?

"Get a comment from Prunskiene," I advised him.

His face brightened instantly.

"Okay!" he says and rushed out of the waiting room.

Landsbergis came out 30 minutes later and gave Regina a sheet to type written in small handwriting—response to Gorbachev on the occasion of registering volunteers who, if needed, could take part in the maintenance of public order. I immediately joined him:

"I believe that it is finally time for my appointment."

He nodded at me readily. The correspondent from L'ESPRESSO joined me, apparently unable to find Prunskiene. First Landsbergis said a few words to him: "I just wrote a telegram to Gorbachev: We do not have any sort of armed formations. There is nothing to do here for tanks that approach the capital of the republic of Lithuania. Why so many tanks? It would be enough for him to send 30 submachine gunners here, and they could seize everyone and everything. We will not put up resistance."

He and I sat down to talk near his writing table. In the light his face looked grayish-white and swollen from lack of sleep. He immediately began to answer my questions briefly and stiffly, and this shortness and stiffness contrasted unpleasantly with the mild and friendly manner in which, all evening and night, he promised to receive me for a unconstrained and detailed conversation.

Conversation With Vytautas Landsbergis, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania

[Moroz] Respected chairman! I respect the right of all the people inhabiting Lithuania—and all the other republics of our country too—to desire to live better than they do now and to determine their fate themselves. It is only a question of the way to achieve that—should it be the way that the leadership of Lithuania has chosen? Here I have some doubts. Do you not have any? Do you believe that the steps you have taken are the only correct ones?

[Landsbergis] In my opinion we have done everything correctly.

[Moroz] The question of secession is a serious one. It seems to me that the time has come to stop following the tradition of past rebels and revolutionaries when you try to resolve it and instead approach it on the basis of reason and law. Most importantly, it must be the will of an absolute majority of the people, and the procedure for expressing that will and for withdrawing the republic from the Union should be carefully thought out and legally formulated (the USSR Supreme Soviet is occupied with this issue now). Why do you not wish to wait for the law on secession and a new Union treaty? Why have you preferred unilateral actions over a bilateral examination of the issue?

[Landsbergis] Because the law on secession that is being drawn up has nothing to do with us. We are not a member of the Union. We did not join the Union—we were seized and annexed. There is no reason for us to put ourselves in an ambiguous position. All the more because the law stipulates such conditions that no one could ever leave the Union in accordance with it.

[Moroz] What do you mean?

[Landsbergis] For instance, the requirement to submit the right to one's freedom to the approval of all the other republics.

[Moroz] But the law has not been adopted yet. It is only a draft. You could take part in the discussion and put forward your own demands for it. It is possible that they would accommodate you.

[Landsbergis] We have seen how they accommodated us when other laws were being discussed. In addition, if we make any small concessions, we will put ourselves in an ambiguous position—as though we acknowledged the authority of the Union's jurisdiction over Lithuania.

[Moroz] But such acknowledgements have already been made repeatedly: The Supreme Soviet of Lithuania has repeatedly voted for decisions which were adopted at the level of the Union.

[Landsbergis] That is so, but you yourself know what that voting was worth. It was not worth anything.

[Moroz] You believe that 50 years ago Lithuania was occupied, and the decision to join the USSR was made under conditions of occupation and are therefore invalid. You agree, however, that the course of history has in general gone this way: In the distant past (it is not important how long ago), questions of secession, merging, etc. were as a rule decided in an unsophisticated manner—by force; and only later, to the degree that civilization began to take hold, did people speak of law and acknowledge a legal system established at some point by fire and sword (in Russia, for instance, the rule of the house of the Romanovs was considered legitimate even though it was clear that the Romanovs did not come to power through general elections). Fifty years is a fairly long time. A new legal reality has taken shape which also must be considered, no matter what we may say about the sources of that reality. Is that not so?

[Landsbergis] Those times, when power was seized by force and it was considered acceptable, ended here for us in 1918-1920. But then in 1940 we were returned to those primitive times. And now we are pulling ourselves out of them. But they argue with us, "No, we have force—that means you belong to us, so do not try to free yourselves." I see that your country cannot free itself from the principle of might makes right.

[Moroz] Are you aware that your actions are driving Gorbachev into a corner?

[Landsbergis] It is not me—Comrade Stalin drove him there. Comrade Stalin put your whole country in a very bad position. We wish to help that country dissociate itself and free itself from that criminal heritage. But you reproach us, "Why are you trying to help us become more civilized?"

[Moroz] When I say that you are driving Gorbachev into a corner, this is what I have in mind. As I understand it, if the president of the USSR is to agree to the secession of Lithuania in the way that you insist it must be done, it means that he agrees to the disintegration of the state (Lithuania will quickly be followed by Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, etc.). In principle one might imagine that in the future, in accordance with a legal procedure that has been worked out, some republics will secede and remain in a federation or a confederation or even leave entirely. But this process, of course, should not take on the character of a disintegration of the country. I expect that many leaders will agree with that. As a result he must act decisively and rigidly.

[Landsbergis] If you believe that the republics will begin to secede one after another, that is your business. Personally I do not know how the matter will go. And why is Gorbachev in such a difficult position? Was the British Government in a difficult position when it was necessary to free the colonies of the British Empire? Were the French in a difficult position when it was necessary to free Indochina and especially Algeria? Of course General de Gaulle had a complex task, but he was equal to it. Should not Mikhail Gorbachev try to solve it in the same spirit? Perhaps he is not equal to it. If so, it is a pity.

[Moroz] If you were in Gorbachev's place, would you solve it?

[Landsbergis] Well, I would try.

[Moroz] Do not your political instincts tell you that you will suffer defeat on the road you have taken?

[Landsbergis] I do not believe that the most important thing is whether I or my friends suffer defeat. Do you think that the Decembrists suffered defeat?

[Moroz] In one sense, yes.

[Landsbergis] Yes. And so we should not do what they did?

[Moroz] I do not speak about that—I ask what your prediction is.

[Landsbergis] I do not predict whether the outcome will be successful or not. I simply see that we are following the right road and going in the right direction. We are acting humanely and according to reason and conscience. We do not have any strength. At least of the type that is valued here and in the east of Europe. Perhaps in all of the world. But we have a strength which is not valued here, in the East, but which is valued somewhere in the world. It is the strength of conviction and truth.

[Moroz] How far in advance did you look when you decided to undertake the 11 March step? Did you foresee the retaliatory steps which have been taken so far?

[Landsbergis] Not at all. But on the whole we foresaw that there would be opposition. We had already been threatened with some measures in advance—economic difficulties, instigation of hostility between nationalities... And so to some degree we were prepared for this.

[Moroz] What did you feel when you saw Gorbachev's first telegram, in which he sent you the decree on Lithuania of the Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies?

[Landsbergis] A feeling of regret. The Third Congress made a political error which has put Mikhail Gorbachev in a difficult position. In a way it has obligated him to defend the sovereignty of the Union over a country it seized. It is an absurdity. In the 20th century this kind of sovereignty cannot be. It is a sovereignty of the Stone Age.

[Moroz] How far are you prepared to go in your confrontation with the center?

[Landsbergis] We have no such notion—the center.

[Moroz] With Moscow.

[Landsbergis] For us, Moscow is the capital of a big neighbor with whom we would like to live in friendship and harmony, as good neighbors. But not as subordinates, and not as the hired hands of a land owner.

[Moroz] At what point will you be prepared to repudiate your plans for the secession of Lithuania and, as they say, "back off a step."

[Landsbergis] I cannot imagine such a situation.

[Moroz] But tanks just filed past this building. Many tanks.

[Landsbergis] So what? What can they do? It is an absurdity. Of course they can remove us and crush us, but that is not a resolution of the issue.

[Moroz] Are you able to predict how events will develop? What will happen to Lithuania in the next six months? In the next year?

[Landsbergis] I believe that we will conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union. We will achieve a partial solution of the issues which are awaiting settlement. There might even be a complete resolution. It will depend on the development of events in the Soviet Union. And on the world context, of course.

I believe that the world around us will soon be convinced that we will not harm Gorbachev but help him. We have always helped the Soviet Union to wake up...

In general, Gorbachev has handled the matter well up to this point. And now they're trying to put him in an awkward position. Specifically in relation to Lithuania... Mikhail Gorbachev is a man who is quite worthy of respect. But we have often gotten the impression that he rises above his political surroundings, but that those surroundings pull him down...

As you can see, the natural and detailed conversation which I had been counting on did not take place. Perhaps Landsbergis' general exhaustion had an effect, or perhaps it was the nervous tension he experienced as a result of the tanks. More likely, from the beginning I should not have hoped for a journalistically interesting, relaxed conversation concerning those particular questions which I prepared for Landsbergis. They were not a subject for discussion for him. Landsbergis believed that we could discuss anything we pleased except for the 11 March decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

Well, each publicist has his successes and failures. But what is my small journalistic failure in comparison with the danger of great damage which our common cause—perestroyka—might suffer as a result of the question of Lithuania?

I believe that Lithuania has committed its share of the kind of hasty, ill-considered actions that can send everything to pieces. A double responsibility has fallen upon us.

...Ten days have passed since that memorable March night. They have not brought any relief. In all the conversations I have had these days with my friends and acquaintances, the subject has always been Lithuania. The questions are "What is the answer? How will it all end?" I do not envy those who must resolve this problem.

Last Sunday two documents were published, two appeals from the president of the USSR to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania and to its people. In them it says that the 11 March decision of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania "has led all of us to a critical juncture." The president suggests that the Supreme Soviet "immediately... revoke the illegal acts it has passed," after which discussion of all issues may begin. This is a path. A path out of the deadlock. I believe, however, that there is little hope that the acts will really be revoked, at least in the immediate future. Which means that the opposition will continue. The list of mutual threats and insults, both great and small, will continue to grow. But how long before a limit is reached?

Estonia Continues To Form New Government

LD1804143190 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT 18 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloverian]

[Text] Tallinn April 18 TASS—The Estonian Supreme Soviet session continues discussing candidates for ministerial posts in the republican government headed by 39-year-old Edgar Savisaar.

Candidates for ministers of finance, interior, material resources, justice and social matters were discussed on Tuesday. All, except Enn Rooze for the finance minister, were approved.

Rooze was asked what sum of money he would earmark for maintaining a shadow cabinet if he became minister—a question recalling his demand some time ago that the republican government should finance the shadow cabinet formed by the republican Popular Front. Rooze's attempts at evading a direct answer showed him for what he was—a champion of one-way democracy—and left him without a portfolio.

The formation of the government continues. Prime Minister Savisaar's proposals are not being taken on trust. When a candidate for the minister of material resources was discussed in parliamentary commissions, participants in the debate said they would only approve the man if he promised to keep the present deputy. The demand was motivated by their concern for stability in ministerial activities.

Savisaar has his own point of view on the matter. The newly- appointed foreign minister Lennart Meri began his work by proposing that all ministry staffers should hand in their resignations in keeping with the prime minister's words that it should be a completely new government.

Estonian Supreme Soviet Approves Officials

LD1904091790 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Summary] Today's session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet endorsed the following ministerial nominations: Arvo Kuddo will be the new minister of social affairs; Juri Raidla the justice minister; and (Aleksander Sikkal) the new minister of material resources.

Estonian Assembly Discusses Transition Issues

LD1804192590 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 18 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn APRIL 18 TASS—The Estonian parliament today discussed bills "On the Temporary Order of Government of Estonia" and "On the Symbols of Estonia."

The bills, just as the Supreme Soviet's March 30 resolution "On the State Status of Estonia," proceed from the idea that Estonia has been occupied since 1940.

The transition period was declared on March 30 to "restore the constitutional bodies of power of the Estonian republic."

Throughout the period, the temporary order should replace the republic's fundamental law, and the present state symbols of Estonia have been proposed to be replaced by the national ones.

The parliament passed a resolution on these issues, regarding the discussion of the bills as the first reading, and set up a commission to analyses deputies' proposals and prepare for the second reading.

Estonian Ban on Communists Protested

PM1604233590 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 3

[Own correspondent S. Tarakanov report under "Fact and Commentary" rubric: "Ban on Profession?"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted a decree on the partial depoliticization of law-enforcement organs, while the Central Committee Secretariat (of the independent Estonian Communist Party) has adopted a resolution ending party organizations' activities in law-enforcement organs and a corresponding instruction on membership. Here is what people have been saying about this:

P. Panfilov, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee which advocates organizational and ideological unity with the CPSU:

"We discussed the emergent situation at the Central Committee plenum. We unanimously deemed the decree to be illegal and invalid, since it constitutes blatant interference in the CPSU's internal party affairs. We instructed communist deputies in the republic's parliament to discuss this illegal act at the next session and to strive to get it repealed on the grounds that it is not within the jurisdiction of the state organ of power at a time when we lack a law on parties in the USSR.

"It was decided to consider the resolution of the Central Committee Secretariat (of the autonomous Estonian Communist Party) to be antiparty and aimed at doing away with CPSU organizations within law-enforcement organs, excluding their workers from the party, and banning them from their profession.

"We have instructed primary party organizations at courts, prosecutor's offices, and internal affairs and state security organs to be guided by the CPSU Statutes."

V. Purro, chief of the Tallinn City Internal Affairs Administration:

"At a 12 April administrative party meeting we decided to suspend our work, retain [ostavit u sebya] our party cards, register [stat na uchet] with the Morskoy Rayon Committee (which upholds CPSU positions), and pay our membership dues. And everyone would be entitled to decide for themselves whether they would join the autonomous Estonian Communist Party or not.

"Our people have been put in a very difficult position. The decree not only attacks the existing party structure, but forces communists to give up their ideological convictions for the sake of a job. The decision to suspend the party organization's activity was dictated by a desire to retain militia personnel and avert the possibility of the militia's work becoming disorganized."

Commentary by Our Own Correspondent

Indeed, the situation is unusual. Both the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Central Committee Secretariat (of the autonomous Estonian Communist Party) were clearly in a hurry and have merely caused confusion in the ranks of the law-enforcement organs. It seems that they have taken the concept of depoliticization literally. Yet under a multiparty system it means, above all, changing the functions of political departments rather than doing away with party structures. All the more so as there are no legal grounds for so doing. A cable to the republic's internal affairs minister from the chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Political Department stated that the decree contravenes Soviet and Estonian SSR legislation.

Problems, Cost of Estonian Currency Plan Viewed

PM1704142790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Leonid Levitskiy report: "Estonian Currency"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium has heard a report from R. Otsason, president of the Bank of Estonia, on the republic's readiness to switch to its own currency.

The head of the bank has been empowered to sign a contract with a foreign firm to print the national currency—the kroon. Necessary amounts of foreign exchange will be set aside for this purpose. The preparations for the switchover to Estonian currency should be complete by 24 December this year...

A few hours after the Presidium session an agreement on printing the kroon was signed in the palace on Toompea Hill—the government building. Estonia was represented by Finance Minister E. Myandmaa and R. Otsason. The name of the firm's representative is a secret, as is the name of the firm and the country from which it comes. Secrecy was part of the contract—as if the secret can be kept for long... So far it is known that producing the kroon will cost $2.5 million. Payment will be spread over [vyplacheny v rassrochku] two and a half years. According to R. Otsason, the deal is advantageous to the republic. Admittedly, there will be only enough krooni printed for two or three years. In order to maintain a normal money supply, it will be necessary to supplement the supply of cash [bankovskaya nalichnost]—that is, it will be necessary to print further bills [assignatsii] redeemable for foreign currency.

All bills irrespective of their value (1, 2, 5, 10, 25, or 100 krooni) will be the same size—slightly larger than our 10-ruble bill.

Inhabitants of Estonia are most concerned of all about when krooni will appear and on what terms they will be exchanged for rubles. The timetable has been set—the first wage packets of 1991 will be paid in krooni. But the exchange procedure has not yet been determined. As R. Otsason noted, this is a difficult task: Workers' interests must not suffer, but nor must we allow rubles to flood onto the local market from outside. So there is yet another new addition to the various conflicts—the confrontation between the ruble and the kroon.

The fractional unit—the sent—will be minted by the Tallinn Jewelry Plant.

Work of Baltic Naval Border Patrol Described

PM1804195790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Samsonov article: "Alarming Wind of Pursuit"]

[Excerpt] "I order you to guard the state border"—with those words ships of the USSR Border Guards' naval units put out to sea. They were heard on board our border guard vessel too. And the tall outline of the ancient city's towers and spires were soon disappearing in the mist.

"Our vessel has been tasked with defending the state border in the Tallinn area," Captain Third Rank N. Gerasimov, commander of the border guard vessel, said. "It is the most difficult area in the sector covered by our unit. It is distinguished by its proximity to a neighboring state's territorial waters, and by intensive shipping traffic, which includes foreign shipping."

The state border. I listened to the commander but kept looking ahead, where our ship's course lay. I wanted to see the line I had been shown on the map. But it is invisible, and only the border vessels protecting its inviolability are a reminder of its existence.

Once we turned the border into a solid wall, impenetrable from either side. But times change, and we are opening our doors ever wider to those who visit us with good intentions—they are welcome.

Moving along the motherland's invisible border, we contacted vessels traveling to and from the port of Tallinn, ascertained their names and courses, and warned them what would happen if they violated the demands of border procedure. Was this, perhaps, just the usual caution? Of course not. Let us not forget that the NATO states are in no hurry to reduce funding for intelligence purposes, and such funding has even been increased recently in certain areas.

One other point. The situation in the Baltic today is very difficult. In nearby Lithuania the very concept of the inviolability of our state's borders has become a subject for emotion and adventurist decisions. What is the border guards' attitude to this?

"Recently I've felt that the unit personnel have taken a clearer and more serious attitude to concepts such as the border and the motherland. The political events in Lithuania have forced many people to look differently at those concepts," Captain Third Rank A. Shukputov, deputy chief of the Political Department, told me before putting out to sea. That is just one characteristic, incidentally. As Akhmetzhan Mauleshevich told me, the number of unit members seeking places in military colleges has doubled in comparison with last year. [passage omitted]

Riga Reportedly To Be Baltic Market Headquarters

LD1904052990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0233 GMT 19 Apr 90

[From the "120 Minutes" program]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A report has arrived from Riga that this city will host the Council of Cooperation and Executive Commission of the Baltic market. The decision on setting up such an organization was signed by the heads of state of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

According to the agreement, a single information network will be created. The resolution of goods turnover and the introduction of national currencies and customs rules are also envisaged. A special fund of the Baltic market is envisaged for aid in emergency situations, for instance, in the case of a blockade by the Soviet Union. Kazimieras Prunskiene, the Lithuanian premier, disclosed this. She is presently in Norway, where, in her words, the possibility of the purchase of Norwegian oil will be [word indistinct]. [video shows Lithuanian Supreme Council in session]

Estonian Priest, Housekeeper Found Murdered

AU1904093090 Paris AFP in English 0656 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 19 (AFP)—An Estonian priest and his housekeeper have been murdered, possibly because of his work in investigating the deportation of Estonians to Stalin's prison camps, journalists said Thursday.

The badly-mutilated bodies of Harold Meri, a protestant priest in his 70's, and his housekeeper, Valve Klein, were found last Saturday in a field near the town of Turi, central Estonia, the local journalists said. The priest appeared to have been tortured before being killed.

He had not been seen since April 4 and his house was destroyed by fire two days later, though nothing appeared to have been stolen.

The priest had been compiling a list of Estonians deported by the NKVD, Stalin's secret police in the 1940's and 50's, and might have come across the names of people responsible for the deportations, the journalists said.

He was reported to have received anonymous telephone threats.

The parliament in Tallinn has set up a special commission to look into what political implications the murders might have.

Estonian Mothers Returning Fugitive Servicemen

PM1704194790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by special correspondent Captain Second Rank S. Turchenko: "Estonia: Mothers Against Dishonor"]

[Text] Tallinn—As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has adopted a law "On Service by Estonian SSR Inhabitants in the USSR Armed Forces During the Transitional Period." To call a spade a spade, they are proclaiming an amnesty for deserters and draft-dodgers. The legal bankruptcy of this act is obvious. Nor is there any doubt that, while inciting its young countrymen to commit military crimes, the republic's parliament is unable to give them any guarantees. One of the authors of this apology for a law—R. Tamme, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Defense Commission (and who, incidentally, has not spent a single day in the Army)—made the following statement in this regard:

"Every individual should be clearly aware of the personal risk he is running. It's risky serving in the Army at all, but it's also risky to avoid service: You could be subjected to reprisals."

Currently, according to figures from the defense commission, there are 60 young Estonians who, submitting to the politickers' provocative agitation, have deserted from the USSR Armed Forces. What can they expect? Do they all agree to remain on the wrong side of the legal line? Are their mothers prepared to give their blessing to such a fate? I think not. And this confidence is based on specific facts.

I visited Air Defense Unit X. Political worker Colonel A. Mamayev said:

"The process has begun whereby mothers are bringing the runaways back. Recently the mothers of Privates Kunar and Urmas Syuldov, who had left their unit following an appeal from 'Geneva '49,' brought their sons back to the unit. They tearfully asked for them to be severely punished, provided they were not tried. The other day, for instance, Private D. Varanauskas was also returned to his unit by his mother. She saw how the servicemen live, and tearfully recounted how she had been scared of reprisals against her son and, deciding that it was better to be judged than to live in everlasting dishonor, brought him back to the unit."

Unfortunately, it would be too optimistic to believe that such insight will be universal. But how nice it would be to think that all mothers whose hearts are currently suffering because of their sons' fate would help them to reach an honorable and worthy decision in this difficult situation.

Latvian Communist Party Split Examined

PM1804103190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 1

[Report by correspondent K. Markaryan: "Clean Division. No Compromise Reached: Latvia Has Two Communist Parties"]

[Text] At the extraordinary 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress maybe only naive people could have hoped that unity of ranks would be preserved. Admittedly calls from all sides for consolidation were made from the congress rostrum, but in my view neither those making them nor those listening to them really believed them. Although it is no secret that most communists (and there are 176,000 of them in the republic party organization) made their choice a long time ago: Approximately 40,000 of them belong to the People's Front and 60,000 to the Interfront [International Front of Working People of Latvia].

With every hour that it was in session the congress became more and more like a rally. Everybody was impatient to express their view without listening too hard to the opposite side's arguments. And then in the evening of the second day virtually one-third of the congress delegates—among them a former Latvian Communist Party Central Committee ideology secretary, leaders of the republic council of ministers, and many first secretaries of rural party rayon committees—walked out.

No compromise was reached. Most of those who stayed behind rejected the proposals that the one-third of deputies had made. And these were as follows: First, to recognize the party's political objective of achieving Latvia's independence as a state which is to become an international legal entity. Second, to give the Latvian Communist Party the status of an independent social political organization not organizationally subordinate to any other political organization. Third, to abandon the objective of building communism. And finally, to recognize diversity of forms of ownership and develop private ownership of the land and means of production.

"The independence train will be departing 3 May (when the first session of the newly elected republic Supreme Soviet starts work). And the whole question is whether the Latvian Communist Party will be aboard or will be left behind on the platform waving it goodbye," that was how the situation which has developed in the Latvian Communist Party was described by J. Rozenvalds, dean of the Latvian University Faculty of History and Philosophy, who is leading the work to elaborate the program documents for the constituent congress of supporters of an Independent Latvian Communist Party.

The 518 delegates remaining in the hall worked on through the night, deeming the work of the previous Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and Bureau to have been unsatisfactory and electing a new Central Committee and first secretary. He is A. Rubiks, former mayor of Riga and a USSR people's deputy.

A small sensation was also caused by the open letter which Ya. Urbanovich, first secretary of the Latvian Komsomol [Communist Youth League] Central Committee, sent to the new Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretary [as published] from the All-Union Komsomol Congress in Moscow. In it he asked to be released from the duties of a member of the new Central Committee, citing the recent Latvian Komsomol congress decisions envisaging only partnership relations between the republic's Komsomol and party organizations. Another factor was the fact that the elections took place during Urbanovich's absence and without his consent.

Within a few days of one congress ending, another began.

At this congress a second republic communist party, known as the Independent Latvian Communist Party, was founded. The party program and statues were adopted, and its chairman was elected—former Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary I. Kezbers, USSR people's deputy.

"The strategic objective is clear—a sovereign Latvian state," he says. "Our party wishes to be the successor of the party born in 1904. Therefore we will be known during the transitional period as the Independent Latvian Communist Party and in the future as Latvian Social Democracy. Relations with the Latvian Communist Party must be structured in the form of dialogue; without this it is impossible to think about the future of the republic. Despite common historical features, we cannot have an option equivalent to that of Lithuania or Estonia... The process of achieving Latvia's independence will be extremely protracted because we are linked to other republics by thousands of threads. And we have seen that the West is not awaiting us with open arms. In its activity the Independent Latvian Communist Party must not infringe the rights of representatives of other nationalities living in Latvia. We must occupy internationalist positions in order to enjoy authority."

Time will tell what substance there is behind the words of the two parties' leaders. But, for example, the strong-arm decision to close down the "recalcitrant" city weekly RIGAS BALSS (Riga Voice), which is published in Latvian and Russian and has a print run of 150,000 copies, has not enhanced the authority of the party gorkom [city committee]. An extraordinary plenum of the Latvian Union of Journalists described this decision as "antisoviet" since the gorkom disregarded the rights of the newspaper's other proprietor—the city soviet. For a week workers on the evening newspaper were without a job. The conflict has now been settled. The party gorkom intends to publish its own newspaper. And RIGAS BALSS has become the organ of the city soviet and is again getting to its readers.

RSFSR

Moscow City Soviet Holds First Session

Deputies Vow To Solve Problems

LD1704105190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0553 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 17 April (TASS)—TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov reports:

Today is the second day of the work of the first session of Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies of the new convocation. Deputies are today expected to discuss the standing orders of the work of the session and possibly to hear the report of the credentials commission.

Millions of Muscovites are pinning high hopes on the activity of the capital's body of deputies elected for the first time in conditions of an acute preelection campaign on an alternative basis. An excessive load of problems—economic, ecological, and social—has been left by the previous leaders of Moscow. Their solution was for too long postponed indefinitely.

The first day of the work of the session showed that there is not a trace of the previous "complete unanimity": The 400 Muscovites elected are divided into a minimum of four groups. The majority of them are supporters of the "Democratic Russia" bloc; these are followed by members of the "Moscow" group, Fatherland, and the independents. But disregarding these bloc differences, all people's deputies of Moscow Soviet are seriously concerned about problems of the city's multi-million population, although they see their solution in different, sometimes mutually exclusive ways. Yesterday, albeit not without difficulty, the working bodies of the session were formed and its agenda was confirmed.

Members of the presidium of the session, reviewing the results of the first day at a press conference, expressed overall satisfaction at the work that had been done. "So, we have formed the Credentials Commission in one day, while in Leningrad city soviet that took four days," Sergey Stankevich, people's deputy of the USSR and Moscow soviet, said. Professor Ernest Bakirov, chairman of the session's Organizing Committee, stressed that "the whole program planned for today has been fulfilled." At the same time, at the press conference it was noted that deputies still lack experience of "parliamentary work" and many have not settled down after the strain of preelection meetings.

'Heated Debate' Ensues

LD1804100390 Moscow TASS in English 0857 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—By TASS correspondents Lev Aksyonov and Dmitriy Polunin:

The second day of the first session of the new Moscow city soviet passed in heated debate, reminiscent of street meetings.

On Tuesday the deputies planned to discuss the agenda and the working procedure and hear a report by the mandate commission.

However, the second day began inauspiciously: There was no quorum at the conference hall. By the evening the delegates managed only to complete the discussion of the last of items to be included in the agenda of the current session.

It was decided that the session would analyse a wide range of problems, including the formation of new steering committees of the Moscow city soviet, the creation of permanent working commissions and the election of judges for the city court. In addition, the deputies will discuss top-priority social and economic measures to improve the situation in Moscow.

Several more items added to the agenda were approved by the deputies. These include discussing the fate of some 40,000 refugees in Moscow, who fled from regions plagued by recent interethnic conflicts. It was decided to discuss ways to perpetuate the memory of Andrey Sakharov, prominent scientist and citizen and Nobel Peace Prize winner.

During the break between the morning and evening sittings some 200 deputies took part in a sanctioned meeting in the centre of the city, which was organised by the committee in defence of Gdlyan.

The session has accomplished little during the first two days of its work. The deputies' assessments of the session were somewhat critical. Sergey Nikiforov said: "The desire for confrontation is still prevailing over the desire for cooperation." "Many of us have a low level of legal education," Gayk Zulumyan believes. "The impression is that deputies do not want to learn from other people's mistakes, to draw on the experience of sessions of other soviets, including the Supreme Soviet," said Vladimir Gefender. One cannot help agreeing with them.

Reportage on Medvedev's Visit to Leningrad

Meets With Art, Culture Leaders

LD1804125190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The following report is from Leningrad. Comrade Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is here. Today he met leaders of creative unions and cultural and artistic figures. Issues relating to preparations for the 28th Congress of the CPSU were discussed. Vadim Andreyevich is also to visit Leningrad State University and meet leaders of primary party organizations.

Interviewed on Party Retreat

LD1804180290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the party's Central Committee, today met with leaders of creative unions and workers in culture and the arts. Questions of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and of the joint city and oblast Leningrad party conference and questions connected with the letter of the CPSU Central Commitee to the country's communist were discussed. Listen to an interview which Comrade Medevedev gave to our correspondent.

[Begin recording] Vadim Andreyevich, at this meeting the thought was expressed that whereas as recently as a few years ago the party was in the trenches, now the party is retreating. How do you assess the situation which has arisen in the party?

[Medvedev] Just as in the country as a whole, the situation is not a simple one. I would not use such a general formula: that the party is retreating. No. Perhaps there are some sectors where a retreat is in progress, where the party is only delivering defensive fire. As a whole, however, if one takes the country as a whole, it seems to me that the party both is occupying strong positions and is displaying more activity than was the case, say, even a year ago: I mean both the pre-congress debates and the vigorous position which has been taken up in them. I also mean the resolution of some nationwide problems, the perfecting of our political system, and the functioning of the first steps of presidential rule. I also mean the very serious proposals now being prepared on economic problems, on radicalizing and deepening the economic reform.

[Correspondent] You were at Elektrosila and have familiarized yourself with the machinebuilders' views. Various sharp questions were asked. Sharp questions were asked here, too, in the Hermitage by Leningrad's creative workers. What is the opinion you have formed about the state of affairs in the Leningrad party organization? I understand this is perhaps only a preliminary view because further meetings lie ahead.

[Medvedev] It is probably a bit too early to speak about this. I came here precisely for the purpose of familiarizing myself with the sentiments of the Leningraders and of the city's communists, to get a sense of the problems with which they live. The first impression is such that many problems of a socio-political nature have indeed come to a head, which require to be resolved in Leningrad. The conditions for their resolution are not improving and perhaps are becoming even more complicated: I mean the results of the elections to the Leningrad soviet, the first steps of the soviet's work. This is of course the expression of the Leningraders' democratic will. Many additional efforts and unconventional steps will of course be required here for the mechanism of managing the city not to malfunction. That is simply impermissible. It is impossible to imagine and permit that somehow. That is why the entire Leningrad public bears a great responsibility here and I think the communists will realize the responsibility they bear. [end recording]

Discusses Party Problems

LD1804210690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Comrade Medvedev is in Leningrad.

[Correspondent V. Batalov] The second day of Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev's stay began with a meeting at the Hermitage with the leaders of creative unions and the intelligentsia. The guest declined to make a speech and immediately proposed an exchange of views on matters worrying people in Leningrad. In general, the conversation, which was at times pointed and unflattering, dealt with real-life issues. The range of problems raised was fairly wide: the work of the first session of the Leningrad city soviet, the forthcoming constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party, the redistribution of the city's mass media among publishers by an arbitrary decision, the condition of the nation's culture and—probably one of the most painful issues—the situation in the party. The writers, artists, and performers said that even today the Central Committee is maintaining a vow of silence on many problems, leaving people with their anxieties and doubts, or responds too late. The Central Committee's open letter to communists cannot be called timely. Some consider this document as one which promotes a split among communists, not their unification. However pointed the remarks were, this meeting reflected the range of opinions and points of views existing in the party and society. [video shows Leningrad city scenes; Medvedev and participants in meeting; cuts to show Batalov interviewing Medvedev]

[Batalov] Vadim Andreyevich, at this meeting the thought was expressed that even a few years ago the party was in the trenches, but that now the party is retreating. How do you assess the situation which has developed in the party today?

[Medvedev] Well, the situation is complex, just as it is in the country as a whole. I would not use that general expression, that the party is retreating. No. There may be some sectors where it is in retreat or just returning fire, but overall, on a country-wide scale, I feel that the party is occupying firm positions and showing itself to be more active than was the case, say, even a year ago. I mean both the precongress discussion and the active position which has been taken up there; I also mean the resolution of certain problems affecting the whole state, the further improvement of our political system, and the functioning, the first steps, of presidential power; and I also mean the very serious proposals being prepared now on economic problems, on radicalizing and deepening economic reform.

[Batalov] What opinion have you formed on the state of affairs in the Leningrad party organization? I think that it may be just a preliminary opinion, because you still have further meetings ahead of you.

[Medvedev] My first impression is that many sociopolitical problems which require a solution have indeed come to a head in Leningrad; and the conditions for solving them are not improving, and even may be deteriorating. I mean both the results of the elections to the Leningrad soviet and the first steps in the soviet's work. This is, of course, an expression of the democratic will of the people of Leningrad, but of course many extra efforts and nonstandard steps will be required here to avoid breakdowns in the city's administrative mechanism. That is simply impermissable; it cannot be imagined or allowed to happen. Therefore, all the people of Leningrad also bear a great responsibility. I think that the communists are aware of the responsibility resting on them. [video shows Medvedev and Batalov in conversation in foyer]

[Batalov] In the afternoon Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev visited Leningrad University. In the evening there was a meeting at the Smolnyy with the secretaries of party organizations of the city and oblast. [video shows Leningrad facades]

Kaliningrad Rallies Reject Lithuanian Moves

LD2503081190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 24 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Rallies are being held among the workforces of Kaliningrad in support of the decision passed by the extraordinary third Congress of People's Deputies and the Soviet Government's statement on Lithuania. A report from our correspondents:

[Begin correspondent S. Chekalin recording] The Kaliningraders cannot remain unconcerned by the events in Lithuania. Russia's most westerly oblast center is literally welded to its neighbouring republic by a variety of economic and other ties. For instance, the precision mechanics and office equipment plant, where we are at the moment, is affiliated to the Vilnius radio measuring instruments works; Kaliningradrybprom's fishing and transport vessels land their catches and are overhauled in Klaipeda. Hundreds of people from the neighboring republic work at enterprises in those of our towns that are close to Lithuania, and many of them have earned RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] pensions. These people are now vulnerable and worried. Over the years there have been many mixed marriages. Fuel, goods, and produce pass through Lithuania to this, Russia's most westerly area.

Addressing the rallies, people have spoken with anxiety and perplexity about the so-called committee for lesser Lithuania which has been set up under the presidium of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, without any consultation with us. By lesser Lithuania, what is meant is Kaliningrad Oblast. Also, without seeking our agreement, Sajudis publications are plotting how to divide up our oblast in their interests. And maps recently printed in Lithuania show Kaliningrad not as Kaliningrad, nor even Koenigsberg, but as Karaliaucius.

At the rallies held at the Stroydormash and precision mechanics works, at the marine and fishing ports, and on ships at sea, the Kaliningraders are resolutely rejecting the ambitious plans and the claims of certain Sajudis figures, while reaffirming their traditional desire for good-neighborliness and a further development of their multifaceted ties and contacts with the diligent and talented Lithuanian people. [video shows meeting at plant, shots of Kaliningrad port] [end recording]

RSFSR Komsomol Congress Appeal to Citizens

90UN1483B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 p 2

["Appeal to the youth of the republic and all citizens of the RSFSR" from the RSFSR Komsomol congress: "The Komsomol Is for a Russian Renaissance."]

[Text] The Russian Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] is being revitalized not because of some kind of political ambitions. Our Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] league is embarking on a stormy public life for the sake of simple and clear goals.

We shall strive for a situation in which society will provide the opportunity for young people to create their lives by their own hand and be people worthy of marching into the third millennium.

We shall strive for a situation in which our generation will create a happy life for all, not in some distant future, but now.

We shall strive for a situation in which our society stands in line with socialist ideals and principles, not just in words but in fact.

What shall we be defending, and for what shall we be striving?

I. For a Socialist, Politically Stable, Rule-of-Law, and Sovereign Russian Federation. The congress of Komsomol organizations of the Russian Federation decisively advocates the creation of a new RSFSR Constitution. We believe that a revitalized Russian Federation is called upon to do the following:

1. Be a republic of Soviet parliamentary democracy where law rules rather than the self-will of the mob or the bureaucracy.

2. Be an equal in the Union of Soviet Republics and not serve as a "lightning rod" for their dissatisfaction with the work of the central departments.

3. Be the master of its own natural resources and not a nonparticipating witness to their cheap sale.

4. Ensure order and stability and create authoritative state organs answerable to their own citizens and showing enterprise and initiative in the interests of the youth.

5. Guarantee tranquility, peace, and safety for each family by restoring public respect for law enforcement agencies and reviving the honor and prestige of military service and the valor of the Soviet officer.

The congress of RSFSR Komsomol organizations advocates the creation of worthwhile Russian Republic television and radio broadcasting and the publication of Russian youth newspapers and journals, thus providing young people in the republic with real opportunities for expressing their own viewpoints.

We call on Komsomol organizations in the republic to help in revitalizing national and state holy things, and we propose the creation of a civic memorial service to care for them. We support the desire of young people in the republic's cities and villages to restore their original historical names.

The congress deems it necessary to announce a competition to compose a national anthem for the RSFSR and to approve by referendum a flag and state emblem for the republic that would be a source of pride for the people and for the RSFSR.

II. For a Russia That Is Home for All the Peoples Living in It!

Youth has become the "coinage" in interethnic conflicts. We do not wish to be cannon fodder in fratricidal clashes or to be made into fanatics filled with the venom of national enmity!

The congress of RSFSR Komsomol organizations decisively advocates equality, good-neighborliness, and mutual understanding between all citizens regardless of nationality and place of abode.

We demand that the USSR Supreme Soviet, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and the union and republic government create a state-legal mechanism to safeguard the national and human dignity of the representatives of all peoples in our country and in the republics, no matter where they may live or be.

The congress is for the creation of a public foundation to provide help for refugees arriving in the RSFSR.

Each people will feel comfortable in our common Russian home only when its national aspirations are realized.

The congress believes that the national-state structure of the republic and of the entire country has from the beginning contained contradictions leading to inequality among peoples. The reason for this is the different status of the national-territorial and administrative-territorial formations, which also entails different opportunities for the development of the peoples of the RSFSR. The congress of RSFSR Komsomol organizations advocates equalization of the status of union and autonomous republics and all national-territorial and administrative-territorial formations in the country, without changing the current borders. Our congress advocates that all peoples be able to realize their own national interests and needs, using different forms of cultural-national autonomy to this end.

The RSFSR Komsomol will in its practical activity strive for a situation in which, through our organization, young people will be able, according to their capabilities, to realize their own national interests and needs now without waiting for the reform promised from above. And this applies first and foremost to youth of those peoples that do not enjoy their own autonomy on republic territory.

III. For a Life of Dignity and Equal Chances for a Start in Life!

It is an illusion that it will be able to deal with the economic crisis in short order. We regard as demagoguery the political and economic recipes that promise quick prosperity! In all countries society has overcome its difficulties thanks largely to young people and because of young people. The exhausting labor, sweat, and blood of growing young people embarking on their road through life have created the prosperity of societies through the mechanism of the market economy. But even more terrible for us are the bleakness and backwardness of life given the further preservation of the administrative-command economy and the "feudal-socialist" system for the distribution of the good things of life. Understanding this, we shall support only the kind of government socioeconomic policy that enables young people to create through their own conscientious work a materially ensured life for themselves and their families.

The congress believes that only democratic relations in the economic sphere and equality of the labor forms of ownership are capable of destroying the existing system of hidden exploitation of man by man and of the appropriation of the results of others' labor, leveling the "shadow economy" and the general state mismanagement which have all assumed horrifying proportions.

We believe that the state is designed to guarantee for each young person equal chances to become the co-owner of any form of property: to enjoy opportunities to contribute to the initial shares in a cooperative enterprise, to own labor stock in a state enterprise, to become the owner of a peasant farm or the member of a lease collective, and to obtain adequate credit for initial economic activity. The Komsomol proposes that a public-state fund be created to provide financial and material support for young families that express a desire to manage their own peasant farms in the Non-Chernozem Zone and in other parts of the republic.

The congress regards as a condition for the comprehensive development of the individual and for the republic's economic revival an increase in the educational and intellectual level of young people. In this connection we are for the legislative formulation of priority funding for public education programs.

We believe that a young person setting out on an independent life should have a real right to choose the forms and kinds of education he receives, including education abroad. We favor discussion of the question of the possibility of noncompetitive admission to all kinds of educational establishments, with appropriate competition and streamlining as education is acquired. The republic Komsomol organizations will strive for extension of the rights of student and pupil self-management and restoration of the best traditions of the Russian student body and the autonomy of institutions of higher education. They will provide such assistance as they are able for innovative teachers.

The congress of RSFSR Komsomol organizations demands legislative underpinning of and the provision of guarantees for opportunities to work from the age of 14 years, thus giving teenagers a chance to pay for their own leisure spending. The Komsomol regards prohibitions on passports, and even more having to pay for them, as a "modern form of serfdom" and a violation of human rights. We firmly advocate the removal of all administrative restrictions on change of residence, work, or study. As a first step we propose that all restrictions on passports for young people under 21 be abolished, that is, during the period when a young person is trying to find his place in life.

The congress advocates the creation of opportunities to acquire housing for every young person who has settled down in life as a married person. Young people want housing for themselves—to acquire or build it—and not go begging into their old age as they wait on endless lists.

We understand that in the future, as the sphere of market relations expands, each person involved in it should consider the risk of failure equally with the chance of success. We therefore favor state social guarantees that would be reflected in a multistage and developed system of social security. Here, society should guarantee for all citizens a socially acceptable minimum living standard and a system of social assistance.

IV. For a Spiritual and Moral Revival!

A Russian renaissance is inconceivable if the younger generation forgets its historical roots and remains a prisoner to absence of spirituality, moral degradation, and general bitterness. Young people must have opportunities for free labor and creativity, ensuring normal human standards in life. Young people need a revival of natural human values—kindness, tolerance, charity, mutual respect, and love. The congress calls on Komsomol organizations to strive for a situation in which the young person will in his union with them see the practical embodiment of these moral values and will bring them into society.

We assess at its worth the role of those religious associations that promote a revival of spirituality.

Overcoming the moral crisis will help in overcoming the economic crisis. We shall therefore strive for a situation in which the state prevents the general commercialization and decline of culture. Insofar as they are able, the Komsomol organizations will support new outgrowths in all spheres of culture and will promote and defend young talents.

One of our goals is to restore in young people the prestige of harmonious family life. Through school, the mass media, and legal and public initiatives we shall strive for actions by all of society to develop the ability and desire to live in love and in emotional and sexual harmony.

What can we all together give each one of us?

A Komsomol member in our republic cannot have interests that are at variance with the interests of society and of youth. We want society to be receptive to the aspirations of the younger generation and for youth to understand and accept common interests. We want the great slogans of socialism on the well-being of the individual to become reality, when the individual is not suppressed by society but can freely realize his own capabilities without infringing on others.

The congress confirms that the RSFSR Komsomol is open to young people of all nationalities. Our league is open to students and workers, peasants and employees, rural and urban intellectuals, members of cooperatives and students, scientists and servicemen. Different people from different professions have the right to expect the following from their league:

—protection of their civic and economic rights and national dignity;

—help in preparing for and entering into the management of the affairs of society, region, or labor or training collective;

—promotion and support for their own nomination in elections to the organs of state power and public self-management;

—support for their proposals and opinions on topical issues relating to the development of society and for their critical assessments of and protests against any manifestations of injustice;

—being offered opportunities in the Komsomol mass media clearly to state their own positions on worrisome problems;

—help in adapting to their first labor or educational collective, or a new collective, and tactful attention to their personal problems;

—the creation of conditions for realization of labor and social initiatives and to acquire up-to-date economic knowledge and to use to this end the Komsomol cooperatives, cost-accounting and innovative enterprises, student detachments, and centers for youth scientific and technical creativity;

—help in dealings with their contemporaries both in the USSR and abroad, and in their own discovery of the world;

—help in gaining free access to the national-cultural heritage and in the search for a proper understanding of the historical truth about the past;

—support in their enthusiasms, making available for this purpose the cultural and sports base of the Komsomol;

—joint search for answers to the eternal questions about love and the meaning of life.

Who we are and with whom do we move along the path?

The Komsomol is a youth league that bases its activity on a modern understanding of communist ideals as humanitarian and common human values, and also of the national-state interests of the motherland.

The Komsomol organizations lay no claim to expressing the interests of all young people but only of those young people who do not want to vegetate in poverty and dependence, be unequal and oppressed, forget their own national and historical roots, who want with their own hands to try to make their lives those of worthy working people, and who therefore help and support their own youth league.

We are trying to engage in dialogue and to cooperate with other organizations that take nothing on faith, critically evaluating their activity as we do. Therefore our move to cooperate with existing public organizations, movements and parties, and with those being created, will depend not only on their program but primarily on their specific actions.

The RSFSR Komsomol organizations now advocate the creation of a Russian Communist Party as an integral part of the CPSU. We are for a political alliance with the Communist Party. But we shall not express our support unconditionally. Komsomol members want to be participants not only in the implementation of policy but also in policy decisionmaking. Only then will we be prepared to share responsibility, rather than taking the political blows for others' mistakes. We shall not show solidarity with dogmatists, careerists, or time-serving elements within the party. The task of renewal and democratization in the party can be solved only if there is an inflow of young people and progressive forces into it.

The congress of RSFSR Komsomol organizations advocates political nonconfrontation in the development of the children's movement in the republic and in the USSR. We support renewal of the All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin on the principles of democracy and humanism. The congress appeals to all political forces in the country: "Give our children the opportunity to have a childhood and to learn to live in a human way without involving them in the political and nationalist ambitions of adults!"

The congress states that the RSFSR Komsomol organizations will do the following:

—support those who are fighting to protect the environment and save Baykal and the small Russian rivers and the historical national and cultural things of value to the peoples and the state;

—establish contacts and develop links with the progressive youth among Russian emigres;

—consider its natural allies any trade unions, movements, or associations of workers that act in the interests of young workers, peasants, employees, and intellectuals;

—propose cooperation with young believers in the name of common human ideals, charity, peacemaking, and moral health.

The congress of RSFSR Komsomol organizations expresses its solidarity with those who are being discriminated against because of national affiliation or because they belong to an ethnic minority or those who are subjected to persecution because of humanitarian convictions.

For Renewal of Our Great Motherland—the RSFSR!

The Future Already Belongs to the Young People. We Are for Having a Present!

For a Pure Sky for Russia, For Its Clean Rivers and Living Forests!

For Agreement Among the People of Labor!

For Love, Happiness, and Peace!

Secretary Stroyev Airs Issues at Orel Meetings

LD1804151490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1300 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The consolidation of forces around the platform and new draft charter of the CPSU, an extensive use of a range of systems in the agrarian sector, and the necessity for a radical social transformation in rural areas were among the issus raised at meetings between inhabitants of Orel Oblast and Stroyev, secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and people's deputy of the USSR.

Those taking part in the meetings expressed their support for the party's policy, and basically approved the platform and draft charter of the CPSU.

Comrade Stroyev attended a gathering of the party aktiv of the oblast, met his electors, answered their numerous questions, and held receptions for the citizens.

Concern Expressed Over Civil Defense Exercise

LD1804151290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The news flew round Moscow in just a few minutes: an explosion at a gas pump! An ammonia leak! An accident at a chemical works! These alternatives could be heard from people living in Khoroshevo and

Kuntsevo, who saw the staff of one of the food shops starting to put on gas masks.

Nashkhunov, the head of the Civil Defense headquarters of Khoroshevo, explained that the food products (?rayon trade organization) held a civil defense exercise within the organization. In the message containing the introductory task and sent to the ill-starred shop, they either forgot to dictate the word pretend, or the person who took it misheard the oral message; but the staff, presuming that the chlorine leak at the Rublevskiy water station that they were told of on the phone was a real one, quickly put on their gas masks, which panicked the customers. After that they started to take urgent measures to save their lives and their childrens' health. Police patrol cars appeared on the streets which got people even more excited.

The exercise showed that first, even a small mistake in a text can easily create panic. Second, the speed with which rumors spread round Moscow is several dozen times faster than the speed at which any gases spread. Third, the shop workers have absolutely no idea of how to protect themselves properly from gas, since gas masks give no protection from chlorine.

Western Republics

Democratic Platform Supporters Meet in Minsk

LD1704164390 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 0515 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] The adherents of the democratic platform from among Belorussian communists convened a republican conference in Minsk on 25 March. Nearly 200 delegates and as many guests gathered in the hall.

The conference elected a coordinating committee whose task will be to explain to all communists of Belorussia the essence of the democratic platform and have meetings with officials of the Minsk party obkom [oblast committee] and gorkom [city committee]. The conference adopted a number of resolutions.

How the events are going to develop, time will show. What is needed now are responsibility, tolerance, and patience. All depends on where the alternative platform will lead to—to dialogue or confrontation.

Belorussian Party Plenum Information Deplored

PM1504164190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Again a Barrier to Glasnost"]

[Text] Minsk—Minsk journalists and central newspapers' own correspondents are perplexed: Why were none of them invited to the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee plenum?

The plenum considered M. Kovalev's application to be released from the post of chairman of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers in connection with his retirement on pension. V. Kebich, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic State Planning Committee, was recommended for this post. By decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium V. Kebich was appointed chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

V. Kebich's appointment to such a responsible post has been greeted with satisfaction in Belorussia. He is known as an enterprising leader and organizer noted for his boldness in adopting decisions. Moreover, Vyacheslav Frantsevich is very democratic. And this, you will agree, is extremely important in our time. In short, V. Kebich has found his niche, as the saying goes.

It is a question of something else. The very brief information report on the plenum published in the local press states that V. Kebich was recommended for this post as the result of a secret, multiple-choice ballot. But not a word about the alternative candidates. Who were they? How did the discussion go? Was there any discussion at all? For the report does not even state who addressed the plenum. It merely says that it was opened by Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee.

Therefore many people in Minsk, particularly journalists, are asking the question: Is this really such a secret—the discussion of the candidacy for the post of chairman of the republic Council of Ministers?

Moldavian Deputies Debate Present, Historic Issues

LD1704193890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] The Moldavian and Lithuanian parliaments held sessions on 16 April. The deputies who assembled in Kishinev discussed the laws on citizenship, the republic's sovereignty, and guarantees for the rights of ethnic groups. It was proposed at the session that commissions of deputies be set up to prepare a new Constitution and conduct additional study of the circumstances connected with the implementation of the Soviet-German accords of 1939-41.

Lvov Communists Manifest a 'Lack of Faith'

LD1804213890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As we have already reported, a complex sociopolitical situation has recently developed in Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol Oblasts in the Ukraine. Here is what Vladimir Lyashko, our correspondent in Lvov, has sent us today:

[Lyashko] The session of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies resumed work today after the Easter holidays. People are following it here on the square, which has been equipped with a radio link, and local television is carrying a live relay. [video shows small groups of people standing outside a building, some holding blue-and-yellow Ukrainian flags; TV clips of session]

The first decisions and the political appeal adopted by the deputies have prompted varying reactions. A statement by the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers of the republic, published today, says, in particular, that certain political forces, having secured a majority in the elections to local soviets in some cities and rayons, have begun to openly implement their amibitious intentions; speculation on people's national and religious feelings has intensified; disrespect for the constitutions of the USSR, the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, and for Soviet laws is gaining a hold. The deputies of the oblast soviet have expressed their categorical disagreement with the assessment of their activity provided in that statement.

A new sociopolitical situation, in which we have not yet had occasion to live, has developed in Lvov now. Communist deputies are in a minority in many soviets. Confusion and a lack of faith in their own strength have appeared among some communists in the oblast party organization itself. The departure of communists from the party has intensified. Some of them, trying to gain the trust of the leaders of the Democratic Bloc, are moving to antiparty stances. This was stated directly at the oblast party committee plenum held last Saturday, which elected a new leader of the oblast party organization.

Yesterday, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Sekretaryuk, first secretary of the oblast party committee, met the communists of the Lvov railway. In his first public speech, he stated he will do everything to unite the healthy forces of the oblast party organization and enhance the party's respect and authority among people, and will seek ways of constructively cooperating with the new soviets, while dealing a resolute rebuff here to attacks on the party and attempts to destabilize the situation in the oblast. [video shows newspaper pages carrying the Ukraine authorities' statement; more shots of Lvov soviet session and flag-holding onlookers]

Ukrainian Party-Government Statement on Nationalism

LD1704171790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Certain political forces in Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol Oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] have recently begun openly carrying out their ambitious intentions, having ensured that they have the majority in certain towns and rayons at the local authorities' elections. In this connection, the Ukrainian Communist Party [CP] Central Committee, and the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR made a statement.

It notes that an unbridled nationalist propaganda campaign is being conducted under slogans proclaiming the rebirth of the sense of national identity. The so-called idea of Galician [West Ukraine] autonomy is being imposed upon the region's population. Active calls for secession of the Ukraine from the USSR, and for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state are being heard. The conflict between the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox believers is being stirred up deliberately. A large and broad-scale campaign of discrediting the Communist Party is being launched. Psychological pressure on communists is being stepped up: They are being threatened with dismissal from work, and coerced to leave the CPSU. Practical steps are being taken to remove party and Komsomol organizations from enterprises, offices, and educational establishments. Reliance is being placed on taking charge of the mass information media.

Young people are becoming actively involved in unlawful and nationalist activities. Leaders of the Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], the Ukrainian Helsiniki Union, the Union of the Independent Ukrainian Youth, and other politicized groups are calling on them to struggle for a free Ukraine, to refuse to serve in the Soviet Army, and are even trying to recruit volunteers to ethnic military formations.

All these processes, the statement stresses, are becoming dangerous in nature, for they are often being directed and organized by the newly created organs of power. People's deputies are taking direct part in them. Even the first decisions, the practical steps taken by the organs of power, particularly in Lvov, in the towns of Chervonograd and Stryy in Lvov Oblast, in Ivano-Frabkovsk, and in Ternopol, testify to their destructive and separatist essence.

Measures are being worked out to block and sabotage the implementation of government directives and decisions. The symbols and the state attributes are being changed. In their letters and addresses to the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, labor collectives, war and labor veterans, and the working people are condemning the newly emerged fighters for the future of the nation, and are demanding that urgent measures be adopted to ensure law and order, to strengthen legality, and to protect their rights, dignity, and honor.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the republic's Council of Ministers assure the working people of the Western region of the republic that decisive measures will be taken so that the USSR Constitution, the Ukrainian SSR Constitution, and Soviet laws are being strictly fulfilled.

Ukrainian, Belorussian Election Results Reported

90UN1312B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Articles by IZVESTIYA special correspondents S. Tsikora and M. Shimanskiy on election results in the Ukraine and Belorussia, respectively: "Results of the Elections in the Republics"]

[Text] **The Ukraine**

The newly constituted Ukrainian parliament is ready for work. At its regular meeting, the central election commission confirmed: 442 deputies were elected as a result of two rounds of voting for the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], which ensures a quorum for creating legislation.

Who made it to the new convocation of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, and whom did the voters prefer? The most realistic strength in parliament is held by the party workers, after this come the informals, and then the executives and representatives of soviet organs.

The handling of the election campaign and its results for the candidates from the workers and the collective farmers should be recognized as unsuccessful. Of the workers, 26 persons were elected, which constitutes 5.9 percent of the total number of people's deputies, and of the collective farmers, 26 persons were also elected, but 24 of them were chairmen of kolkhozes [collective farms].

An abrupt improvement occurred in the quality of the staff of deputies of the Kiev city soviet. According to calculations, at a minimum, half of the seats here now belong to representatives of "Rukh," the association of the "greens," and to other new public organizations.

Belorussia

Preliminary results have been conducted in the runoff elections for people's deputies to the Belorussian SSR. This is what M. Lagir, chairman of the central election commission, told me about them.

"On 17-18 March, voting took place in 190 electoral districts. It showed that, first, the activity of our voters dropped somewhat, although it is still quite high: On Saturday and Sunday, 77 percent of the voters cast their ballots. This is almost 10 percent less than on 4 March."

The makeup of the new parliament of Belorussia is not absolutely clear yet. At present, approximately 280 of the 360 seat holders are known.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Appeal for Civil Order

90UN1268A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
20 Feb 90 p 1

[Appeal to the citizens of Ukrainia from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet adopted at 12th Session of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet on 17 February 1990]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] appeals to the mind and heart of each one of you to evaluate the present moment responsibly.

The Soviet Ukraine, as is our entire multinational country, is living through a difficult phase of revolutionary transformations. These are occurring with difficulty, and they are encountering obstacles. Problems and contradictions that have accumulated over the years have come to the surface. In addition, new difficulties have arisen: Discipline has fallen; shortages have increased; and crime, the shadow economy, and instability in society are growing.

Various kinds of shady dealers and national careerists take advantage of such a situation. Starting rumors and slander, they try to discredit the socialist choice and Soviet authority, incite the workers to imprudent acts, and bring chaos and discord to society.

All of this gives rise to anxiety and legitimate alarm among the workers of the republic.

Many letters from worker collectives and the population come to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, to state and party organs, and to the mass media, which express anxiety that the activation of destructive forces in the republic can lead to civil confrontation.

Sharing this alarm, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet appeals to the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and to each inhabitant of the Ukraine, irrespective of age or national and social affiliation, to display civic maturity in this critical time of perestroyka, not to be deceived by loud slogans, and not to submit to provocations.

We call on you to firmly rebuff extremism, nationalism, separatism, and chauvinism, and to strengthen the unity of the peoples of all nationalities.

Each person who is not indifferent to the fate of the Ukrainian people should fully realize that it is not isolation but real sovereignty and economic independence of the republic within the structure of a renewed Soviet federation that will ensure a turning point in the Ukraine's socioeconomic development and a normal human life.

Our tomorrow will depend on how we will be able to bring order into our common home. This can be done only on the basis of socialist renewal, consolidation, discipline, and prudent actions.

For its part, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is applying measures to stabilize the situation in the republic and to perfect legislation designed to regulate social relations as applied to the tasks of perestroyka and to the assurance of the constitutional freedoms and rights of citizens.

For the purpose of removing tensions in society, the Supreme Soviet of the republic steadfastly demands that the government of the republic ensures the unconditional fulfillment of plans for the production of food products and consumer goods, and in this year to improve their supply to the population and to efficiently resolve the most critical ecological problems, and in the near term to submit for Supreme Soviet review a concept for the republic's transition to economic independence.

The Supreme Soviet believes that, exercising their constitutional powers, the local soviets of people's deputies will increase their demands on law enforcement organs, will ensure strict adherence to Soviet laws in each populated area and the irreversibility of punishment for crimes and violations of law and order, and will come out resolutely for the protection of the safety of citizens, as it should be in a rule-of-law state.

We, the deputies of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet to accelerate the adoption of decisions on questions of the renewal of the Soviet federation, to qualify the sovereignty of the union republics with real substance, and to settle interethnic relations.

We hope that the highest organ of state authority of the country will use all its prestige and power to stabilize the situation in society and to bring order to the country, and that it will adopt all measures to protect the life, honor, and dignity of each Soviet individual.

Dear comrades! On 4 March you will elect a new structure of republic organs of state authority. We believe that you will make your personal choice judiciously and seriously, and that you will elect to the soviets at all echelons people who are honest, competent, industrious, dedicated to the interests of the people, and open in their intentions and actions. In doing this, you will set up a reliable barrier to destructive forces.

We are mobilizing our knowledge and will to establish a humane democratic society and to ensure the socioeconomic development of our native Ukraine.

Ukraine Oblasts Appoint New Officials

LD1604165990

[Editorial Report] Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian at 1745 GMT on 10 April broadcasts a three-minute report on the election of oblast soviet chairmen. The report states that the following have been elected:

Kharchenko, first secretary of the Zaporozhye party obkom, has been elected chairman of the oblast soviet, and Demyanov as chairman of the oblast executive committee;

Yakovina, a painter, has been elected chairman of the Ivano- Frankovsk oblast soviet, and Zakharuk as chairman of the oblast executive committee;

Zalepa has been elected chairman of the Kirovograd oblast soviet.

Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian at 1745 GMT on 12 April broadcasts a five-minute report on organizational questions which were discussed at various oblast soviets in the Ukraine.

In Donetsk, Yu. Smurnov, formerly chairman of the oblispolkom (oblast soviet executive committee), was elected chairman of the oblast soviet; Shcheludchenko was elected chairman of the oblast executive committee.

In Kiev, Plyushch was elected chairman of the Kiev oblast soviet; prior to this he worked as chairman of the oblispolkom. Senko was elected chairman of the oblast executive committee; he was formerly deputy chairman of the oblispolkom.

In Lutsk, Blazhenchuk, second secretary of the Volynian party obkom, was elected chairman of the Volynian oblast soviet; and Parasunko was elected chairman of the oblast executive committee; he occupied this post in the previous oblast soviet.

The following is taken from RADYANSKA UKRAINA for 6 April.

In Crimea: M. Bagrov, presently first secretary of the Crimean party obkom, was elected chairman of the oblast soviet; and V. Kurashik, as chairman of the oblast executive committee.

In Rovno: P. Prishchepa, presently first secretary of the party obkom, was elected chairman of the oblast soviet.

In Chernovtsy: Ye. Dmitriyev, presently first secretary of the party obkom, was elected chairman of the oblast soviet.

Kiev City Council Session Begins

LD0504210590 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Excerpt] The first session of the newly elected city council has started. Its agenda includes formation of the city's governing organs. The main pretenders for the post of mayor are Anatoliy Korniyenko, first secretary of the Kiev party gorkom [city party committee], and Oleksandr Mosiyuk, scientist at one of Kiev's research institutes.

Best chances to become chairman of the executive committee of the Kiev city soviet lie with Ivan Saliy, first secretary of the Podol party raykom [rayon party committee] in Kiev, Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy. Before the session opened, he had a conversation with our correspondent. Here is a recorded portion of it.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Ivan Mykolayevych, you were nominated for the post of chairman of the executive committee by the city soviet's democratic bloc, the overwhelming majority of which represent Rukh, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and others. Does it mean that now you are closer to these organizations than to the CPSU?

[Saliy] Not at all. Above all, I am a communist. I remain a member of the communist party of the Ukraine. Both communists and members of the democratic bloc know well my position, namely that our party should renew itself more actively and, mainly, refreshen its cadres. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Four Rayon Party Chiefs in Kharkov City Resign

PM1804104390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report from Kharkov by IZVESTIYA correspondent Anatoliy Kleva under "Direct Line" rubric: "Resignations From Party Rayon Committees"]

[Text] The Kharkov city party organization has come up against an unusual situation: The first secretaries of four of the nine rayon party committees have resigned under various pretexts.

And so four more first secretaries have declared their readiness "to depart." The party oblast committee plenum which was held a few days ago revealed that confusion reigns also at oblast level. Seeing no prospects in party work, a number of functionaries have started looking for other jobs.

New Kharkov Leader Stresses Economic Work

LD1804121990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] At the session of the Kharkov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies:

It was only on the seventh day of work that (Yuriy Ivanovich Tsytov), a former senior scientist at the Kharkov Physical Technical Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, was elected chairman of the soviet. In a conversation with our correspondent, he said: I see my paramount task as being to do urgent work on our gravely neglected economy and to work out a program for it to make a gradual transition to the market. I do not rule out local party bodies being able to participate in its management at the first stage, while the economy is not self-regulating.

Restrictions on Entering Sevastopol Eased

90UN1329A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 27 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent S. Sadoshenko: "The City Is Open"]

[Text] Sevastopol—**As we know, it is not so easy to get to Sevastopol: A special permit is needed.**

Why the city was closed at one time is an interesting question. It was even explained to me at one time that it did not happen because the command element of the Black Sea Fleet is located there and the bays are full of warships and submarines—such details are well-known to the entire world. It is allegedly a question of the city's own problems, which are much easier to solve in a "closed" city than in one that is open. So they covered up the city's holes with the prohibitions of a border zone.

The times are changing and the checkpoints on the roads—clever cab drivers will freely take you around to see them for a certain fee—already look like an anachronism. And on 26 March they finally decided to "crack open the door." The Directorate of Internal Affairs of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] has decided to allow entry to the city without registration for a permit to all who have a Crimean permit and to those veterans of the Great Patriotic War who participated in the defense and liberation of Sevastopol.

We are grateful even for that.

Further on 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Accident

Anniversary Marked

LD1704125290 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Only a few days now separate us from 26 April, the black date in the calendar of the Ukrainian people. The Ukraine SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet presidium has issued a decree to mark it as the day of the Chernobyl tragedy. In six Ukrainian oblasts, 32 rayons were affected by radiation in varying degrees. Even today up to 60,000 people live in zones of so-called rigid control. [passage omitted]

Victims Given Housing

PM1804095590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Morning Edition p2

[Report by Sergey Tsikora under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA's Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "The Time for Exhortations Has Passed"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian Government has penalized those people who have jeopardized the fulfillment of the timetable for resettling people from the area of radioactive contamination resulting from the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station].

Only his assurances that housing constructed by Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Ministry of Construction contract organizations will be commissioned without fail by 15 September this year saved G. Gordeychuk, first deputy minister, from immediate dismissal at a Council of Ministers sitting. He has "gotten away" until the fall with a strict reprimand from the Ukrainian

SSR Council of Ministers Presidium. N. Stepanenko, deputy chairman of Kiev Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee], has been given a strict reprimand for failing to take timely steps to fulfill government resolutions. Many ministers and department and oblispolkom leaders received uncomplimentary evaluations of their activity.

Contrary to the government target, Volyn, Kiev, Odessa, and Sumy Oblispolkoms [oblasg soviet executive committees] reserved housing for resettling families from Polesskoye and Narodichi rayon centers in houses commissioned in the second rather than the first half of 1990 as instructed. Despite the acute need to speed up the resettlement of people, Zhitomir Oblispolkom has not issued citizens with a single posting, while Kiev Oblispolkom has issued only two.

A government decision instructed oblispolkoms to reserve an additional 800 apartments in blocks commissioned in the second and third quarters of this year for the resettlement of families with underage children and pregnant women from Polesskoye and Narodichi Rayon centers. In the first half of this year Kiev Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] is reserving 400 apartments constructed on the orders of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs for this purpose.

Scientist Comments on Pollution

LD0504220290 Moscow TASS in English 1514 GMT 5 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev April 5 TASS—The use of the Dnieper River still needs to be restricted as a result of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident, Nikolay Kuzmenko, head of the department for the fresh-water radioecology of the Institute of Hydrobiology of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences, told TASS.

He explained that this point of view is accounted for by "complex radiological that developed in the catchment area of the largest Ukrainian river and the Kiev water reservoir" following the accident at Chernobyl.

The Dnieper catchment area is 509,000 square kilometers and includes territories in the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Russian Federation.

Radiation has been added to such chronic blights as "water-bloom and chemical pollution." Particularly intensive pollution has affected ground and water ecosystems within the 30-kilometre zone around the Chernobyl plant.

The zone includes the lower reaches of the Pripyat River which flows into the Dnieper and the upper part of the Kiev water reservoir.

The main radionuclides that formed the radioecological situation have a long half-life: 29 years for Strontium-90 and 30 years for Caesium-137. Of all the nuclides that got into the water reservoir, more than 90 per cent settled in bottom-set deposits.

"It would be wrong to expect a substantial improvement of the radioecological situation in the Kiev water reservoir in the coming years," the scientist emphasised.

"Last year, for example, saw a tendency towards an increase in the radionuclide content of its waters. This is accounted for by the fact that radioactive impurities in the catchment area became more mobile."

Kuzmenko considers it necessary to elabroate and implement a comprehensive inter-republican programme which would combine the research and technical potential of the three republics in the fight for the pure waters of the Dnieper.

Caucasus

Transcaucasus Situation Remains 'Tense'

LD1804192190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1745 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Good evening, comrades. First of all, the situation here in the Transcaucasian region, as before, remains tense. Skirmishes continue in the border rayons of Armenia and Azebaijan and other extremist sorties are also being carried out. At the same time, the bodies of power of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the law enforcement bodies are taking certain measures to stabilize the situation.

Thus, on 13 April, representatives of the Ministry of Railways, with the participation of soviet bodies, of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Procuracy, carried out a test departure on the (?Magrinskiy) section of the railway with the aim of testing its state of readiness for the resumption of train traffic.

On 15 April, by decrees of the Supreme Soviet Presidiums of both republics, to normalize the situation, a provisional special regime zone, 5 km deep on both sides of the two republics, has been created in individual adjacent areas along the Azerbaijan and Armenia administrative border. Nevertheless, I reiterate: The situation in the region remains tense.

Recent Events in Georgia Viewed

PM3003130390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by TASS special correspondent V. Dzhibuti: "Situation in Georgia"]

[Text] Tbilisi-Moscow—On 9 March the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet admitted that "the introduction of Soviet Russia's troops into Georgia in February 1921 and the occupying of its entire territory was, from the legal viewpoint, military interference (intervention) and occupation with a view to overthrowing the existing political system; and from the political viewpoint it was annexation." The republic's Supreme Soviet "declared illegal and void the 21 May 1921 union worker and peasant treaty between the Georgian SSR and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the 12 March 1922 union treaty on the formation of the federative Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the Transcaucasus."

The session also decided "to begin talks on the restoration of an independent Georgian state since the 30 December 1922 treaty on the formation of the USSR is illegal with regard to Georgia."

After this Supreme Soviet resolution a new spiral of political activeness began in the republic. On 13 March a conference of all Georgia's opposition forces opened.

"Views immediately divided," Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Deputy N. Mgaloblishvili, told a TASS correspondent, commenting on the course of the conference, in which he took part. "And that was entirely explicable since the conference was attended by representatives of dozens of parties, unions, and societies. Some believed that the elections should be boycotted, others that it was essential to take an active part in them and create a Supreme Soviet which would express the opinion of the majority of the Georgian people. Others said it was necessary to defer the elections for a while until all existing parties have been registered so that the new parliament should be a multiparty one. I personally believe that elections in the republic are so far unacceptable. I have always struggled for the Georgian parliament being an independent and multiparty parliament—that is how I see democracy."

It was suggested at the conference that a new coalition opposition government be elected. But this is simply unrealistic right now. The majority of those taking part in the conference agreed.

Corrupt elements have also markedly galvanized their activity on the wave of democratization.

At the end of three days of discussion, the conference elaborated a resolution announcing a boycott of the elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet. A decision was also taken on the withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces units from the republic's territory and on an end to the drafting of young Georgians into Soviet Army subunits and units. A demand was also made to the Georgian Communist Youth League that it announce its self-dissolution.

The conference elected a national forum which has become the coordinating organ of the Georgian national movement.

It should be noted that the following question was also debated: How to withdraw from the USSR? Some people suggested deeming all Soviet structures illegal, extending the further destabilization of the situation, and creating their own government. Others suggested seeking Georgia's independence by parliamentary means.

As defense for their positions, the former also cite the following argument: "Our government will not be linked with the USSR by any treaties, and the Union will therefore be unable to demand any compensation from the republic."

Late on the evening of 20 March one more extraordinary session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet was held. It decided to switch the elections to October-November (until all existing parties have been registered), extending the powers of the present deputies correspondingly. The session also adopted a law on changing Articles 6,7, and 49 of the Constitution. What happened then? The opposition was not content with this. Today the national forum is already asserting that the parliament now in operation is also illegal.

A tense situation is taking shape in the republic. Acts of vandalism against monuments to V.I. Lenin are continuing. According to the official reports of the Georgian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], this has been noted in Samtredia, Kutaisi, Gori, Zugdidi, Poti, Batumi, and Kobuleti.

Here is an example taken from the MVD summaries: "On 19 March this year at 1700 hours, 200 representatives of informal associations arrived in Chokhatauri settlement from Ozurgeti with the intention of removing the monument to V.I. Lenin on Peace Street. Twelve rayon internal affairs department employees were brought in to halt criminal actions. Despite the militia's resistance, with the aid of a crane truck the mob removed the monument from its pedestal..."

On 25 March in the republic's capital the informal associations again attempted to remove a monument to V.I. Lenin on Tbilisi's Central Square.

The press center of the republic Communist Party Central Committee has distributed a report on the meeting between the republic's leaders and the leadership of the KGB, the prosecutor's office, the MVD, and the Ministry of Justice. It says that a definite power vacuum has formed.

The republic's Communist Party has also found itself in a complex situation today. It must be recognized, the participants in the 22 March Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum said, that the party is lagging behind political events.

In this complex situation the televised appeal to the republic's people by G. Gumbaridze, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, had a timely ring.

Urging the republic's inhabitants to conciliation and consensus, G. Gumbaridze stressed that this complex stage which the republic is living through requires a high degree of responsibility from every person. Claims to a monopoly on truth, patriotism, political position, and public opinion are inadmissible here.

Central Asia

New Ministers Appointed in Kazakhstan

LD1804170190 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1400 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] By decree of the Presidium of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, Tolebek Abdikhadir-ogly Abdikhadirov is appointed minister of finance of the Kazakh SSR.

By decree of the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, Zavde Dzhusuf-kizi Kadirova is appointed minister of social security of the Kazakh SSR.

The Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet released Abdrakhimova from her duties as minister of social security of the Kazakh SSR at her own request, in connection with her election as a Kazakh SSR people's deputy.

The Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet released Batsula from his duties as minister of finance of the Kazakh SSR, in connection with his retirement on pension.

Tajik Ministry Official Surrenders Party Card

LD1804165990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The special commission for uncovering the participants in and organizers of the mass disorders which led to dozens of casualties, is continuing its work in Tajikistan. (Khabibov), the former chief of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs Political Department, had to part with his party card. In the decision of the primary party organization, approved by a plenum of the Dushanbe City Party Committee, it is stated:

For infringement of the demands of the decree of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium on the declaration of a state of emergency and the introduction of a curfew on the territory of the capital of Tajikistan during the tragic February days and for political immaturity and insincerity, (Khabibov), by order of the republic's minister of internal affairs, was earlier released from the post he occupied.

As was reported in the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs, more than 100 criminal cases have been begun in relation to the events of 12-14 February. The majority to date are ordinary participants in pogroms who acted while stupified by drugs and drink. The investigations have facts at their disposal on the presence of certain groups which, for the sake of their own political ambitions, incited sections of the young people to commit illegal acts.

Reported Shootings Trouble Uzbek Citizens

PM1804154290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15, 15 Apr 90 p 5

[Timur Pulatov dispatch: "An Order To Shoot in Parkent"]

[Text] Tashkent—Who gave this order? Why? After the tragedy which occurred on March 3 in Parkent, Uzbekistan, these questions continue to trouble the republic, generating rumours and speculations. People even say: "The Russians again, Moscow again."

Although passions didn't run as high as after the events in Tbilisi, the events almost provoked outspoken debate at the session of the Uzbek SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet which ended recently. Despite vigorous interference on the part of the parliament's chairman, Deputy A. Khadzhimatov of Parkent managed to shout out these bitter words: "Who brought interior troops into Parkent? Who gave the order to fire on unarmed people? What crimes had they committed?" He explained that he had received no persuasive reply to his inquiry from the republic's minister of internal affairs.

So what happened in Parkent? Before answering this question, let us recall the February events in another small town, Buke, near Tashkent, from which Meskhetian Turks were evacuated after the massacre. Some of them—about 600—were given temporary accommodation at the Kumushkan tourist camp in the mountains, 20 km from Parkent.

The refugees came down to Parkent, selling and buying at the bazaar, sitting for hours in the tea houses and relating their troubles. And no one from the local population of 85,000, among whom the Turks had never before lived, ever offended them.

True, it happened that at Tashkent bazaars the sellers of raisins from Parkent were criticized for being too kind to the Meskhetian refugees. It also happened that Parkent students were pestered about this by provocateurs from Tashkent high schools.

The elders of neighbourhood communities used to come to the district authorities to discuss matters. But the latter dismissed it as worthless gossip. I. Salimov, first secretary of the district party committee, almost conceded and ordered the elders to be brought together at the city soviet a day before the tragic events, but did not attend the meeting himself, sending the militia chief, Ts. Saipov, instead. The esteemed elders failed to have a heart-to-heart talk with the formidable "keeper of law and order". They merely learned that the authorities were strongly opposed to "extremists" and "drug addicts" and would take steps if the latter staged riots at the rally on the following day.

What kind of extremists? What sort of a rally was this? No organization or public group in Parkent had asked the authorities for permission to hold a rally; no preparations had been made. Alarm began spreading from door to door. People recalled that a week ago leaflets had been distributed, calling them on behalf of the Berlika unofficial organization to a meeting at the building of the district party committee at 11 a.m. on March 3. But no one attached any significance to this. After all, there were no home-grown Berlika people in the locality.

Running ahead of events, let me say that towards evening on March 3, when the blood of killed and wounded people had not yet dried on the streets of Parkent, representatives of Berlika and its splinter faction, Erk, started hurriedly arriving here from Tashkent. In an attempt to calm the population they pounded each other with "ideological attacks" whereupon the Parkent people demanded that they should leave the city and, if they wanted to, carry on the polemic at home, in Tashkent—a very important detail for our story....

On the morning of the same day, March 3, the unusual sight of militia units and Interior Ministry troops moving into the city centre alarmed the elders I. Abdullayev and U. Yakubov, as well as the imam of the Moslem mosque, A. Mamadzhanov. They hastened to Salimov to find out the reason for these "military preparations." But as always the first secretary was unapproachable. Having advised the elders not to interfere, he took a seat at the window to watch the movement of troops and equipment. The district party committee building is set on a hill and offered a good view of the maneuvers taking place in the city.

A formidable armoured carrier turned round and came to a halt at the side of the hill, near the gates of a clothes factory where women workers were hurriedly arriving for the day's shift. The Parkent people had brought their children to the kindergarten and were already assembling in groups on the other side of a little square. They stared in bewilderment at the soldiers and militiamen lined up in formation in front of the district party committee's building.

The chairman of the city soviet, S. Tuichiyev, the secretary of the district party committee, Kh. Irmatov, and the chairman of the district executive committee, E. Ruzimatov were unable to explain either to one another or to the people gathering near the entrances: Who had summoned "alien" militiamen and soldiers to Parkent? This question had not been discussed either at the district party committee or at the city soviet. Nor did the "city fathers" know that the troops had been brought in on the night of March 3 and stationed in the hostel of the local military school.

In the meantime tension was growing in the narrow square set between the hill beyond the district party committee's building and the Say River. Wasn't it possible to order the soldiers away and so avoid a conflict? The deputy chief of the Tashkent region's department of internal affairs, Volkov replied: "Do you want another Ferghana?" This was witnessed by the vice-chairman of the executive committee, A. Eshmatov.

At this time a lieutenant colonel, whose name could not be identified, shouted into a mike "Disperse! I give you three minutes," and started counting: "One, two, three," whereupon he commanded: "Forward!"

The militia and soldiers rushed on the crowd with rubber batons indiscriminately striking the heads and backs of both old and young. This happened at 10:35, that is 25 minutes before the allegedly planned rally. The crowd scattered in all directions, mostly running towards the steep banks of the Say River, not knowing where to find cover, some people grabbing stones as they went. Only a few stones were hurled at the soldiers and already shots were fired in reply. The first people hit by bullets fell onto the ground. Blood was shed and no one heeded the voice of reason any longer, both sides—the crowd and the troops—were moved by blind fury. From the air an army helicopter was throwing smoke bombs into the crowd.

I don't want to describe in detail what happened on that day in the streets of Parkent. People were herded along by the troops, beaten with sticks and fired upon with submachine guns. Old folks sitting peacefully in a tea house were driven away, there was shooting near the mosque, at which a funeral service was being held. Soldiers broke into the bakery and brutally beat up baker Chumayev for allegedly hiding "extremists." Doctor M. Khamidov, 27, the father of young children, was killed by a submachine-gun burst near his home, one kilometre from the district party committee, where events had started. In several places bullets blasted away the iron bars of the fence against which the doctor collapsed. Why was Khamidov killed? He was not in the crowd near the district party committee's building, having been at the funeral repast for his cousin, who had died the day before.

Four killed and 70 wounded, many of them severely—this was the result of a "combat operation" against an unarmed population.

Of course I cannot justify the Parkent inhabitants who smashed windows in the district party committee with boulders (for some reason the window from which I. Salimov observed the battle operation remained intact: Was it bullet-proof?), and wounded militiamen and soldiers. Nor can they be justified for setting fire to the militia office, to which the furious crowd came with the demand: Let us see the lieutenant colonel who ordered the shooting.

And yet I am sure nothing like this would have occurred had the military operation in Parkent not been prepared in advance, kept secret from both the local authorities and the local population. The curious little crowd of

50-60 who received the first strike at the building of the district party committee attracted others and numbers quickly swelled. According to general estimates, some five or six thousand people gathered to wreak vengeance for the killing of innocent fellow-citizens. No one knows how the confrontation would have ended were it not for the chairman of the republic's council of ministers, M. Mirkasymov, who came to Parkent and ordered hostages to be released—they had been seized, guilty and innocent alike, and placed in custody. He also accepted E. Ruzimatov's arguments that the crowd would calm down only if the soldiers and militia were withdrawn from the city.

True, even Mirkasymov was reluctant to answer the question: "Who ordered troops to be brought into Parkent?"

The troops and militia left, but inasmuch as the authorities in Parkent were paralyzed from the very beginning of the dramatic events, a citywide rally elected a public committee with the chairman of the district EC, E.L Ruzimatov, at its head. This would be in charge of social and economic measures and maintain law and order. The committee includes physicians, teachers, lawyers, workers, students and journalists.

The last time I was to Parkent was on March 25—the nationwide Remembrance Day. For nearly three weeks public order squads were operating in the town. During all this time there were no thefts of state or personal property, no brawls or hooliganism, although prior to March 3 the crime situation in Parkent was as complicated as in the rest of the republic. Food kiosks are strictly guarded. And warehouses with hoarded goods in short supply have been sealed until "circumstances have been clarified." It's unusual to walk around the city and see no militia and military people. But this, one should presume, is a temporary phenomenon. Not for nothing do people say that it's unwise to oppose the "militia in general." Those workers who are guiltless must go back to work, primarily the traffic cops.

We have coined an expression: the "Parkent syndrome", that is, horror of people in uniform. One can understand what Parkent citizens, who experienced the March events, feel when they pass by a concrete structure—the town's Board of Honour—riddled with bullets. They see bullet traces on the trunks of nut trees in bud, on the gates of houses, on the walls of factories and schools. And although Remembrance Day passes in meditation over fast-flowing time and external questions, in almost silent prayers, one can sense the suppressed grief of those whose children, brothers or fathers were killed or maimed. Outrage has been done upon the Parkent people's honest intentions and their faith in change, in democracy, in the protection of civil rights and liberty.

After all, the tragedy occurred against the background of growing tensions in the republic, with decrees and resolutions banning meetings and rallies becoming increasingly tough. There is a transparent desire to see everyone attending a meeting or rally as an "extremist", a "drug addict" or "corrupted person." It is dangerous to believe in the fantasy according to which all disorders and ethnic strife must necessarily begin with false provocative rumours, the circulation of leaflets with exhortations and threats, then meetings with spontaneous incendiary speeches invariably ending up in mass pogroms.

But what about the events in Parkent which do not fit into this scheme—there was no rally and no exhortation by unknown bodies, but still there were shots and provoked murders? Who provoked them, who brought in the troops? Who gave the order to fire on unarmed people? And why? Wasn't it done out of a desire to bully the whole of the republic—so that its citizens should become meek and mild again, so that sham tranquility and order should prevail?

These questions need to be answered without delay, everyone in the republic is angry. Witness public initiatives, collective letters of protest to central and local publications reluctant to tell the whole truth, and this is not all. The latest news is that three leading members of Berlika have left their party membership cards at the main entrance to the building of the CP Uzbekistan Central Committee.